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The thesis considers the dialectic of
"institution" (the Catholic Church) and "ideology"
(the Church's teaching on justice and peace), and the
response by the American Catholic Bishops to foreign
policy issues (Vietnam and Latin America) involving them
in this dialectic, as leaders in the institution and as
those principally responsible for preaching the gospel
of justice and peace.
The first section traces the evolution of
the structure of ecclesiastical government, in which
episcopal authority was subordinate to the papal primacy,
and its domestication of the prophetic-millenarjpian challenge
(social and religious reform) in the interests of preserving
the structure and the political power of the papacy (Chapter 1).
The aggiornamento of Vatican II has heralded a change in
structure - episcopal collegiality - and the establishment
of social prophecy as the Church's mission in the world,
but this calls in question the present character of the
institution and its forms of authority.
The second section considers themes from
American catholic Church history which exemplify the tension -
the reconciliation of the Church with the American way of
life (chapter 1), the constricting influence of hierarchical
autocracy on social criticism (Chapter 2), the formation of
structures for episcopal collegiality and for the work of
justice and peace (Chapter 3), the prophet of social
criticism within the institution (Chapter 4).
The third section considers the response
of the American bishops to the war in Vietnam-— from support
of government policy (Chapter 1), to an attitude of
questioning, under the influence of Vatican II (Chapter 2),
but without lasting effect on the tradition of acquiescence
(Chapter 3). The only episcopal debate on the war at
last establishes it as a moral issue and a collegial
resolution is passed calling for its ending, as a moral .
imperative (chapter 4). The number of individual episcopal
voices critical of the government's policy increases, but
the most powerful voice is "diplomatically" silent(Chapter 5).
The fourth section considers the response
of the U.S. bishops to the situation of the church in Latin
America. The initial formation of collegial structures
is directed to the institutional interests of the church
in Latin America and in opposition to the danger of Communism
(Chapterl). The movements of social change and revolution
in the countries of Latin America and the experience of
Vatican/
Vatican II's aggiornamento provide the background to
Medellin, 1968, at which the Latin American bishops
commit themselves to a mission of prophetic social
criticism. The initial response of the U.S. bishops
is evasive and lacking in awareness of a responsibility
for the promotion of justice and peace (Chapter 2).
The fifth section records the response
to the Vietnam War in one diocese of the United States,
by the diocesan priests' senate and a non-territorial
parish. Here we see the consequence of accommodating
the Church to the demands of social acceptance - the voice
of criticism emerges only from within an experience of
the inadequacy of present institutional forms.
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This thesis attempts to relate theology and international
2
relations , in the specific context of the American Catholic
bishops' response to the events of the Vietnam War and the
contemporary political situation of Latin America. The
general warranty for such an endeavour, and the source of my
synthesis in what follows, is to be found in the writings of
pioneer social scientists like Max Weber and Ernst Troeltsch,
the contemporary works I have found relevant, and in the
writings of socially and politically conscious theologians like
Reinhold Niebuhr, Paul Tillich, Johannes B. Metz, Gustavo
Gutierrez. This by now well established tradition of trying
to address social and political issues from a theological
3
perspective , and placing theology in a social and political
context, has been given authoritative impulse within the Roman
Catholic Church by Vatican Council II (in particular its
'Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World' -
Gaudium et Spes and its aftermath, which is considered at
various points throughout the thesis.
In turn, the events in Vietnam and Latin America have
impinged on the American Catholic bishops who took part in
Vatican II, and who now live in its shadow and within a society
which resonates with the consequences of American foreign policy
in those countries. The "response" by the bishops to these
experiences is characterized by the common "reaction" of
Americans to their nation's foreign policy (whatever the form
that reaction may take, from indifference to protest), but
involves the extra dimension of "responsibility" in consequence
of their position as religious leaders to preach the Christian
gospel of love, peace and human community (a gospel given depth
and specific applications to life in society in the documents
of Vatican II). The twofold character of their response is
considered here.
In order to make sense of that response (which is described
in Sections III and IV) I place it in an ecclesiastical context
of a general (Section i) and a specific nature (Section II),
which tries to come to terms with the Catholic and American
traditions in which they have been formed as American Catholics
and as Catholic bishops (at Vatican II the supra-national
character and responsibilities of this latter category were
given authoritative expression^). Finally (Section V), .1
attempt to form some 'Conclusions' from this material, by
utilizing a particular local example of the American Catholic
contemporary experience with which I am familiar, in the diocese
of Louisville, Kentucky, as a take-off point for a consideration
of theology in relation to international politics in the light
of the preceding sections.
Since my own upbringing is Catholic and my education
eclectic, I will use here both the language of theology and that
5of the social sciences . No pretence of a 'wertfre.ij social
science will be made, nor an unwillingness to recognise the
presence of conscience and moral judgment in any human enterprise.
Confidence in making such value judgments has been enhanced by my
reading of respected exponents of the social sciences , but the 11
most significant factor has been the whole process through which
I have been formed myself by Vatican II theology, my courss of
study and itinerant-life experience in the past five years,
almost equally divided between periods of time in Britain and
in the United States. In the Latin American section such a
process will be described as "conscientizacion" (conscientizacao
in the original analysis of Paulo Freire) - this thesis is the
product of my experience of conscientizacion.
As such, it exemplifies the inevitable limitations of time,
opportunities, intellectual capacities, range of experiences
While I enjoyed the advantage of doing research at the head¬
quarters of the 'United States Catholic Conference' (the central
institutional agency of the American Catholic bishops) in
Washington, D.C. it was necessary to do so discretely , known
only to a limited range of staff people there. My views and
impressions, therefore, reflect those of the 'Divisions' in
which I did the research, and the people with whom I was able to
talk and who provided me with the research opportunity. As far
as possible I have relied on written evidence, since I had
neither the opportunity nor the resources to undertake a more
personal approach, and since the accessibility of such evidence
has enabled me to deal with the Vietnam and Latin America issues
as comprehensively as possible within my limitations, without having
to undertake the impossible task of solliciting information from
bishops themselves. The drudgery of going through boxes and
drawers of files (classified and unclassified) is the ultimately
rewarding price to pay for the opportunity, however limited, of
discovering many details of information which would not
otherwise be available and which are often unknown or forgotten
by the people involved (in this case, the American bishops).
Within each section I shall try to include the ideas and
method of consideration appropriate to that section as a
supplement to these initial remarks. This study is intended
to be a mosaic, hopefully bringing clarity through the success¬
ive stages, leading to a comprehensive panorama. The notes,
which I include in a separate binding, are intended to serve
this same purpose of mosaic comprehensiveness. I do not
pretend to have covered all the possible points of discussion:
but I attempt to deal comprehensively with those I consider to
be the most significant.
Without the hospitality, advice, and help of many people,
this study would not have been possible. To all of them I
am deeply grateful. Consciousness of the study's limitations
cannot detract from the value of the materia prima which I have
had the opportunity to consider, and I owe that opportunity to
their friendship and assistance.
SECTION ONE
SECTION I r
THE CENTRALIZATION OF CHURCH
GOVERNMENT AND THE AGGIORNAMENTO
OF VATICAN II
PROLEGOMENON
"In general, it would Le true to say that the hierarchy,
as the guardian of the integrity of the institution and
also, therefore^ of its relations with the social system,
reacts more strongly than the rest of the Church against
social change. And this opposition is all the more
accentuated when the relationship between the religious
institution and civil society is one of reciprocal
uarantees. In this case, those in charge of the
ecclesiastical institution are not in a position to take
a stand of critical opposition to the existing regime
except on the level of secondary norms, whereas they must
be fundamentally opposed to the introduction of a new
regime."
"The Catholic Church has possessed its own distinctive
body of political philosophy for many centuries. It is
a philosophy which, whatever other objections may be
raised against it, is innocent of one charge. It does not
possess the characteristic economic and political conception
lying at the base of Western liberalism
Secondly, the Roman Catholic Church has never been whole-
2
heartedly sympathetic to the European nation-state.
Finally, the Roman Catholic Church has never made peace,
so to speak, with capitalism. It always maintained a
critical position toward capitalism's amoral stance on
economic justice. It always identified itself - at
least on a doctrinal level - with the cause of the
M2poor."
"Religious forces, and religious forces alone, have had
sufficient influence to ensure practical realisation for
3
political ideas."
The tensions which these quotations describe run through all
that comes to our attention in this study. In Section II I
deal with what I consider to be relevant themes from American
Catholic Church history which exemplify these tensions,
particularly as they relate to the bishops. In Sections III
and IV the case-studies I have chosen (Vietnam and Latin America)
provide specific examples of the operation of these tensions.
In the final Section whatever 'Conclusions' one can draw from
all this accumulated evidence revert to the same debate. There¬
fore, in this Section I I try to situate the debate in its
original theological-social-political perspective. This is a
very limited venture, since the bulk of the thesis must rest in
Sections II, III, IV, but in this first section I have found
important insights into the problems raised in these later
sections.
3
The summary description I choose to give this debate is that it
is a form of dialectic between "ideology" and "institution". By
"ideolcqiy" I mean the superstructure of values and beliefs which
determine the character and purpose of a social entity (in this
case "the Church"), by which it defines itself, its relationship
4
to other social entities, and its "mission" or social project .
In the case of the Church, "ideology" is based on the original
Christian kerygma ("preaching") preserved in the New Testament
and promulgated by the Church through the agency of its official
spokesmen and its members (a division arises in the corresponding
"authority" claimed and accepted in the case of "spokesmen" and
the general membership - the Roman Catholic Church emphasizing the
authority of the bishops, with the pope as their head: the
Churches of the Reformation giving more room to others, while
retaining the concept of "ministry", involving the primary
responsibility of the "ministers" for the preaching of the word.)
The "ideology" which is our principal concern in this study,
and which is described in the- second set of quotations above as
a "body of political philosophy", has traditionally been called
"Catholic social doctrine", particularly as this has been given
focus and evolution in the "Social Encyclicals" and in Vatican II's
'Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World'. This
tradition of Catholic social teaching, incorporated in a series
of documents from Rerum Novarum (1891 ), Quadragesimo Anno (1931),
Mater et Magistra (1961), Pacem in Terris (1963), Gaudium et Spes
(1965), Populorum Progressio (1967), to Octogesima Adveniens (1971)
and the Synod of Bishops''Justice in the World' (1971), is the
4
source of reference for this "ideology" throughout the sections
of the thesis. In Section IV we shall see this "ideology" given
more particular focus for its application to Latin America, while
in Chapter IV of Section II I describe the contribution of the
American ecclesiastic who did more than anyone else to promulgate
this "ideology", within the American Catholic Church and as an
instrument of general social reform.
Since this is an evolving "tradition", its specific content
becomes manifest in relation to particular situations and historical
environments. The second set of quotations above point to its
tendency to oppose dominant political and economic structures. This
"tradition", this "ideology", is a "theology" - a form of discourse
based on a relationship of faith with God, who reveals himself to
man in thecommunity of faith called the Church. Although this
"theology", speaks to the issues of "community" and "power", which
are the issues of politics^, the tendency to stick to the more
institutional and abstract analyses of these issues, as distinct
from the operational has been a major lacuna and has led to social
conservatism and political acquiescence.^ However, the existence
of that corpus of social doctrine (the "tradition", the "ideology")
remains to challenge theco mpromises and betrayals of the original
7
"gospel", even to the extent of initiating a new form of politics.
It is these latter two phenomena which we shall consider in
this section - the "institutional" and the "millenarian" impulses
in the Church. The establishment of ecclesiastical government
6
which filled the vacuum left by the collapse of the Western
1 2
Roman Empire . The prophetic role to which the Latin American
bishops committed themselves and their Church at Medellin in
1968 is the most outstanding example of the social and political
expression of that aggiornamento to which Pope John and Vatican
II committed the Catholic Church.
Here we shall consider the dialectic between the centrali¬
zation of church government as the institutionalization of the
"Kingdom" and the millenarian challenge, as this has been ex¬
pressed in the aggiornamento of Vatican II in the attempt to
reconcile the institutional and prophetic elements of the Church.
This synthesis of Vatican II is ambiguous both in its origin and
in its character: without the centralization of ecclesiastical
authority in the papacy the aggiornamento could not have become
the official ecclesiastical programme; the "institutional"
Church and the "prophetic" Church seem to be irreconcilable and
yet indispensable elements of the one religious reality:
"Every enduring human enterprise must exist in
institutional structures, and the enterprise of
1 3
the Christian community is no exception."
"The church must conceive itself as prophetic not
political. Acting prophetically it will express
values related to the political dimension, but
it will not be playing politics The church has
14
to show its function is not that of social control."
.1'
In this historical consideration my attention is directed
to those historical memories in the consciousness of the Church
which have continued to affect the Church's contemporary
experience. I look upon Vatican II as an experience of these
memories and as an experience of a shift in the Church's histor¬
ical consciousness of those memories. This consideration of
history concentrates on the "institutional" formation of
ecclesiastical government at four crisis points - Middle Ages,
conciliar movement, Trent, Vatican II. The "prophetic",
"millenarian", challenge is expressed in the shift from a
"premillenarian" (Martin Marty's distinction, note 7) to a
"postmillenarian" influence on the "institutional" order of the
Church. Prom the "prophetic" being institutionalized (e.g. the
undae monasticae I refer to in Chapter l) or failing to overcome
the integrist direction of papal monarchy (John Hus, Peter Waldo;
conciliar movement); the "institution" is confronted with the
problem of incorporating the prophetic dimensions of the
Christian gospel, in the structure of authority ("collegiality",
"co-responsibility") and in its mission as "the pilgrim people
of God", by the aggiornamento of Vatican II. Although this
issue has not been resolved, indeed I would consider it impossible
of resolution (in line with the view of international relations
as the domain also of the tragic and the unresolvable problems)
I think this framework is, at the least, an important structure
of historical memories to support the various strands of
1 5
consideration presented in the following sections . . .
CHAPTER I
A. PAPAL
"Medieval thought in general
part with the conceptions of
8
MONARCHY
was saturated in every
the Christian faith." ^
"In the Middle Ages politics was a branch of theology,
with whatever admixture derived from Aristotle and
2
Civil Law. Its basis was theocratic."
"Medieval politics, in fact, are a philosophy of
universal right, and that, in its turn, is a theory
of ethics, which is a part of theology. Men,
accordingly, may not transgress it, since they dare
not transgress the will of God. It is thus the
ultimate criterion by which all human action must be
3
judged."
In the "Corpus Christianum", the "Societas Christiana" of
medieval Europe Church and Society were coterminous. The
Europe founded by Charlemagne, who considered himself the
"vicarius Christi", entrusted with the ordering of the
4
society of Christians, had inherited the religio-political
character of the Roman Empire and the Church was its founda¬
tion. The struggle between Pope and Emperor was for religio-
political supremacy in "Christendom" - "the Kingdom"'had been
institutionalized in conventional political form. While the
most powerful emperors aspired to the Carolingian suzerainty,
the popes claimed supremacy in this all-embracing Christendom
9
and looked on the emperor as the papacy's anointed protector.
Even the millenatian impulse became part of this struggle
for institutional supremacy. As this impulse was expressed in
the undae monasticae which have continuously broken over the
Church^, it was coopted by the Salian emperors (Otto I, II, III)
as a reforming instrument in their rescue of the papacy from
the control of the Roman aristocracy ('Les Tribulations du
Siege Apostolique')^ and in the imposition of their own control,
which attained its symbolic expression at Sutri (1046) when
Henry III deposed one pope, Gregory VI, and controlled the
election of,his successors. The same Cluniac reform
produced Gregory VIII (1073-85), who strove to assert the free¬
dom of the papacy from imperial control and the subordination
7
of the emperor to the position of "protector".
Church government and the conception of ecclesiastical
authority was given its monarchical form in this struggle, in
which a distinction between 'political' and 'spiritual' authority
was impossible . Not until the re-discovery of the Greek
philosophers in the 13th century and Marsilius of Padua in the
14th century was there possible a theory of society and polity
9
which was not theological and hierocratic . The expression of
this hierocracy was the work of the Canon Law. This combination
of theology and Roman law became in the middle ages the dominat¬
ing influence in political thought and practice, and, has
1 0
continued its control of ecclesiastical government ever since
Although this has been expressed overwhelmingly in a centraliz¬
ing direction under papal domination, the Canon Law contains
10
other precedents and concepts (as we see in the next chapter)
favourable to the collegiality emerging once more at Vatican
II.
Canon Law gave a juridical character to politics in the
Middle Ages because it defined the terms of political debate
11
and the practical issues to be resolved . This was exemplified
in the controversy over investiture, resolved in favour of the
papacy by the Concordat of Worms (September, 1122) and the
1st Lateran Council (March, 1123). Although this resolution
was not final, as the long history of Gallicanism has shown,
with its variations like the "Real Patronado" in Latin America,
Canon Law continued to control political consciousness and any
challenge to papal or imperial hegemony found in it the only
source of legitimation. Its all-pervasiveness reached even
the movements of religious reform, which became "Orders"
(Ordo Sancti Benedicti, Ordo Fratrum Minorum, Ordo Praedicatorum),
approved by the papal sovereign of the Corpus Christianum and
serving as an important pillar of support for the papacy in
its political disputes with princes and prelates.
The inspiration of Francis and Dominic was dynamic, but
the previous monastic conception of stabilitas loci continued
to prevail influencing a static view of the world, with
renunciation and social pessimism influencing people's
attitudes.
"Like the cultural life in general, the devotional
1 2
life of this period bore a monastic allure."
The monastic institutionalizing of Christian millenarism is
the classic medieval expression of that fuga mundi, which the
original Christian monks and hermits had expressed by with¬
drawing from a corrupt world to the desert, but which had to
adopt changed forms in a world ostensibly Christian in its
structures and institutions. The monastery had moved from
the periphery to the centre of the world, but it was ill-
equipped for any work of social reconstruction and reform.
Like the "premillenarian", "revivalist", "evangelical",
party in American Protestantism, its concern was individual
regeneration in view of the Judgment - "Kingdom" at hand.
In the medieval feudal society the monastery and its view
1 3of eschatology-millenarism was a pillar of the social order
Where the lay political power was strong, the monastic
sacerdotium supported that power and prevented the break-up
of imperial domains into hereditory fiefdoms, as had happened
to Charlemagne's empire, since church property could be made
dependent more easily than others on the central political
1 4
authority . This made it vulnerable to the corresponding
process:
/
"L'Evangile est, plus on moins, mais parfois
expressement, pris en charge par le pouvoir
terrestre comme un moyen efficace de g#l{verner,
de moraliser une politique, d'idealiser un regime.."
For the papacy, the sacerdotium was the means at hand by which
a sufficiently autonomous pope (free of imperial domination)
could exercise his authority throughout Christendom at the
expense of the lay "protectors" when these were unwilling to
accept the role marked out for them and submit to the papal
16
yoke. This required a central control of the sacerdotium,
in which the priests' role and functions were juridically
defined as flowing from the apex of the ecclesiastical
hierarchy, and the removal of lay appointment of the clergy.
While the Canon Law could take care of the juridical formulae,
lay power took care to prevent the practical application. This
was more easily accomplished in the case of the non-monastic
parochial clergy who often depended for their benefice on the
local lay authority. It was more difficult to control papal po¬
wer over the monastic orders whose independence of lay control
could be overcome only by dissolution or the confiscation of
their property.
The papal effort to control the sacerdotium in the Middle
Ages was expressed in the formation of the corporate body of
cardinals as the pope's inner council, and in the establishment
of the papal curia as the central papal civil service, which
took place in the period from Gregory VII to Innocent III
(1198-1216). The edifice of hierocratic medieval government
built on the foundations of Canon Law and sacerdotium depended,
however, on a unique combination of religious prestige,
expressing itself in an exercise of political power in a
society which respected its authority, and an absence- of
alternative sources of power able to usurp this prestige with
their own resources. It also depended on the character and
capabilities of the individuals occupying Peter's chair.
Less than a century after Innocent III the medieval papacy
came to its nemesis with Boniface VIII (1294-1303), who
combined the most explicit and most universal statement of
papal sovereignty in the Bull 'Unam Sanetarn' with an inability
to sustain papal political power in the face of lay opposition.
In the break-up of medieval Europe those forces which had
wor.ed against the centralization of authority in the papacy
17asserted themselves with increasing success . For the
sacerdotium this was expressed in the Conciliar Movement.
B. THE CONCILIAR MOVEMENT
The central historical point of reference is the resolution
of the Great Schism (1378-1417) and. the first half of the 15th
century, the so-called "conciliar period". The Schism had followed
-J
the period of the Avignon Papacy (1309-1378) . The long process by
which Europe broke up into a congeries of separate states and
principalities could only lead to a weakening of the power and
prestige of the central agency representing the unity of Christendom.
This was helped by the pretensions of Boniface VIII and the debacle
at Anagni (1303); the disputes among the cardinals, expressed in
the eleven-month conclave to elect Bertrand de Got as Clement V
(June 5, 1305) after the short pontificate of Benedict XI.the in¬
ability of the papacy to escape the embrace of the factional
2
struggles of late medieval Christendom . This process found"its
logical conclusion in the compromised election of Urban VI
(April 8, 1378) and the subsequent election of Clement VII
(September 20, 1378) as a rival pope.
The Schism was resolved only under the auspices of the Council
of Constance (1414-1417) and it is that fact which must always be
taken into consideration in any discussion of church government.
" the deposition of the three Popes of the Schism
and the validity of the election of Martin V - hence also
the legitimacy of his successors - rested on the authority
3
of the Council of Constance."
The decree 'Sacrosancta' (5 April 1415), in which it was
declared that everyone, even the pope, owed obedience to a Council,
which derived its authority immediately from Christ, represents the
historical antithesis of Boniface VIII's Unam Sanetarn and the
constitutional counterpoint to the establishment of papal monarchy
4
represented by Gregory VII and Innocent III . Later popes were
to declare that Constance was a legitimate ecumenical council
(they could hardly do otherwise and not compromise their own
legitimacy), excepting its 'conciliarism' as expressed in'Sacrosancta'
but this cannot remove the historical fact of 'Sacrosancta' and its
companion decree 'Frequens', which called for frequent councils and
thus would have established them as a guaranteed constitutional
reality in the life of the Church.
The conciliarist position had a tradition in the canonical
5
writings just as venerable as the tradition of papal supremacy ,
since the concept of the Church as the Corpus Christi^ involved both
the idea of a visible head - a central sign of unity (represented by
the papacy), and the corporate body of the faithful - congregatio
7
fidelium - which likewise demanded some visible expression in
g
keeping with the spirit of the age . The resolution of the Schism
by the 'via concilii' did not spring from some new source of
ecclesiastical life. The General Council was recognized as the
ultimate court of appeal in the Church, whether for questions of
9
orthodoxy or papal legitimacy .
Two aspects of the conciliar controversy and its historical
unfolding are of interest here - the relationship of the controversy
to general politics (not just the specific ecclesiastical question
16
of the relationship between Pope and Council); the question of the
representation of the Church at a General Council. The conciliarists
manoevred to overcome the agreement of interests between a monarch¬
ical papacy and a civil order of monarchies. A form of "the balance
of power" was necessary, since the three parties could be distinguished.
The fact that Basle dragged on for almost twenty years (1431-1449) was
due in no small measure to the existence of separate interests. John
of Segovia's speech at the Diet of Mainz (1441) expressed both the
conciliarist case and the attempt to reconcile this with civil politi¬
cal interests. The conciliar sovereignty which he supported was
declared to be confined to the Church as a religious body and not a
10
general political principle . This was necessary to allay the
suspicions of the civil rulers and to ward off the attempts by the
papal partisans to point to the revolutionary implications of the
11
attack on papal sovereignty . But the argument stood on weak
ground - not only the fact that the tradition went against any attempt
to confine the debate to the purely ecclesiastical sphere, but also
1 2
the general acceptance of a common political theology .. Neverthe¬
less, the Baslean conciliarists were emphatic in distinguishing
ecclesiastical and secular constitutions, and insisting on divine
revelation as the explicit foundation of the former. In the form¬
ulations of Cracow University, they were willing to support a
monarchical form of government for the Church considered as a
"political body" - a series of individuals under a single president:
but, as a "mystical body governed by Christ" - the Church as a whole,
"that is, in a general council", the pope was held to be subject to
13
the authority of the Church as a whole - the universitas .
Such a distinction would have been impossible in earlier
centuries, when the 'corpus politicum'was the 'corpus mysticum' and
vice-versa. The conciliarists of Basle were expressing the change
of consciousness from those times which the changing political
circumstances and the influence of the new learning was bringing
14
about at the very core of the medieval juridical theology . This
theology was losing its unique hold as the universal ideology in
favour of a multiplicity of "professional ideologues", an emerging
class of courtiers who began to replace the canonists and whose
oratory became the art form of new political ideas and the develop-
1 5
ing art of diplomacy . The conciliarists failed to avoid the
consequence of the convergence of interest between the papacy
1 6
and the lay 'dynasties ,
Thus, a new twist was given to the changing relationship
between "theology" and "politics", and an element which would
continue to exercise an important influence in policy was the
emerging policy of "concordats", by which the papacy strove to
bargain with the secular powers in order to gain advantage - in this
case to remove the conciliarist challenge. In the changed
situation of diminishing papal hegemony, this policy became
necessary to maintain papal influence and prestige. But a price
had to be paid, involving an increase of secular power in national
church affairs (principal symbol of this was the Pragmatic Sanction
of Bourges of 1439) and a confusion of religious concerns and the
17
political.ambitions of the papacy in Italy
The historical record of the councils of the conciliar period
expresses the ambivalence of the idea of "representation".
18
The political potentates would like to have exercised that role; as
would the Cardinals who had provoked the Schism and who would have
formed an ecclesiastical oligarchy; the more concerned bishops;
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the doctors and masters of Basle ..However, the fundamental elan
which the Conciliar Movement expressed, away from a concentration
of ecclesiastical authority in the monarchical papacy to a scheme
which better represented the Church as a collectivity, a 'communio',
is more important than the difficulties experienced in determining
what group within the 'communio' should represent the 'Church-in
Council'. It was this fact of the conciliar period which ex¬
pressed an anti-dynastic impulse at the centre of ecclesiastical
authority, validated as we have seen by the theologico-juridical
system itself, and established the "collegial" concept of the Church
as an historical memory of relevance to the resolution of issues of
1 9
church government and policy
Although the conciliar movement was overcome by a re-assertion
of papal monarchy, especially at Trent, it has ranained the
principal historical precedent- for a re-establishment of the more
ancient form of ecclesiastical government, some form of episcopal
collegiality, which could express better the unity of the Church as
a communion of local "ecclesiolae" bound together in the one
"Ecclesia" presided over by the chief bishop, the successor of
20
Peter, as the centre of that communion . The spirit of the
conciliar movement had incorporated the opposition to papal
authoritarian irresponsibility, which in turn reflected the innate
21
Christian opposition to tyranny in all its forms . The identifica¬
tion between the cause of reform and this movement, which Luther
was to seize upon has persisted in spite of the resolution of Trent
in favour of papal monarchy, so that in a new age, when once more
the excesses of the latter had discredited ecclesiastical government
and the mission of the Church, this spirit resulted in the unexpected
resolution of Vatican II.
C. THE COUNCIL OP TRENT
The Protestant Reformation was an attempt to remedy the def ic-
iencies of church teaching, morals and government, which had reached
their nadih under the auspices of the Renaissance papacy. It was
an event whose consequences continue to be decisive for the whole
Christian Church. The response to the Protestant challenge as it
•j
took shape in the Council of Trent (1545-1565) coloured the
image and self-understanding of the Roman Catholic Church at least
until Vatican II (in this perspective Vatican I is a council of
the Tridentine era). The break up of the unified organization of
the Church reached its second stage with the decisive end of
Western Christendom and the establishment of a "Europe des Patri€S".
The demands of the reformers, to some of which the Catholic Church
responded in Vatican II, challenged the legitimacy of the forms of
church teaching and government which had evolved from the medieval
period, so decisively that "the Protestant principle" has become a
common.inheritance of Western Christianity and an essential element
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of European civilization .
At the level of church government, the Reformation was one answer
to the situation of the Renaissance papacy, which devoted more
attention to the cultivation of art and classical culture, and in¬
ternal Italian politics, than to the conditions of religious living
in the Church. The papacy had once more become the preserve of
Italian family concerns (Colonna, Orsini, Farnese, della Rovere)
and later arrivals (the Borgia of Spanish origin; the Medici of
Florence). The concerns of such family pontiffs were directed more
to the promotion of their family ambitions and the military defence
of the papal states than to causes associated with the New Testament
(in this regard Alexander VI and Julius II were but the most notable
promoters of a tradition which continued throughout this period.)
In spite of periodic calls for reform, "in head and members",
of the Church, nothing changed, and the intended reform decrees of
the fifth Lateran Council of 1517 became the classic dead letter
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of the age . On.ce in the chair of Peter a typical Renaissance
pope was jealous of his prerogatives and anxious to use his position
and powers of patronage to outrival any fellow Italian potentate in
style of living and conventional prestige. Avignon and the Great
Schism were but a distant memory of more uncomfortable times; the
re-established post-Basle papacy was back in the seat of command,
and from Rome it could strive to determine the course of political
events in the peninsula, -while aspiring to make use of its tradition¬
al position of power and prestige in the rest of the continent.
However, the successors of Gregory VII and Innocent III were
in no position to attempt a serious challenge for real European
hegemony and confined their practical political ambitions to their
immediate neighbourhood on the Italian mainland. A Gregory or an
Innocent advanced claims to what was in practice a universal
political sovereignty, but their claims at least were based on
genuine religious and theological ambitions and ideas ( the unity
of Christendom, their responsibility for the promotion of the moral
teaching of the Gospel and the religious living of the Christian
world). They did not confuse the prestige of their office with
their own private or family ambitions (who bothers to note their
4 j \
family name J) Whatever reservations one may have about the
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consequences of a full realization of their claims, it remains that
a church/society polity of those dimensions presented a vision of
the societal common good, in comparison with which the squalid
intrigues of the Borgia and Medici popes and their imitators
represent a grotesque foim of "corruptio optimi pessima". In place
of Canon Law was II Principe in person - Cesare Borgia, furthering
the family cause, without benefit of law or theology except the
convenience of the ancient theological justification of the papal
office now held by his father.
The religious dynamism which might have counterbalanced papal
preoccupation with political intrigue and steered the Church in
the direction of religious reform and the renewal of the institut¬
ions was not forthcoming. There was no Francis of Assisi to inspire
a re-direction of universal religious energies. The undae monasticae
had dried up for the present. There were examples of outstanding
religious life and individual church leaders of renown (Lawrence
Guistiniani in Venice, Antonino of Florence), but no successors of
Cluny or the Mendicants to infuse new life into the tired limbs of a
languishing Church. The re-establishment of the papacy at the
head of the Church had not led to an invigoration of religious life
throughout the Church. Instead, it served to fortify the identifi¬
cation of the institution of the General Council with the cause of
religious reform in the Church. Patterns of monastic and clerical
life in many places had proliferated in pre-Hildebrandine directions.
Theology.was at a low ebb; piety had taken off into extremes of
frivolity and superstition, incapable of nourishment from a liturgy
now at the advanced stages of formalism and aridity.
Into such a scene came Martin Luther, fresh from his experience
of conversion. The occasion was provided by the preaching of
indulgences to raise funds for the building of a new St. Peter's
(a typical Renaissance project). The clash of Luther's theological
enthusiasm and Roman sharp practice was archetypal. The papacy was
in no fit condition to meet the challenge of Luther once it had
gathered steam, and was unwilling and unable to reform itself or
to initiate a real reforming Council, where the Protestant critique
could have had a hearing and been accommodated. Such a Council,.in
the eyes of the papacy, would have resurrected the old question of
Council vis-a-vis Papacy, thus presenting yet another challenge to
papal supremacy in church government.
In addition, the political conflict between the emperor
Charles V and the French king Francis I provided another distraction.
Left to himself it is possible that Charles V could have initiated
a reforming council in answer to the Lutheran challenge, but the
papacy continually thwarted his initiatives, played for time, or
intrigued with Francis I when .it considered the conduct of the
emperor a direct challenge to its own pretensions. The papacy still
considered Europe in a medieval perspective, as did Charles V.
Francis I was more perceptive - the first wide screen realpolitischer.
Charles respected the papal initiative in the calling of a
General Council, and was unwilling to act like a Constantine in that
regard, although he tried to impress on successive popes the impor¬
tance of the project, of his own interest and willingness to co¬
operate - without success. While the supreme ecclesiastical
authority, finally recognized as a beata possessio of the papacy by
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its only other possible legitimate claimant (Charles), dithered
and dallied, intrigued and ignored the changed circumstances, the
societas Christiana disintegrated. Local potentates in Gemany
found in the new challenge Protestantism offered to papal supremacy
a convenient tool for their local ambitions and above all their
desire to make a break with any imperial control. In this their
Protestantism, whether a real religious conviction or not,
dovetailed with their political instincts - the papacy had for long
enjoyed the benefits of this type of convergence.
Only in the late 1530's was a reforming group in a strong
position in the college of Cardinals-- Contarini, Carafa, Ceryini,
Pole, Giberti, Morone, del Monte. Once more an unda monastica
provided some of the inspiration, this time a movement of spiritual
renewal based in some circles of the secular clergy in Italy and
having lay associates - the Oratorio del divino amore, the
Somaschi, Barnabites and Theatines, and the like. This influence
slowly penetrated into the Roman centre, to set a tone of renewed
clerical and Church-wide life, but too late to save the unity of the
5
Western Church .
This was the price the Church paid in consequence of that movement
towards papal supremacy and institutional centralization we have seen
established in the Middle Ages and surviving the Conciliar Movement.
Such an arrangement demands a degree of excellence at the centre
which cannot be procured by legislation. This excellence in the
character and ability of the pope himself, in the competence and
responsibility of the papal Curia, was absent at the crucial time -
the end of the fifteenth and beginning of the sixteenth centuries -
and the Reformation took its course outside the unity of the
institutional Church. Within what was left of the Catholic Church,
the issues of church government (the balance between centralization
and localization; the papacy as an ecclesiastical and not political
authority - with its presence in Rome involving an immersion in
Italian politics; papal lack of concern for transalpine affairs),
continued to be left unresolved.
The period between Luther's initial outcry (1517) and the
beginning of Trent betrayed the organizational paralysis at the centre
of the Church. Contarini stood out for his concern with reform and
willingness to meet the Protestants halfway - he was opposed by the
curial conservatives and died prematurely. The only non-Italian
pope of the period, Adrian VI, represented the case of the lonely
individual overpowered by the system - treated as an interloper by
the Curia, his reforming instincts of no avail in the middle of an
organizational shambles, and another who died too soon^. The
careers of Cervini, Carafa, Pole, each in their own distinct fashion
testify to the power of the curial bureaucrats to stifle the
enthusiasm and abilities of outstanding churchmen. The suffoca¬
ting hold the Curia now had on the organizational wheels of the
Church, and the private concerns of its autocratic head combined to
prevent a reforming council.
The -beginning of the Council itself was a symbol of the state
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of the Church . After delays and false starts the intended "great
reforming Council" began at Trent on December 13, 1545 with a
pathetic turn-out, the majority of the twenty-five bishops Italians.
In the circumstances of public apathy and curial indifference, the
papal legates - Del Monte, Cervini, Pole - did well to guide the
first session of the Council, until the summer of 1547, to an
initial confrontation with the questions of doctrinal formulation
and church reform.
The duration of the Council reflected the dilatory process by
which reforming attitudes only gradually overcame the apathy and
g
hostility to reform at the organizational centre of the Church .
Trent was not concluded until twenty years after its opening - the
twenty-fifth and last session taking place December 3-4, 15s5 - ana
even after that it took until the end of the century before its
programme of reform was wholeheartedly embraced as papal policy.
Many elements of medieval Christendom had disappeared by that time,
in particular the unity of the Catholic Church of the West in
doctrine and organization (the consequences of the initial break
were not appreciated by most of those involved)"*. One element
which did remain was the position of primacy enjoyed by the papacy
at the centre of the Roman Catholic Church.
If we consider two crisis points in the course of Trent's
unfolding, the priority given to the preservation of papal authority
will be manifest as an overriding concern, putting the questions
of doctrine and religious reform (the questions of substance) in
jeopardy. These are - the transfer of the Council from Trent to
Bologna (March 11, 1547), and the final resolution of the Council.
This ecclesiastical, constitutional factor is our concern here.
In 1547, of the legates Pole had left Trent, Del Monte and
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Cervini were deferring to the susceptibilities of the Roman Curia.
A compromise had been struck allowing discussion of doctrine (the
principal concern of Pope and Curia) and discussion of reform (the
demands of the Catholic reformers) to go hand in hand, with each
doctrinal debate and decree to be accompanied or immediately-
followed by a. reform one. This had resulted in the "Decree on
Justification" being completed by Session VI (January 13, 1547),
the opening of debate on the question of the bishops' obligation
of residence (June 9-10, 1546), and in Session VII (March 3, 1547)
a reform decree to affect some aspects of the pastoral ministry.
Those who were committed to reform realized that only a break
with "the traditions of the Roman Curia" could effect a change forth# better
in the Church *• pastoral ninistry, but the members of the Curia were both
Unaware of the■ , pastoral conditions their "traditions"
brought about and jealous of the power their juridical hold on
ecclesiastical institutions gave them. The whole style of dealing
with the ecclesiastical order of ministry under the rubric of
'beneficium', conferring such beneficia on minors, relatives of
prelates and princes, court favourites, had led to a system of
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absenteeism and pastoral neglect. Only a change whereby bishops
would once more reside in their dioceses and concern themselves
with pastoral ministry to the people entrusted to their care could
bring about a fundamental reform of the Church and a rebirth of
Christian living, without which all the institutional scaffolding,
including the Curia, was meaningless. Such a change was supported
only by a minority of the leadership in the Church. The Popes,
in general, had shown less interest in reform and a renewed Christian
life than the Emperor, and when at last a pope was persuaded to
initiate a Council he considered it an answer in doctrinal terms to
the Protestants more than an instrument of reform. Only a pope
committed to reform could give Trent the impetus necessary to
establish it as the central reforming agency for the Church. The
lack cf such papal commitment stymied the Council throughout,
rendering it at best a half-hearted effort at reform and eventually
transforming its character into a partisan attack on the Protestant
Reformation.
The first step along that road, the crucial dismissal of the
opportunity to repair the breach of the Reformation and to institute
a real refoim of the Church, was taken by the transfer of the
Council from Trent to Bologna. The guardians of papal supremacy -
in particular the legates Del Monte and Cervini - sacrificed the
credibility of the Council to papal prerogative and convenience and
destroyed the hope that the alliance of Pope and Emperor would
repair the schism. This was done at the very time when the
Protestant princes were in disarray and the possibility of conciliating
the Protestant reformers at Trent was at hand. By the short-sighted
action of transferring the Council - on the weak excuse that the
plague was about to engulf Trent (in fact disproved) - the ecclesias¬
tical schism was made irreparable and the cause of Catholic reform
once more compromised^ ^.
The true reason for the transfer to Bologna was not the physical
climate of Trent but the fact that the theological climate, just
beginning to emerge at the Council, was uncongenial to Del Monte and
Cervini. Del Monte had always disliked Trent and complained that
it would lead him to an early grave, but the timing of the move to
Bologna - not at the onset or in the middle of winter, but at the
beginning of Spring - and the fact that he survived to become
Pope Julius III (1549-1555) and to exemplify yet another misplaced
hope in a change for the better at the top, points to other
reasons rather than these convenient excuses. In fact, the
signal for getting out of Trent was not the plague but the call
for a recognition of the ius divinum of episcopal residence, with
all this implied for the "traditions of the Roman Curia", coming
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with the news of the successes of imperial policy in Germany
Cervini, like his compatriot Carafa later, made no secret of his
dislike of Charles V and his fears of another Constantine, and was
prepared in the event to destroy the credibility and effectiveness
of the Council as the instrument of reform and reconciliation in
order to save the ecclesiastical and general political power of the
papacy. This expressed the dominant mood among the Italian bishops
Thus the scene was set for future events. The Council took
its course as a moderate, house-cleaning operation, and a prepara¬
tion for the papal counterattack on Protestant opponents. This was
precisely the view of the curial party, whose most respectable
adherents at this stage were not concerned to meet the Protestants
half-way. The more conciliatory view was inspired by the Catholic
humanists, whose prophet was Erasmus, and #10 tried to reconcile
the Protestants with the Catholic Church. The Catholic humanists
either failed to establish positions of influence and uthority at
the institutional centre, or like Erasmus, in reply to Adrian VI,
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preferred to stay away from the suffocating embrace of curial Rome
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The second crisis point, the final resolution of the Council,
represents an ecclesiastical compromise - abuses in the ecclesias¬
tical order were to be corrected, but only in terms of the
constitutional status quo ante-Reformation. This involved a tight-
ening-up of what remained of Catholic Europe, a re-assertion of
institutional centralism and papal monarchy, a policy of confront¬
ation with those considered to be heretics and schismatics. The
quwstion of a re-interpretation, decentralization, de-curialization
of church authority, which had been mooted in the first and final
period of Trent with the question of 'the 'ius divinum' of
episcopal residence was resolved in favour of the papacy, which
continued to keep the reins of the Council in its own hands and
in consequence the future direction of Catholic reform based on
Trent^ ^.
The question of 'ius divinum' was shelved, the practical
question of residence was taken care of, there was a papal reform
of the Curia, but the underlying question remained - was church
government monarchical, collegial, or a mixture of both, and what
were the implications for the whole conception of the Church and its
mission? If it had been decided explicitly that the bishops' duty
of residence in their own dioceses was not just a matter of
ecclesiastical law or custom, but demanded by the very nature of the
episcopal office (emphasis on pastoral care and not the juridical
arrangements), then the authority corresponding to the office would
be jure divino and not just jure ecclesiastico, inherent in the
office of bishop and not dependent on a separate delegation of
jurisdiction from the Pope. But to allow this in the eyes of the
curialists would have been tantamount to destroying the basis of their
ecclesiastical power. In the same framework, the institution of
religious exemption provided yet another instrument of central
16
jurisdiction inherited from the Middle Ages
The final period of Trent (1563-65) brought to a head also the
conflicting interests of the political powers. While the Pope
and Curia could protect their juridical authority ecclesiastical,
gone were the days when they could directly affect the Emperor and
the independent sovereigns politically. One main consequence of
the Reformation was to render the Church even more dependent on the
17
goodwill of the Catholic princes . Trent itself could not be
successfully completed until this necessity was recognized and the
diverse interests of the powers reconciled. This is the other
side of the coin of papal supremacy. At the end of the conciliar
period the papacy had opted for the politics of concordats, with
their consequent proviso of conciliating the interests of the
powers.
The Concordat of Bologna between Leo X and Francis I
(December 1516) neutralized conciliarism at the price of closing
up the French Church within herself and turning conci liarism into a
"Gallicanisme du Roi". This was demonstrated by the lack of in-
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volvement of the French Church in the first two periods of Trent
Other nations too witnessed the consolidation of national and
religious absolutism as a concomitant of the break-up of medieval
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Christendom . In this the Protestant Reformation provided the
definitive impetus and corresponded with the aspirations of the
different potentates.
"The viewpoint of Christendom conflicted with that of
20
the national State."
Men like Seripando and Sadoleto saw in the dispute between France
and the Emperor another aspect of the tragedy that had struck
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Christendom, where in their eyes wars could only be civil wars.
They shared with Charles V a medieval conception of the world, in
which the only legitimate form of warfare, beyond moral reproach,
was the crusade against the infidel. A period which at one time saw
Francis I allied with the Turks against the Emperor, and at another
Francis and the German Protestant princes united in opposition to
Charles, was clearly a watershed. The Interim of 1548 and the
Peace of Augsburg (February-September 1555) consecrated the principle
'cuius regio eius religio':
"Such was the solution of the religious problem in
Germany in the middle of the sixteenth century. It
was at least original. Freedom of worship exists
for the princes; it does not exist for the subjects."
What had once been the geographical centre of Christendom thus became
the most conspicuous exemplar of the new Europe of "'territorialism',
the religious despotism of the new sovereign State which rose out of
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the ruins of Christendom."
In France where the identification of national aspirations
with a religious, cultural and educational mission had been given
expression since the beginning of the fourteenth century; where a
war for the king of France was defined as a war for justice, for
France, for culture, and education, for the Church, for the Christian
faith; where "une foi, une loi, ur, roi" was invoked; a policy of
conciliation ended with the failure of the Colloquy of Poissy
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(1561) and the eventual emergence of the Politiques . In the policy
of conciliation inspired by Erasmus and the Christian humanists,
religion and the state remained inseparable, religious considerations
predominated, the goal was a reunited Christendom: for the Politiques,
the national point of view ana national political considerations
predominated, religion was considered as only one element of the
political picture and subject to the raison d'Etat. The Counter-
Reformation and the Protestant principalities, by contrast with the
Erasmians, gave a denominational cast to their religious politics and
political religion, and unlike the Politiques considered religion the
defining instrument of the political picture, qualifying the
character of any raison d'Etat.
Philip of Spain wanted Trent to be firmly established as the
basis of Catholic reform and the religio-theological foundation of
the Counter-Reformation. The Emperor Ferdinand wanted a Council of
re-union, in effect a new Council, whether at Trent or elsewhere.
The French under the Cardinal of Lorraine came to Trent in search of
that solution to the schism which they had been unable to achieve in
their own national councils. Pius IV found himself in the position
of having to conciliate these interests. The decrees of the first
two periods of Trent had not been ratified by the pope and made
universal Church policy. Thus there remained doubts about their
validity, and the question of a new Council which would be distinct
from Trent, now twice suspended and its work incomplete. To
conciliate all interests - those who wanted the first two periods
accepted and the Council of Trent completed; those who were concerned
for re-union with the Protestants and the first two periods' decrees
left open for the sake of reconciling any Protestant objections to
them - an ingenious formula was used to re-summon the Council at
Trent: "Quaeumque suspensione sublata".
However, it was too late in the day to be operating with the
ingenuity that would have been appropriate in the first period. By
now the divisions were irreconcilable, what were soon to become the
battle lines were already drawn up, and all that remained to give
Trent its final imprint was the working out of the dynamics of the
conciliar process, in which the ecclesiastical interests of the
curial party corresponded with the religio-political aspirations of
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the strongest group of bishops present - the Spaniards . The
vestiges of reconciliation disappeared with the establishment of a
reformed Latin Catholicism based on Trent as the instrument of a
political Counter-Reformation led by Spain. Lepanto (1571) was a
symbol of its military vigour, St. Bartholomew (1572) the sign and
the Thirty Years War the reality of its nemesis.
Its ecclesiastical consequence was the re-establishment of
the power and prestige of a renewed papal monarchy. Once more a
prophetic challenge to this ecclesiastical polity had failed to
become established within the institution and "the Protestant
principle" became the Protestant Churches. The millenarian impulse
had however not been without effect. The condition of the papacy
at the end of the century in comparison with what it had been at
the beginning was testimony enough to that, and the millenarian
movements within the Roman Catholic Church such as the Jesuits,
the reformed Carmelites, the Oratorians, were leading forces in the
work of Catholic regeneration and in the forms of Catholicism
brought to North and South America. Four hundred years later an
unexpected turn of events set in process a movement which brought
the Tridentine era to a close, and inaugurated a new era which not
only witnessed the establishment of what Tillich describes as
"the Protestant principle" within the Roman Catholic Church, but
potentially established the forces of millenarian prophecy as the
institutional expression of the Church in the modern world.
CHAPTER II
THE AGGIORNAMENTO OF VATICAN II
The Second Vatican Council (1962-1965) is the single most
important reality in the life of the Catholic Church in our age.
Every institutional expression of Catholic life and practice now
must be considered in the light of Vatican II. Although there is
no adequate historical precedent or analogy for this council, it
can be compared to a parliament or congress which convened for a
period of four years, for the first time in a hundred years. There
is first of all an enormous backlog of business to attend to, an
attempt to deal with the issues and problems which had arisen during
the preceding century. In the course of the assembly, policy guide¬
lines for the future would have to be drawn up, especially if it was
not known when the next assembly would be held. In the formulation
of such guidelines compromise would be essential for a heterogeneous body
like a congress, a parliament, or a council. Afterwards, dissatis¬
faction would be expressed on all sides with decisions, official acts
and statements, considered to give less than full support to the
most interested partisans. Nevertheless, what would be of primary
importance, and what would determine the course of future events,
more than anything else, would be the general tone of the proceedings,
"the spirit of the meeting," and its impact on the respective con¬
stituents. By this criterion, the Second Vatican Council can be
ranked with Philadelphia 1776 or Westminster 1946 in its signi¬
ficance for present and future ages."'"
It is a remarkable irony that a history of monarchical papacy
("institutionalized charisma") had prepared the way for the charismatic
individual whose personality set a new tone, not only for the papacy
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but for the whole Church. This became of vital importance in the
actual operation of Vatican II, because the central issue to which
the bishops addressed themselves was the concept of "the Church".
The language they used was that of Catholic theology, but, as the
Council itself was to demonstrate, that language was polyglot; and
what became more important than the actual vocabulary was the
"spirit of the meeting" - for this the personality of Pope John
was the fundamental determining factor.
Catholic theology is not something which takes place in vacuo,
but reflects the self-understanding of the Church of a particular
era; and 'ecclesiology' - that branch of theology which sets out
to formulate explicitly the Church's understanding of herself - is
essentially historical.
"Our concept of the Church is basically
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influenced by the form of the Church."
Again, the short pontificate of Pope John modified "the form" of the
papacy, and that, along with his initiation of Vatican II, was
destined to modify "the form of the."Church."
The actual formulation by Vatican II of its ecclesiology
shows the tension involved in this "modification,". In order
to answer the question, "What is 'the Church' according to Vatican
II?", all the conciliar documents must be taken into account. The
Council's understanding of the Church is stated explicitly in Lumen
Gentium (LG), and the implications of that understanding are worked out
in the course of formulating the other documents (for our purposes,
the most important being Gaudium et Spes) - 'The Church in the
Modern World' (GS). But, if we want to understand the nature of
se:lf»-understanding of the Church as formulated by Vatican II, and
the tension between the past and the present of the Church, the
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first three chapters of Lttmen Gentium are of primary concern.
In those chapters, Vatican II expressed an understanding
of the Church by a juxtaposition of biblical liturgical and
juridical concepts which attempts to balance what had been for
centuries an overwhelmingly juridical and legalistic way of
speaking about the Church, with a return to a more ancient trad¬
ition of biblico-liturgical discourse. The form of the Church as
dictated by the exigencies of the .Counter-Reformation is clearly
different, in the understanding of the bishops of Vatican II, from
the form required to carry out the pastoral mission of service in
the world as it is today (Pope John had from the beginning insisted
on this "pastoral" character of the Council he had called, and the
majority of the bishops never lost sight of that fact). However,
the weight of the recent tradition still continued to influence the
whole course of Vatican II, and in LG, when the priority of the
more traditional biblical and liturgical theologicalformulations was
established in the first two chapters, the juridical was re-asserted
4
in chapter three. No amount of special pleading for their com¬
patibility, and for the unity of the "institutional" and the
"charismatic" in the one Church, can disguise the fact that the
5
"forms" are destined to live in tension.
The co-existence of "juridical" and "pastoral" is not only
a historical necessity, reflecting the existence of the Church,
whose form had been defined in the era of the Counter-Reformation,
striving to assert herself in a new age; but a manifestation of
the transitional character of Vatican II. The Church,, which has been
conceived, until recently, overwhelmingly in juridical terms, is
now facing problems of re-definition, not only in theology but
especially in practice. This involves questions of church order,
the relationship of tie Catholic Church to other Christian Churches,
7
and the direction of Christian presence in the world today.
The abruptly terminated Vatican Council I (1870) is best known
for its definition of papal infallibility. Whatever the specifically
theological meaning and origin of this definiation (its historical
g
roots were to be found in the Middle Ages.), the political context
was most significant. Somewhat like Boniface VIII and 'Unam Sanctam',
this assertion of papal authority came just in time to be waived aside
by the usurpation of political power unfavourable to the papacy.
The Risorgimento put an end to the remaining territorial expression
of papal power - the Papal States - where the conventional political
expression of papal authority had all begun with the dubious 'Donatio
Constantini', the papacy took some time to adapt to the new situation
which was leading inexorably to a new conception of the Church's
position in the world.
The centuries after Trent exemplified the ossifying effects of
the papal and curial victory there. This had been achieved in league
with the Catholic heirs of Charles V and the price to pay was papal
support of Catholic protectors and their imperial ambitions, while
the papacy was left in possession of its estates. This period was
dominated by that experience described in thefirst quotation of the
trilogy introducing this section - the hierarchy opposed to social
change as guardians of the integrity of the diminished institution,
in particular under a system of reciprocal guarantees with the powers.
The integrist claims were not diminished when their papal holders
were ignored or treated with 'contempt - rather, the stridency with
which they were proclaimed grew (the Syllabus of Errors of 1864) as
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the denouement approached. The content was minuscule, in accordance
with a phenomenon we shall observe in the American context - con¬
servative upholding of the status quo against the movement of
9
change in favour of a radical restructuring of society.
"Ainsi \ la mort de Pie IX la situation est tragique. ""''0
The recovery of the papacy, and the corresponding recovery of
confidence in the Church's position in political affairs as a
responsible participant and not just as a spectre of the "ancien
regime", was to be slow and full of setbacks.
Rerum Novarum (1891) today symbolizes the inauguration of the
Modern Church's role as a partner in dialogue with the world in
which it exists, and the papacy as a teacher of those mortal
principles which the Church is commissioned to preserve and proclaim.
While Leo XIII still retained many of the attitudes of his
predecessors'^, his attempt to come to terms with the social question,
the employment of Christian concepts of the dignity of work and
the necessity to give justice to the workers, opened the way for a
new relationship between church and world in which the tradition
of Catholic social teaching would be brought to bear as a standard
of judgment for the economic and political forms of society. From
the condition of being more a victim of social and political
circumstances, this new evolving role opened up the prospect that
the Church once more would be an active agent in the shaping of the
world.^
The ecclesiastical institution, however, was still not prepared
to put aside those attitudes and practices of the past which
necessarily limited its prospective role in society and undermined
the credibility of its own message. The "anti-Modernism" witch-hunt
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gave vent to all the excesses of absolutism within the Church and
obsessive fear of the world not under the-control of ecclesiastical
authority which, the resolution of Trent in a Counter-Reformation
13
and aggressively Catholic direction had encouraged. Since my
sympathies in the consideration of Trent were with men like Erasmus,
Contarini, Seripando, I see the anti-Modernist period as another
spasm of the Leirathan unwilling to come to terms with its limited,
though in my opinion proper role as the inspirational critic in favour
of that vision of the Kingdom which the Church holds as its "ideology."
Instead, ecclesiastical authority attempted to control society, in
favour of that institutional memory which had haunted the papacy
since the Middle Ages - the Church as the perfect society which alone
gave expression to the primacy of the spiritual. While this vision
was not unworthy, it failed to attend to the human side of the Church
and this debased the Gospel message into something recognizable in
terms of the pejorative sense of "ideology" - an instrument to
promote the vested interests of the papacy and curia.
This was given its most obvious expression in Italy, where the
papacy had not reconciled itself to the loss of power. The story of
Italian Christian Democracy and Catholic Action has been punctuated
by Vatican efforts to control the State and promote its own
14
organizational interests. The change of emphasis which Pope John
expressed in his pontificate - his policy of dialogue, which en¬
couraged the formation of the Centro-Sinistra, the slackening of
Vatican preoccupation with the course of Italian politics - was
a remarkable contrast: the contemporary divorce controversy a
symbol of the recrudescence of integrism.
However, the new lease of life which Catholic social teaching
realized with RN continued. Although the prevailing capitalist
order in Europe encouraged an emphasis on the anti-communist and
anti-socialist passages of the encyclical, it was impossible for the
Catholic activists ("militants")who were formed in the Catholic
tradition not to be preoccupied with questions of economic justice -
the very questions which could not be answered within the capitalist
framework. Even when the papacy's policy of concordats led to a
compromising relationship with fascism, the anti'authoritarian and
social justice principles of tie Church's social teaching stood in
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contrast to this policy, and in Quadragesimp Anno (1931) Pius XI
had described the evils of "economic nationalism" and "economic
imperialism" - "the ultimate consequences of the individualist
spirit in economic life" - on the one hand:
"
... on the other, a no less deadly and accursed
internationalism of finance or international
imperialism whose country is where profit is.""^
It was this critique which Pope John developed in Mater et
Magistra (1961) and Pacem in Terris (1963) , and which came to its
most comprehensive expression at Vatican II, with Schema XIII
and Gaudium et Spes.
Two points of this critique are of immediate interest here since
they define the terms of the "justice and peace" issues considered
in Sections III and IV. These are - what Pope John called
"socialization" in MM, and the concept of a world order introduced in
PT and given further expression in GS_. KN had spoken emphatically
about the rights of private property, but it had also expressed the
Christian doctrine of creation*s social character, which leads to
the consideration that the goods of the earth are intended by the
Creator to be used on behalf of all men, so that the right to possess
and make use of private property is not unlimited. gA underlined
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this social responsibility of property, and MM gave it its fullest
expression - that the 'bonum commune' takes precedence over the
'bonum individuale' of the individual possessor of private property;
private property is not an absolute in the tradition of Catholic
social teaching. The emphasis on wide-scale distribution of private
property in this scenario is opposed to the concentration
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characteristic of capitalism, and the use of the word "socialization",
with approval, to describe the modern process of increasing social
management and control of all sectors of the economy, symbolized the
shift from a presumption in favour of capitalism to the establishment
of the Church's acceptance of a position of philosophical neutrality
in the economic order. While this was implicit in QA's equal
condemnation of the evils involved in the socialist and capitalist
scheme, the continuance of a policy of support of the capitalist
18
side of the Cold War, particularly under Pius XII had obscured
this fact.
What was perhaps even more important than the actual works of
MM was Pope John's pontificate. His policy of openness to dialogue
with all philosophies and religions, the welcome given to repres¬
entatives of all governments and countries, the impression made on
the world by his affable and friendly personality, changed the face
of papacy and made possible the new spirit of concern to serve the
interests of peoples, without arrogance and in a spirit of partner¬
ship with "all men of good will", which Vatican II expressed in GS.
This involved a willingness on the part of the Church to look for
common ground with those men of good will who were serving the needs
of people for justice and peace, whatever their "ideology" - Pope
John made a break with the recent tradition of the papacy to condemn
the objectionable doctrine and its supporters unconditionally. Respect
for persons in Pope John's philosophy was unconditional, and where
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their doctrines were not in accordance with the Christian gospel
only a policy of dialogue was appropriate.
It was the second point of Pope John's critique, ejqpressed in
PT, which has been the most significant factor in the shift from what
I have called a "premillenarian" to a "postmillenarian" influence on
the institutional Church. It is my contention that only the latter
is an effective antidote to integrism, which is the constant historical
memory which ecclesiastical authority has carried from the Middle Ages.
The prophetic dimension of the Gospel - the call to reform
("Ecclesia semper Reformanda") - is unable to overcome this integrist
tendency if its influence is not somehow paradoxically institutional¬
ized in the structures of the Church. The shift which the papacy
of John XXIII and Vatican II represent is precisely the attempt to
incorporate the prophetic, "charismatic", element into the institu¬
tional order (structures of authority, ecclesiastical involvement in
society). Since this is a juxtaposition of conflicting tendencies
(the prophetic being dynamic, the institutional a static tendency) they
are destined to coexist uncomfortably in tension.
The international politics of the papacy had been an integrist attempt
to dominate and control Christian Europe. The international politics
to which Pope John, his successor, and the Vatican Council subscribed
are the support and encouragement of the attempts to go beyond
nationalism (in line with Catholic political philosophy's opposition
19
to the nation-state) in the direction of some form of world order.
Since the United Nations is at present the only embryonic ejqpression
of internationalism, the Church's support has been given to that
organization, as documented in PT_ and GS_ and symbolized by Pope Paul's
visit to UN headquarters in October 1965. Thus, the internationalism
which the Catholic Church expresses as a religious organization
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becomes the inspiration for the Church's effort to encourage political
and economic internationalism. The church today is in a more credible
position in this endeavour because since Pope John and Vatican II
it has re-discovered the difference between unity and uniformity. The
Church as the instrument and sign of the unity of mankind can only
be effective if it is an expression of this Catholic unity.
The aggioraamento has manifested certain characteristics of
the Church's nature and its mission which have been obscured by the
practice of recent centuries and whose absence had led to miscon¬
ceptions about the nature and mission of the Church. For example,
that the prophetic - millenarian impulse was somehow foreign or
illegitimate in the Church. In Norman Cohn's classic work,
"The Pursuit of the Millennium,this impulse is identified with its
extreme forms, messianism and utopianism. While he recognizes the
"traditional" nature of beliefs about a future golden age or
messianic kingdom, his concentration on the social situations of
insecurity and disorientation which produced anarchic millenarian
movements has obscured the continuing importance of these beliefs
20
in all situations. His own social conservatism leads him to a
remark like tie following:
"Most curious is the way in which Catholic doctrine
incorporated and conserved the idea that all things on
21
earth ought to belong to all human beings communally."
The only "curious" thing about this is that the Church has not, in
its practice, encouraged the belief that such an idea is in fact part
of its ideologyl He goes on to show his annoyance that Christianity
encouraged egalitarianism, and this betrays him into the gratuitous, not
to say exegetically incorrect remark:
"... it was nowhere appreciated how far St. Luke had
allowed his imagination to overrule his sense of historical
fact." 22
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He is referring to the early chapters of Acts, in which it is quite
clear that the original Christian inspiration in the early Church
was in the direction of a form of communism. The recent history
of the Church is a corrective to Cohn's conservative interpretation of
Christian millenarism. The statements of the Latin American bishops
quoted in Section IV show clearly that the identification between
the millenarian-prophetic impulse and its extreme, violent forms is
23
an inadequate interpretation.
Another misconception is that millenarian movements inspired by
religion are archaic - as society advances educationally,
politically,and in its social experience these are transformed into
24
conventional political parties (Peter Worsley's analysis) . I
have found Worsley's analysis of "charisma" a corrective of Weber's
which is supported in the case of recent Catholic experience. His
emphasis on the social relationship between the charismatic
individual and his followers- the. message as the most important element,
not the person of the leader which can vary, although the message tied
to the leader is an important element in centralizing the movement;
and his qualifications of the leader as symbol , catalyst and message-
bearer: all these points are well exemplified in the case of Pope
T v, 25John.
However, other elements of his analysis do not correspond to
the experiences of the Church. Worsley maintains that as the dominant
form of protest millenarism always gives way to secularized forms
and becomes marginal, pacific and other worldly. While this is true
of "premillenarian" form of Christian sects, it does .not take into
account the "post millenarian" influence which endures precisely
because it refuses to accept the dubious distinction between
"religious" and "secular", and is only pacific if this denotes a
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reluctance to accept that only the extreme forms of protest are
effective - but it is far from passive (as the "orthopraxis "
in Latin America is presently demonstrating).
Worsley does describe very well the cooptation of the
millenarian by the institutional Church:
"The Kingdom of God on earth, orthodox dogma had
it been established by Chirst's first coming, and was
being perpetuated in the Church and its members.
The gradual perfection and growth of the Church would
lead to the New Jerusalem."
And he is aware cf the persistence of millenarism:
"... the secret history of the Middle Ages is.-the
history of millenarian and allied sects, a history which
is only now being written."
But his analysis cannot account for the persistence of what
Marty calls "postmillenarian" tendencies even after the development
of politics as a secular cult. If the Christian tradition of
social criticism was solely "premillenarian", a transition to
secular politics and the "privatization".of religion would be
the only result. The 'Social Gospel' phenomenon in American
Protestantism (Section II) and the experience of Meddlin (Section ±V)
demonstrate the continuing importance of "postmillenarian"
religious inspiration, and make Cohn's and Worsley's analyses less
than comprehensive.
m In spite of this disagreement with Cohn and Worsley, I have
found their books and Barrington Moore's the most valuable foundation
for locating the issues of Church history in their social context.
While I have inevitably had to concentrate more on the history of
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church government than on social history, their perspective is a
vital part of a comprehensive analysis. The social preconditions for
that shift in the Church which the word aggiornamento has come
to define are to be found in the circumstances which they describe -
social and economic changes causing disorientation, upsetting the
hold of the established patterns of society, leading to social
agitation and demands for a message and leadership which will realize
the possibilities of political liberation and economic prosperity for
the masses of the oppressed. ItijI think obvious that one of the main
differences between the Tridentine Vatican Council I and Vatican II
was the lack of awareness and the inability of the former to
appropriate the social and economic changes of the 19th century, and
Vatican II's building on the foundation of the Social Encyclicals
in its attempt to come to terms with these changes. One has only to
read GS_ to have demonstration of the difference between the two
Councils. ('Profoundly changed conditions", 'Changes in the gocial
order', 'Psychological, Moral, and Religious Changes', 'The role
of the Church in the Modern World', are some of the issues addressed
in GS.)
Throughout the following sections, while the influence of these
social science works, and those explicitly cited in the sections, is
often only implicit, it is a very important part of the consideration.
Without their analyses the theological issues are abstract and
incomplete. While I tend to emphasize the priority of the religious
forces which have influenced the American bishops' response to foreign
polity, Vatican II has expressed the impossibility of .separating this
ecclesiastical context from the cultural situation of which it is
part and by which the ecclesiastical is formed, and vice-versa. The
aggiornamento of Vatican II has been set forth in comprehensive terms
by GS. The dialectic of "institution" and "ideology", the continuing
tension between the ecclesiastical and the prophetic, between the
Curia and the prophets, is testimony to the novelty of the
re-discovery of ttie Church's original mission of service, the con¬
tinuing temptation of integrism and self-serving ecclesiastical
politics, the need for the prophetic as a constituent part of the




THE AMERICAN CATHOLIC CHURCH
In this section I shall consider four themes from American
Catholic Church history, since they serve to place the response
of the bishops to the war in Vietnam, and the presently unfolding
situation in Latin America, in an explanatory context which I shall
develop in the concluding section of the thesis, by relating the
"Roman" character of their position as bishops of the Church
(Section i) to the American Catholic experience. The four themes
are - the conflict between "separatist" and "Americanist"
tendencies in the American Catholic Church; the character of
ecclesiastical government, in the relationship between bishops
and priests, and between bishops and the Vatican; the institut¬
ionalization of ecclesiastical government of the American Church
(in particular, that branch of the national 'Catholic Conference'
dealing with international affairs and foreign policy issues);
the example of an historical precedent for political involvement




The first theme - 'separatism' viz -a-viz 'Americanism' -
expresses the ambiguity of the response of the American Catholic Church
to its historical position in the United States. The attitude to
religion of the Constitution itself - disestablishment and voluntary¬
ism - was ambiguous:
"Whereas Jefferson wanted a line drawn to keep clerics
from meddling in civil matters, those in the lineage of
Roger Williams wanted to be sure that civil authorities
would have no say in matters of conscience and belief.
The clergy won most: it has been more difficult for
government to intrude on religion than for clerics to
intrude on civil territory." ^
Likewise, discrimination rather than tolerance has punctuated the
history of religious liberty in the United States (in the Catholic
case, frequently in tandem with ethnic prejudice against Irish and
Spanish-speaking Americans).
The "Americanist" attitude was the attempt to win acceptance
in the society for Catholics and their institutions, as legitimate
according to the canons predominant in the socio-cultural pantheon.
The obstacle facing the Americanists was the conventional establish¬
ment of Protestantism in its various forms as the religious ethos
of the country, in the course of the nineteenth century. The
Republic had been founded at a time when religious institutions
2
were entering a period of decline, thus favourable to minorities
3
like the Catholics, but the growth in numbers of Catholics came when
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a reinvigorated Protestantism could impose itself on the established
social order, shape it in favour of its own religious interests and
in opposition to those of others, the most obvious antagonists being
the Catholics^. The attempt to establish the compatibility of
Catholicism with established American social and political institu¬
tions, which gathered force throughout the course of the 1<Jth
century and came to its most symbolic expression in the age of
Cardinal Gibbons and Archbishop Ireland in the 1890's, suffered
the disability of being preempted by anti-Catholic Protestantism.
This in turn gave support to the "separatist" tendency, which
reacted to the recurring spasms of 'nativism' and 'know-nothingism',
the Ku-Klux-Klan, the APA, with an assertion of Catholic separatist
identity in a basically hostile environment. Since a formal
union between American institutions and Protestant Christianity
dominated the society, this 'separatism' was in many ways a natural
defence for the Catholic "minority" (even though they formed the
major Christian denomination since the Civil War). In the first
half of the century this 'separatism' is identified with the figure
5
of Archbishop Hughes of New York . It was Hughes who insisted on
the absolute necessity for Catholics to have their own schools
under the strict control of the Catholic hierarchy, where the
Catholic faith could be nurtured and preserved in an environment
cut off from the influences of the "public", i.e. Protestant
schools. Where Protestantism in America gloried in its
"denominationalism", which corresponded to the individualism and
voluntaryism celebrated in the constitutional mythology,
Catholicism insisted on the unique character of its authoritative
teaching. The growing number of immigrants, in particular the
Irish , by the middle of the century, magnified the concern of the
Catholic hierarchy for the preservation of the immigrants' faith,
in a society which many of them interpreted as fundamentally hostile
to that Catholic faith and bent on its elimination - the outbreaks
of 'nativism', which expressed American identity in terms of the
dominant social race (Anglo-Saxon), as distinct from Celtic, Latin
7
and any other non-acceptable stock , intensified the separatist
pressure, particularly in New York, the centre of Irish-American
Catholicism.
Another result of the religion/race conflict was dramatized
by the Civil War. This event faced all the Christian Churches
and denominations with the necessity to express the political
implications of their religion, and in circumstances which demonstrate
the univocal character of politics (who could doubt that the Civil
War blurred the national/international distinction!) For
Protestants, not only did it manifest the fact that the Protestant
0
empire was built at the expense of black inhabitants , but it also
solidified those currents of individualism, expressed in personal
salvation at the expense of social responsibility, which have
stilled the prophetic/social-critical voice of Protestantism and
rendered it for the most part a conservative upholder of the status
9
quo . Particularly was this the case in the South, which by the
time of the Civil War and later was the most Protestant part of
1 0
the country . There the conservative social pressures of the
dominant race reinforced and were reinforced by the conservative
pressures of biblical fundamentalism; in which an individualistic
conception of holiness and "salvation" (the dominant category of
American Protestant theology, as distinct from "justification" in
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European), with a rigorous legalistic moral code addressed to the
categories of personal vices, identified the Church with the "rock
of ages" (the symbol of resistance to all religious and social change),
just as vigorously, if unknowingly, as that identification being
promoted at the same time in Europe by the Papacy.
The nemesis of this society/religion/race confusion has worked
itself out in the United States ever since, as these very attitudes
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and their theology conquered American Protestantism and reinforced
the Social ethos, itself based on the same individualistic conception
of social/political/economic salvation, to the neglect not only of
the racial oppression which continued in North and South but even
of the social question itself - was the society indeed observing
"liberty and justice for all", and was the identification of
American democracy with "free-enterprise capitalism" legitimate,
according to the principles of the Constitution and (for the
Christian) the New Testament?
The Civil War for the Catholic Church challenged the
political insularity of the now largely immigrant Church, which
had since Carroll stayed aloof from episcopal involvement except
where Catholic interests were directly affected, as in the
protection of Catholic institutions and property. With one
exception, the episcopal response was to acquiesce in the
acceptance of regional loyalties, and Catholics took sides
accordingly. The exception was Bishop Augustin Verot,. Vicar-
Apostolic of Florida and later Bishop of St. Augustine, who, not
content with simple acquiescence, came out strongly in support
of the Southern cause. In a famous sermon delivered on January 4,
1861 - "Slavery and Abolitionism" - Verot supported the institution
of slavery as legitimate, not a malum in se, while condemning the
1 2
evils which attended the practice . Although this was a common
Catholic opinion at the time, only Verot introduced it into the
political arena. Part of the reason for Verot's position was his
awareness that many abolitionists were nativists, who were quite
prepared to discriminate against Catholics, and whose anti-slavery
views were encouraged by their anti-South antagonism. (it was
this latter reality which helped to fasten the South to its
"peculiar institution!') Verot set a precedent in this case, by
involving himself in a national political matter which had
nothing directly to do with Catholicism. It would be difficult
to find a similar example of such episcopal outspokenness in the
whole course of American Catholic history, but, as he demonstrated
at Vatican I when he opposed the definition of papal infallibility,
Verot was aji outspoken bishop.
After the Civil War, the Catholic population became ever more
concentrated in "the fertile crescent" (from Boston down the east
coast to Northern Virginia, through Pennsylvania to Ohio, round to
Chicago and St. Paul), and while Catholic pockets remained in the
south, there was no further expansion of the Church there, and the
negro population was generally ignored. New Orleans remained the
only centre of a significant Catholic population in the South:
elsewhere, the absence of priests led to the loss of thousands of
Catholics to the Church, and the Southern view of the Catholic
Church as alien became established (no bishop of the stature of
England or Verot was at hand to correct that view - Gibbons spent
too little time there on his way up the promotional ladder to
Baltimore). In the North, the Catholic support of the Union cause
had qualified the "separatist" approach, which had been dominant
at mid-century - Catholics were now bound up with the destiny of
the nation which had been forged in the war, and in the course of
the next thirty years the "Americanist" tendency triumphed.
The domestic religious controversies between Protestant and
Catholic Christianity did not prevent a mutual consensus on the
acceptance of the American political and economic system which
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the Civil War had helped to establish . Both separatists and
Americanists within the Catholic Church were political and social
conservatives. This had been most clearly demonstrated in the
evolution of the Catholic parochial school system (the focus of
the attention of both tendencies) - whatever its supposedly
divisive religious character, it has proved itself as the out¬
standing instrument of the socialization of the immigrant Catholics
with the political, economic, and social institutions of the
society.
The "separatist and "Americanist" conflict which reached a climax
the last quarter of the 19th century, dramatized the historical
predicament of the Catholic Church, which found itself having to
come to terms with cultures and political societies in an environ¬
ment different from that in which its theological-political
ideology had been formed - Reformation and post-Reformation Europe.
The two approaches represented the responses to that situation -
in the first (separatist), the European Catholic ideology dominated
(the ideal of the confessional state in which Catholicism was
recognised as the one true religion, unique in its claim for state
recognition and support, providing the religious legitimation of
the government which supported it), and hence the American system
of government could only be regarded with suspicion in its
profession to regard all religions as equal and in its explicit
denial of confessionalism; in the second (Americanist) the
American political ideology prevailed and the European Catholic
ideology was played down or ignored (the reaction only came when
this attitude was reported back to a European context in an
attempt to upset the "traditional" European Catholic order, and
14\
the whole 'Americanism' controversy developed ). The latter
was typical in its American pragmatic approach; the former
resisted American acculturation wherever this might have con¬
taminated "traditional" Catholicism (the fact that this "tradition"
was of questionable theological validity, and itself more the
expression of particular political circumstances than of evangel¬
ical origin, did not prevent its predominance).
The tendency to choose between the two, and the victory of
Americanist over separatist which seemed to have been vindicated
in 1960, must not be allowed to obscure the ambiguous character
of the historical experience. Whatever the ideological founda¬
tions, which in practice were of secondary concern, the social
situations to which these attitudes addressed themselves were not
such as to allow the unquestioned acceptance of one or the other.
When it is recognised that the American political ideology was
itself ambiguous, as we have seen, since the Constitution was and
is subject to conventional interpretation within the broad limits
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of the anti-establishment of religious clause, this caution becomes
even more necessary.
Two facets of the historical experience may serve to illustrate
- the religious roots of American Catholicism; the ethnic origins.
Both of these were brought over from Europe, and the separatists
and Americanists both had to plant them in the American soil. It
is all but impossible to divorce the ethnic from the religious,
but it can be observed, I think, that Americanists were prone to
the "melting-pot" attitude to the ethnic, while striving to gain
acceptance for the religious through conciliatory moves (like the
Catholic participation in the Chicago World's Fair - the 'Parlia¬
ment of Religions' (1893)), and attempts to show the compatibility
of Catholicism and American democracy (as expressed in particular
by Orestes Brownson, Isaac Hecker, Bishops John Lancaster Spalding,
Ireland and Gibbons). Separatists on the other hand, emphasized
the ethnic, and insisted on the distinctive marks of Catholicism,
with a consequent unwillingness to be conciliatory to other Chris¬
tian denominations (they in common with the Americanists, would
not have considered Catholicism as one of the Christian Churches
but the only true Church - the others in error) - Cardinal McCloskey,
Bishops Corrigan and McQuade being the chief exponents of this
attitude among the hierarchy. The ambiguity can be seen in the
dominance of Irish Catholicism, particularly in the composition of
the hierarchy, a tradition which became established at that time
1 5
and which still exists , so that the same kind of "melting-pot"
phenomenon can be observed in the general social situation and in
the situation of American Catholicism - the dominance of one group
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at the expense of the others (in the social situation - the WASP
hegemony; in the Catholic - the Irish). Therefore, the German-
American Catholics were correct in being alert to this type of
Irish take over, and the difference, in some degree at least,
between Mid-West Catholicism and that of the East, which the
Vatican Council era has exposed, is a tribute to their pertinacity.
Saparatists like Corrigan and McQuade, and Americanists like
Gibbons and Ireland, were at one in their Irish Cathllicism, and
at one in their acceptance of the foreign policy of the American
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government, along with their non-Irish confreres . The conflict
between Americanists and separatists was limited by the common
acceptance of the political and social status quo; the conflict
was an expression of different modes of adjustment.
This can be observed in the Irish American Catholicism which
was dominant among the hierarchy, and which was better suited to
adjusting to the prevailing order in the society. The Irish,
unlike the other Catholic ethnic groups (Germans, Italians, Slavs,
Spanish), had a lot in common with the Anglo-Americans, the
dominant ethnic group - the English language, familiarity with the
canons of social and political advancement (in particular, the use
of the political system for the benefit of one's race, by relying
on the mass support of one's own people in elections and by the
judicious manipulation of the legislative process, as Dania] O'Connell
and Charles S. Parnell dramatized). Whether the policy took the
form of the more "separatist" type of ethnic politics which James
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M. Curley practised in Boston , or the more conciliatory, "Americanist"
approach of A1 Smith'(President Kennedy relied on both), the
attention given to the means of achieving political power was not
notably attenuated by searching examination of the ends to which
that power once achieved would be devoted. This is not to deny
the fact that men like Curley and Smith were in favour of social
and economic reforms - they were much more progressive than their
non-Irish and non-Catholic opponents from the old order - but
much of their energy and sapiential capacities was exhausted in
the power struggle, so that more often than not the economic
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control remained in the same hands as before
Other features of Irish Catholicism united separatist and
Americanist - its clerical paternalism, anti-intellectualism,
legalism and formalism, doctrinal fundamentalism and jansenistic
Puritanism, love of institutional power, and absence of a non¬
conformity which could have acted to temper that love with critical
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caution . It is at first remarkable how many of these features
were duplicated in the Protestant experience, and to the same
effect - conservative upholding of the economic and political status
quo and an absence of radical Christian social criticism. Yet it
is clear that such were the qualifications of entry, and such the
price to pay for even a grudging acceptance in the socio-political
order.
The 'Americanism' controversy itself and Leo XIII's letter
"festem Benevolentiae (1899) proved to be yet another ambiguous stage
of the whole process, which was leading inexorably to the acceptance
the Americanist position, in practice, as the American Catholic con¬
sensus, and the virtual disappearance of separatist tendencies from
the most visible and dominant areas of American Catholicism (again,
we are here concerned with the "fertile crescent"), until our own
times. The condemnation of 'Americanism' (whatever the protesta¬
tions of the American Catholics who favoured the reconciliation of
the Church with American ways, that this was not aimed at them but
at obscure European, in particular French, controversies) was
initially hailed by the separatists as authoritative vindication,
and the Gibbons-Ireland group, within and without the hierarchy,
had to resort to a discrete silence. However, the lasting effect
of the episode was not to establish 'separatism' as the American
Catholic way - such had been without credence since the Civil War
in the U nited States and since the time of Constantine in the
universal Church, and was to disappear soon after this its "last
hurrah" as a viable theologico-political attitude (indeed, its
limited theological and political content, since it was basically
a defensive denominational posture, was not as important in the
long run as its ethnic-cultural component). The main result of
the 'Americanism' condemnation was in the direction of that
impetus to the centralization of ecclesiastical authority in
Rome, which we have seen in Section I; and its most lasting effect
was to bring home to the American Catholic Church that papal
antarchy, which had found its sanction in the definition of papal
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infallibility as an expression of the papal primacy at Vatican I
The separatists were justified in celebrating the discomfiture of
Gibbons and Ireland and the papal brake thus applied to any assertion
of American ecclesiastical autonomy. But they overlooked the fact
that all were Americanists now, including themselves, in their con¬
formity with and acceptance of the prevailing American social ethos.
The re-assertion of papal ecclesiastical control was bereft of any
socio-economic content which might have affected that conformity -
the common authorship of Testem Benevolentiae and Rerjim Novateurn spoke
for nothing but the gap between a conservative policy and an increas¬
ingly critical conception of socio-economic conditions and philosophies
(critical both of state socialism and liberal capitalism).
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CHAPTER II
THE AMERICAN CATHOLIC EPISCOPAL TRADITION
"What the Church in the United States needed most during the
first quarter-century of its established hierarchical life was
a strong central government, profound in its loyalty and
devotion to the Holy See, whole-heartedly in unison with the
dominant anti-foreign and national policies of the day, with
all the parts properly subordinated by the laws of ecclesiastical
authority - the parish to its pastor, the pastor to his bishop,
the bishop to the metropolitan, the whole Church to the Holy
See - with all the prudent and necessary freedom for the merging
of racial characteristics into the national ideal without, how¬
ever, allowing the growth of a sectionalism that might in the
end have been detrimental to Catholic American progress.
This John Carroll did, and did so well that he remains for all
time the exemplar of the loyal citizen and the loyal churchman
1
of our country."
Whatever Guilday's estimation of Carroll, the "founding father" of
the American Catholic hierarchy (1735-1815), and no matter how much
one could question the validity of the criteria of ecclesiastical
authority,"loyal citizen", "loyal churchman", this presents a
remarkable testimony of the episcopal tradition of the American
hierarchy which became established in the history of the American
Catholic Church. Guilday, who preceded John Tracy Ellis as the
doyen of American Catholic historians, wrote this in the 1920's,
and it is the most explicit confirmation I have found of the nature
of ecclesiastical government as this was conceived in theory, became
dominant in the consciousness of the Catholic Church, and determined
the practice in the particular case of the American Catholic Church.
It is ironic, therefore, when one recalls the historical fact
that Carroll himself became the first American bishop by way of
"democratic process" - elected by his fellow priests. This
established a precedent which was quickly superceded by a return
to the labyrinth of ecclesiastical bureaucracy controlled by the
Vatican. (Only Carroll's first two successors were not "appointed".)
The United States was under the authority of the Congregation De
Propaganda Fide, and the American hierarchy was formed in members
and tradition according to the relationships between that
Congregation, other Vatican agencies (especially the Secretariat
of State), and American bishops and priests (lay people's influence
was generally non-existent ). The most important of those relation¬
ships were the result of personal friendship and the establishment
of a Rome-American axis. Here we shall consider some examples and
particularly the more recent leadership of the American hierarchy.
We have already come across the names of representatives of
the principal membership of the episcopate of the early United States
Catholic Church - colonial (Carroll, Spalding - Martin Spalding,
uncle of John Lancaster Spalding, was Archbishop of Baltimore at the
end of the Civil War), French (Verot), Irish (England, Gibbons).
This early United States Church had its centre, appropriately, in
Baltimore (named after the Catholic colonist of "Maryland"), and
the successive bishops of Baltimore represented the course of the
dominating influences on the American episcopate - from the colonial,
through a period of French influence (with the French Sulpicians foun¬
ding the first American seminary - St. Mary's, Baltimore), a short
period of French succession to the bishopric, the spread of this
French influence through men like Flaget (whom we come across in
the Louisville chapter), and the work of the Sulpicians in clerical
formation (one of the significant influences on Irish Catholicism
in its Irish base was this same Sulpician control of clerical
formation in the nineteenth century) - to the establishment of
the Irish dominance under Cardinal Gibbons (1834-1921).
The successive waves of Catholic immigrants brought the
Catholic Church to the important industrial and trade-communications
centres of pre-Civil War America (New York, Boston, Philadelphia,
St. Louis, Charleston, New Orleans), and these became the principal
dioceses,with Baltimore at first being the centre from which these
other dioceses were founded; later they in their turn becoming
metropolitan sees, with suffragan dioceses. One of them - St.
Louis - provides us with a first example of the workings of
ecclesiastical government and the character of those relationships
which controlled that government. At the period in question, the
first two decades after the Civil War, St. Louis was the metropolitan
see of a large part of the mid-west including Chicago. Archbishop
Kenrick of St. Louis (who had himself been a priest of the Baltimore
diocese) had seen to the appointment from Rome (in this case the
Congregation Propaganda Fide) of his own choice to the vacant see
of Chicago - Jaroes Duggan, his own Co-Adjutor , in 1859.
Unfortunately, the new bishop soon began to show signs of that
mental illness which in time was to force his resignation. A
dispute broke out between him and some of the leading clergy of
the diocese and when he suspended their leader, John McMullen, they
appealed to Rome (1868). This was a challenge not only to the
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Chicago bishop but to the metropolitan - Kenrick, a formidable
opponent - and showed a remarkable confidence in their abilities,
in particular a political sophistication which was able to play off
the autarchy of American bishops against Vatican hegemony. In the
event, McMullen's group was vindicated and two of them (McMullen
and Riordan) later became bishops themselves .
This incident shows the terms of ecclesiastical - authority
conflict. Whatever their protestations of the supreme advantages
of the American democratic way, American Catholic bishops were as
monarchical in their own home territory as their aristocratic
contemporaries in Europe, in spite of the fact that there was
nothing similar to the traditional French class structure among
the American clergy . This applied to "Americanists" like Ireland
just as much as to "separatists" like Corrigan. However, there
was a supreme monarchyin Rome which could override the local
satraps, and it was possible, as the Chicago episode demonstrated,
to invoke that authority in the attempt to overcome abuses of the
local ecclesiastical authority. To be successful, however,
required some version of "friends in high places", the most obvious
way, as again in Chicago, the existence of a Rome-American axis,
such as the Rome education of some American priests provided.
Bishops would be alert to the dangers of sending seminarians to
Rome, where they could establish contact and friendships with Italian
clerics, who later could offer support and assistance in such matters
as the Chicago affair; but it was difficult to avoid this once the
tradition of sending American seminarians had been established (an
American bishop who stopped doing so would provoke 'at least'
comment in the Propaganda Fide Congregation, which was in charge also
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of the Urban College in which the American students did their studies
and until 1908, supervised the American bishops).
The proposed appointment of an Apostolic Delegate brought this
issue of ecclesiastical authority to a head, since it underlined the
lack of ultimate autonomy which the American bishops experienced in
their attempts to "Americanize" the Church, and put an additional
check on their ecclesiastical authority. When Satolli was appointed
in 1893 it was against the wishes of the Americanists like Gibbons,
and although they soon came to accept him the appointment was a
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principal cause of the "Romanization" of the American Church , in
the membership and character of its episcopal leadership, which
undermined the confident self-assurance displayed by men like
Spalding, Gibbons and Ireland in their attempts to reconcile their
Catholicism and their Americanism.
Of course, this can be seen and judged from various angles.
If one questions the quality of the ingredients of "the American
way" to which the Americanizers wanted to reconcile their
Catholicism, the Roman obstacle appears in a different light (pro¬
vided Rome offered some guidance in this matter). I.ti the fourth
chapter we shall be considering John A. Ryan, who in my opinion
best examplified the possibilities of this approach. Also, if
one is not a bishop, the advantages of the possible "appeal to higher
authority" are obvious, and the 'Roman' system is not to be scorned
(the Chicago incident)^. No a priori judgment is reasonable -
one must consider how the system operated and, in accordance with
the actual criteria one wishes to emnloy to judge the character of
episcopal actions and policies, the form of ecclesiastical authority
can be evaluated in its practice.
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From the point of view of ecclesiastical appointment, the
"Romanization" of the American hierarchy did not change the un¬
democratic character of the system. Bishops continued to be appointed
from a small group of people, with the natural tendency to perpetuate
their own interests, promote their friends, form an episcopal club
of regional or national proportions. The only difference now was
that the club was chartered, not in Baltimore, New York, or St.
Louis, but in Rome. Nor did the character of the membership change
its "undemocratic" ways - priests and people continued to enjoy
little say in the organization of ecclesiastical affairs. Although
recourse to the Vatican still remained a possibility, if satisfaction
was not to be had from the local bishop, this tended to be limited
by the Roman connections of the hierarchy (in the Chicago episode
an important factor was the Roman background of the priests and the
non-Roman background of the bishops in the case). Unless the
matter in question involved a policy or an issue in which the
bishop was not in concert with Rome (which the Roman education- of
many bishops rendered an unlikely event), or unless the bishop had
abused his authority in flagrante, this possibility of curbing the
power of a bishop, to which the appointment of an apostolic delegate
had alerted the American hierarchy, was virtually overcome. The
price to be paid was the abandonment of any policy and the dropping
of any issue which the authorities in the Vatican did not support.
The pressure to conform was therefore given a Roman twist and the
fate of any American episcopal initiative depended on its acceptance,
or otherwise, by the Vatican. The Modernist period in-the first
two decades of this century completed the process in the Church
universal which the "Americanism" controversy had brought home to
the American Catholic Church, the same process which Martin Marty
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describes for the American Protestant Churches - the prestige of
religious authority grew in inverse proportion to the area of its
concerns .
The separatist and Americanist tendencies had led to a
convergence, through the condemnation of "Americanism" and
"Modernism", which manifests their social and political conservatism.
Both were essentially a conservative reaction to the prevailing
American social order, and the central place which Catholic schools
played in both schemes is yet another indication of that reaction,
since the schools served to integrate the "alien" Catholics into
the social order under "separatist" or "Americanist" auspices.
The separatists were jealous of the power of the Church over its
members, and as a protection against the attacks of the religious
and racial rulers of the society the Church offered the only
sanctuary. The Americanists were secure enough in their ecclesia¬
stical power to venture forth from the Catholic enclave in attempts
to engage the good favour and esteem of the social elites, until
they ventured too far and had-perforce to withdraw back to the
Catholic redoubt. While this did not inhibit their admiration
for all things American, the ecclesiastical constraints rendered
this admiration less and less attuned to the changing currents of
social and political development. The successors of Ireland and
Gibbons in their social and political ideas most often showed no
advance beyond the 1890's, and the inheritance of Catholic social
teaching (with its implicit critique of the socio-economic order)
was preserved from extinction only through the efforts of a few
outstanding priests and lay people, in the first place John A.
Ryan, and the contact with the German Catholic social movement,
promoted by Bishop Ketteler, which the German-American Catholics
of the Central Yerein had established^. Neither separatists nor
Americanists had the benefit of the social and economic ideas which
the advent of Rerum Novarum (1891) was to establish since it was a
long time before this began to be worked into the bloodstream of
Catholic education and institutions; by the time of Quadragesimo
Anno (1931) ecclesiastical leadership had undergone the constraining
effects of the post-Modernism style of Romanization.
Cardinal O'Connell of Boston (1859-1944) symbolized the
transition to a more "Roman" - American episcopate. The method of
his promotion to Boston in 1 906 as Co-ad.jutor cum jure successionis
(after a short time, 1901-1906, as Bishop of Portland, Maine),
where he was appointed only on account of Vatican influence and
in opposition to the wishes of the Boston clerical leadership, was
a classic example of how the American-Rome connection was now
dominant. O'Connell was an American "ultramontane", a protege, of
Cardinal Merry del Val, Secretary of State to Pius X, and coming
back to America, after a period as rector of the North American
College in Rome 1895-1901, on the anti-Modernist wave, he repres¬
ented a style of leadership far removed from that of the Americanists
"Boston's first cardinal represented a new force in
the American Church - a spirit perhaps akin to that of
the classical Renaissance prince.... Stress was now focused
on projecting a massive ecclesiastical presence, resting
upon sound administration and equal to the power and wealth
of government and business institutions. He succeeded in
creating his desired impression"^.
This style in one respect was suited to the Boston Irish scene at
the time, however, because it corresponded to the Irish takeover
of local politics and the projection of a massive ethnic presence.
The quality of these projections in terms of the promotion of
social justice and reconciliation, is of course another matter,
since Boston also exemplified that other phenomenon - the prestige
of religious authority growing, the area of its concerns diminishing.
O'Connell's opposition to John A. Ryan is in itself comment on the
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limitations of this style of authority
Not only was it limited in terms of social and economic
affairs - even at the formal level this ecclesiastical patronage
system suffered the corresponding change and replacement of the
patrons. When Pius X died in 1914 and Merry del Val was no longer
Secretary of State, O'Connell's potential for national episcopal
leadership was finished, almost as soon as it had been initiated
(as long as Cardinal Gibbons lived O'Connell would necessarily
have had to take a back seat, but when Gibbons died in 1921 O'Connell
would have been perfectly placed to assume the mantle). Although
O'Connell was Cardinal - Archbishop of Boston until 1946, his
authority nationally was little more than nominal, and even in his
own territory a similar fate befell him as that of which he had
been the agent himself under Archbishop Williams - his intended
successor was appointed without his consent (to underline the
precarious nature of the Roman patronage system).
We can bring this consideration of the method of episcopal
nomination full circle, since the "intended successor" was
Francis Spellman (in the event New York fell vacant before
O'Connell died and Spellman, the protege of Pius XII, as O'Connell
had been of Merry del Val, was appointed Archbishop). Spellman's
position for national episcopal power was realized more successfully
than 0'Cornell's since Pius XII was Pope until 1958 and Spellman
continued to reap the benefit of this patronage. As a result,
Cardinal Spellman was able to put his stamp on the American hier¬
archy, both by means of his influence on episcopal appointments
(shown most conspicuously in the appointment of the New York
Chancellor, the future Cardinal Mclntyre, to Los Angeles, whence he
proceeded to dominate ecclesiastical leadership on the west coast),
and, in his enthusiastic acceptance of the role of national
Catholic leader and spokesman, dealing on equal terms with the nat¬
ional social, economic, and political leadership (including the
presidency). However, this did not lead to any fundamental change
in the quality of that leadership and in the "iron law" - the
prestige of authority was conditioned by the acceptance of limits
to its range of concerns ("....outside were any attempts to change
the whole fabric of society, to rewrite the social contract, call
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into question basic institutions" .) Until he died in December,
1967 Cardinal Spellman was the titular head of the American hier¬
archy and more than any other bishop gave it a conservative social
and political stamp, in line with that Vatican policy, established
in the pontificate of Pius X and brought to a conclusion with
Pius XII, which had been unwilling to deal with society outside the
limits imposed by the concern to protect the Church internally from
any external, non-ecclestically-approved-and-controlled influences.
When Pope John opened the window, this policy was sucked out.
It is a legitimate point of contention what the merits and
demerits of such a policy are. If one accepts the validity of the
attempt to make the Church, as an institution, a force to he
reckoned with in society, in terms of the conventional climate of
political power and social influence, the 0'Connell-Spellman policy
stands in a different light than would be the case if the ideal is
the Church as an agency of social change ("the leaven" of LG and GS).
In terms of the traditional aspirations of the American Church",
whether separatist or Americanist, the image of ecclesiastical
presence and ecclesiastical authority presented by Francis Cardinal
Spellman admirably combined the separatist concern for the integrity
of the institution with the Americanist attempt to domesticate
Catholicism by demonstrating its compatibility with all things
American. In the absence of a radical critique, such as the
documents of Vatican II provided for the Church and the events of
the '60 s imposed on the American consciousness, those traditional
aspirations prevailed. With some minor exceptions (the pro-Franco
policy, which in any case the American government came to accept;
and a qualification regarding the "freedom for the merging of
racial characteristics into the national ideal", which was never res¬
pected without qualification at any time, either by political or
religious authorities) the words of Guilday with which this chapter
opened could have been written with Cardinal Spellman in mind.
The immediate contemporary leadership of the American hier¬
archy, through the influence of Vatican II, has manifested a
contrast between the traditional method of appointment and its
usual consequences. Cardinal Dearden of Detroit and Cardinal EFT ol
of Philadelphia, past and present presidents of NCCB, in their
episcopal promotions benefited, like Cardinal Spellman, from a
Rome connection. In their case, it was the friendship between
the ordinary of their diocese of Cleveland, P.dward F. Hoban,
and the Apostolic Delegate, Amleto Cicognani, which had been
established during their 'student days in Rome, that brought Dearden
and KV.ol into the hierarchy (both had been in the Cleveland diocesan
major seminary, whence they received their first episcopal appoint¬
ments - Dearden to Pittsburgh in 1943, Knol as vice-chancellor in
Cleveland in 1945, auxiliary-bishop in 1955)- They are, indeed,
only the two principal examples of a remarkable line of Cleveland
priests who have become bishops under the aegis of Cicognani and
Hoban. This method of appointment has not led to the same homogene¬
ity promoted by Cardinal Spellman and Cardinal Mclntyre. As we
shall see in the following sections, the Cicognani-Hoban appoint¬
ments were to include all sides of the post-Vatican II spectrum of
12
opinion within the American hierarchy
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CHAPTER III
THE ORGANIZATION OF ECCLESIASTICAL INVOLVEMENT
IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
In this chapter we come to an investigation of the way in
which the bishops of the United States organized themselves into a
corporate body, to give institutional expression to their collective
ecclesiastical authority as the leaders of the American Church, and
to enable themselves to address, collectively, the social and
political issues which they saw as relevant to their common
responsibility as bishops of the Church (in particular, the issues
of foreign policy discussed in the following sections). This, in
fact, involved an unconscious anticipation of the episcopal
collegiality which Vatican II was to enunciate, and it is the
dialectic between this embryonic collegiality and formal sub¬
servience to papal monarch/which provides us here with an organiza¬
tional scaffolding for the response of the bishops to the issues of
the Vietnam War and Latin America. While this section as a whole
anticipates much of the content of the "Conclusions" of Section V
(since these conclusions are intended to be historically based) in
this section my concern has been to take a broad sweep of the
historical antecedents to the episcopal response to the issues of
Sections III and IV (hence chapters one, two, and four of this
present section) and tie these in with the formation of the organiza¬
tional machinery of the Church in the United States (this chapter
three), through which or, as the case may be, in spite of which,
comes the official response of the bishops to such issues.
A central national agency of the American Catholic Church
originated, in 1917 when the bishops established the 'National
Catholic War Council' to coordinate the service work of the Church
during World War I (organization of a military chaplains' corps,
social service agencies for war relief at home and abroad - the
forerunner of 'Catholic Relief Services' (CRS), which was estab¬
lished during the Second World War). In February, 1919, almost
all the archbishops and bishops met in Baltimore to mark the
golden episcopal jubilee of Cardinal Gibbons, and on that occasion
it was decided to hold an annual assembly of the bishops. At
the first such meeting that September the members of the American
hierarchy voted to establish the 'National Catholic Welfare
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Council' to carry on the initiative of the 1917 Council .
There followed a controversy with the Vatican which underline
the "collegiality" implications of this initiative, then and later
and which is evidence of the anticipatory nature of this Council
noted at the beginning of the chapter. In a decree of the
'Sacred Consistorial Congregation' (which in 1908 had taken over
the supervisory-authority role from Propaganda Fide) signed by
Pius XI in February, 1922, the fledgling organization was declared
to be "no longer useful or necessary". The "Rome" (i.e. Roman
Curia) view was that an episcopal ordinary was supreme in
jurisdiction in his own diocese and accountable only to the Pope;
and their fear was that national organizations like this 'National
Catholic Welfare Council' might begin to formulate Church policy
in a country and thus stand between the local bishop and the Holy
See. (The Curia's power, as we have seen in Section I, was based
on the absence of such a corporate intermediary - hence their
opposition to any forms of conciliarism, in the Middle Ages and at
77
Trent, and their opposition to episcopal collegiality at Vatican II).
Bishop Schrembs of Cleveland was dispatched to Rome by the
American bishops to calm such fear and to reassure the Curia that the
"Council" was a voluntary organization and had no ecclestical
jurisdiction or compulsory authority. The American bishops through
Schrembs appealed to the Pope not to have the Consistorial Congreg¬
ation's statement published in the Acta Apostolicaft Sedis until
review. The Pope agreed, and a new decree of June, 1922 let things
be. To take care of Curial sensitivity the American bishops agreed
to the "suggestion" that the word "Council" be changed, since in
Canon Law "Council" implies legislative powers (for example, the
"Plenary" and "Provincial" Councils of Baltimore, some of the former
being important events in the history of the American Church ), and
in 1923 the organization became the 'National Catholic Welfare
Conference' (NCWC), a name which was to be retained until the post-
Vatican II reorganization.
In 1923 the Conference was officially divided into two bodies -
'National Catholic Welfare Conference' (concerned only with
ecclesiastical affairs); 'National Catholic Welfare Conference
Incorporated (a civil corporation, officially chartered in the
District of Columbia, dealing with public matters). This division
persists in the post-Vatican II reorganization, which came into
effect on January 1, 1967 - the 'National Conference of Catholic
Bishops' (NCCB)(which is considered to be exclusively concerned with
ecclesiastical-pastoral matters (the Church's doctrine on faith and
morals, liturgical reform, religious education, seminary training,
ecumenical relations, etc.)); the 'United States Catholic Conference'
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(USCC), an incorporated organization dealing with public affairs
(hospitals; parochial schools; social work agencies; press
and broadcasting media - 'National Catholic News Service' (NC),
domestic and foreign)) .
In line with this reorganization the bishops had commissioned
a management study of USCC, which was completed in early 1968 and
approved by the Administrative Board of the Conference that April,
for implementation effective June 30, 1968. This study recommended
the concept of a departmental structure, based on major programme
areas, with the grouping of existing and future divisions of the
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Conference within this structure . Thus, in the "programme area"
which is our concern - international affairs - there would be a
'Department of International Affairs', which would include the
various related divisions of the old Conference's structure (the
United Nations office in New York, the Latin American Division,
"Foreign Visitors" office (which was involved with immigration
and naturalization work, much like the traditional similar work
of the old-style political machine and for the same reason -
"our people" were involved and needed help to negotiate the
equally traditionalbureaucratic steeplechase), 'Catholic Relief
Services'(CRS)), and the new 'World Justice and Peace' Division
(WJP), whose origin and operation we shall investigate later in
this chapter, since it is the specific focus of our concern in
this thesis (along with the 'Latin American Division').
Involved in this operation of restructuring would be a.phase-out
of some elements (the BAH study recommended the closing of the
liaison office to the United Nations in New York, and this was
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done), and a consolidation of others (drawing together the similar
functions of CRS, WJP, the 'Latin American Division'). A "Committee
on Research, Plans and Progress" would supervise the implementation
of the management study's recommendations, adapting or modifying
them from within the Conference itself . This is the key committee
from the organizational point of view.
A statement from this committee on July 22, 1970, gives us
an insight into the nature of the USCC itself, reflected in the
very words of the brochure which describes USCC and NCCB to the
general public. The July, 1970 statement makes it clear that
USCC is an agency in the employ of the American bishops, and that
power to determine budget and programming is in the hands of the
bishops, working through the 'Administrative Board'; NCCB has a
different orientation and purpose, corresponding to the "strictly
ecclesiastical responsibilities of the bishops"; USCC represents
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the Church at the national level .
This expresses a convoluted attempt to resolve the dilemma
presented by two factors which must somehow be reconciled -
episcopal control of USCC; avoidance of the identification between
the bishops in their 'persona' as "religious" leaders (NCCB) and their
exercice and promotion of temporal affairs, which perforce stray
into "civil" territory (the traditional American bugbear of the
"separation of church and state"). This also involves an attempt,
at the same time, to preserve the hierarchical character of USCC
while making an obeisance, now customary, if not yet entirely
obligatory, post-Vatican II, in the direction of a recognition of
responsibilities peculiar to the lay members of the "People of God"
for temporal affairs, in their own right and not just as the
instrument of the hierarchy (the classical problem of "Catholic
Action")^. Neither of these attempts is altogether successful -
episcopal control is maintained at the expense of further erosion
of the "separation of church and state" position, and the episcopal
stamp of USCC prevents the initiation of comprehensive collegiality
and co-responsibility (i.e. extending to the laity), in the mission
of the Church in American society.
This dilemma is reflected even in the vocabulary - "USCC is
the national-level action agency of the Catholic Church in the
United States. NCCB is its parent body and normally carries out
its action programs through USCC". - which is a concise statement
of the classical problem of Catholic Action: an agency sponsored
by the bishops serving as a Trojan horse for the promotion of
the institutional concerns of the hierarchy, not as the vehicle
for the collaborative efforts of all the "people of God" for
Christian mission as "the leaven" in society (the gap between the
'Catholic Action' of Pius XI and the "Christian mission" of
'The Church in the Modern World'). Under the surface of the
issues in this thesis is this dilemma of a changed conception of
Christian mission which has not yet been digested in the organiza¬
tional machinery of the Church. Prom time to time I will have
occasion to refer to this shift, and in the concluding section it
will be necessary to deal more directly with this aspect of the
dialectic of "institution" and "ideology" (the Church's organisa¬
tional structure (ecclesiastical authority), and the content of
the Christian message contained in Scripture and 'tradition'
(for our purposes, the 'tradition' of social doctrine of the social
encyclicals and Vatican II) ■. Here we can see its reflection in
the story of USCC.
It was dramatized in the very establishment of the organization
when, as we have seen, the-initial impetus came, not from the
"strictly ecclesiastical responsibilities of the bishops" but from
the preponderantly "secular" concerns of war relief, which
underlined the other horn of the dilemma - "the separation of
church and state". Throughout its history, indeed, whether as
NCWC or USCC, the "national-level action agency" is best known for
its involvement in "secular" affairs, beginning with the "Bishops'
Program of Social Reconstruction" in 1919 which dealt with questions
like minimum wage legislation, legal enforcement of the right of
labour to organize, unemployment and sickness insurance, prevention
of excessive profits, participation of labour in management, child
7
labour amendment . In the following chapter I shall consider the
ecclesiastic chiefly responsible for this particular document and
whose name symbolized the work of NCWC itself, and this work is
impossible to understand if the mythical distinction of religious
and secular is maintained. Vatican II served the additional
function of clarifying the mission of the Church to the world and
in the world, especially its final document GS, as involving a
commitment to change the secular condition of man in the light of
the religious message of the kingdom of God, the fulfillment of
which is beyond the secular but the initiation, the "first fruits" ,
of which have to be realized in time. The fact that the eccles¬
iastical organization was established without benefit of this
articulated theology means that it is out of step in many respects J
but the often unconscious appropriation of the message and the
mission (such as John A. Ryan exemplified) shows that Vatican II
was often anticipated (just as the formation of NCWC anticipated
the articulation of episcopal collegiality in LG), and that "the
g
separation of church and state" was a confusing myth .
A more helpful approach is to observe the distinction between
those matters which the bishops considered to come within their
t 9\
domain ("matters of conscience and belief" ) - as we see in
Section III, "abortion" is a good example - and others which they
ignored or showed little concern with. Into this latter category
came many of the social and political matters which come to our
attention in these pages - the work of John A. Ryan involved the
attempt to make the bishops aware of their responsibilities in
these matters (the 1919 statement being the first result). As
will become apparent later in the course of the narrative, this had
mixed results - a certain amount of success in social and economic
issues at the national level, much less success in the international
field. In this thesis I am more concerned to establish the fact
of this phenomenon: any attempt to give the reasons why is a
more speculative exercise, undertaken elliptically in passing and
very tentatively in the conclusion.
The history of that branch of the NCWC involved with questions
of international relations - the 'Catholic Association for
International Peace' (CAIP) - shows the lack of a corporate aware¬
ness among the American bishops of the importance of the issues and
their responsibility to be concerned. In the first place, it
struggled along on the fringes of the NCWC, never officially a part
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of the corporate structure but a voluntary, loose-knit organisa¬
tion, dependent on the interest and support of like minded
individuals - clergy, laity, religious - only some of whom were
connected with NCWC, either as bishops or as staff. The secretary
of the organizing committee of CAIP was John A. Ryan himself, and
it was through him that the organization came under the umbrella
of the 'Social Action Department' of NCWC. A description of the
Association was printed on the cover of the pamphlets which they
published:
"The Catholic Association for International Peace is
a membership organization. Its object is to further,
in accord with the teachings of the Church, the "Peace
of Christ in the kingdom of Christ", through the
preparation and distribution of studies applying
Christian teaching to international life.
It was organized in a series of meetings during
1926 and 1927 - the first held just following the
Eucharistic Congress in Chicago, the second held in
Cleveland that fall to form an organizing committee,
and the third in East Week, 1929j in Washington, when
the permanent organization was established.
The Association works through the preparation
of committee reports. Following careful prepara¬
tion, these are discussed both publicly and privately
in order to secure able revision. They are then
published by the organization. Questions involving
moral judgments are submitted to the Committee on
Ethics."
The contrast between the peace appeals of Benedict XV during the
Great War, and his internationalism, and the post-World War I
American isolationism formed the background to the Association's
1 0
foundation . A continuing awareness of general Catholic apathy
11
to international affairs punctuated its history
Reading through the Association's statements, reports, and
pamphlets, one finds a reiteration of papal teaching on social
and international themes, much of which - on disarmament, peace¬
time conscription, and foreign aid - representatives of CAIP
1 2
put before the attention of the Congress . CAIP attempted to
promulgate among an American audience - Catholic and non-Catholic
of the educated elite, who might be encouraged to read their
pamphlets and attend their conferences, the corpus of Catholic
teaching on international relations, especially as this had
been presented in papal encyclicals; and while some of that
teaching advocated an internationalism which was unacceptable
to many Americans, it did not result in any significant
modification of the Catholic obsession with the anti-Communist
crusade as the only real international issue. We shall
observe this dogging especially the final years of John A Ryan's
career; and particularly as articulated by Pr. Coughlin and
Senator Joe McCarthy, this became the dominant representation of
the Catholic view of international affairs, with episcopal
1 3
encouragement . Even a mild attempt by CAIP to broaden the
discussion could meet with a note of caution from John Courtney
Murray, S.J. - his comment on a CAIP paper, 'Co-Existing with
Communism':
85
"It seems to me that the relations between the Christian
concept of man and the Communist concept are better
characterized by the word "war" than by the term "co¬
existence". I mean of course a war that is carried
1 4
on purely by intellectual and spiritual means."
At the beginning of Section III I shall record the response
to the events of the Vietnam War of CAIP, and we shall see there
its general acceptance of the anti-communist consensus. The
Association was limited in its attempts to address international
issues not only by the constraints of the Catholic embrace of
the anti-communist crusade, to the neglect of more fundamental
soc.ial and economic injustice at home and abroad, but also in
its very composition and in the quality of its teaching. As
a fringe group of NCWC it fell between two stools - not official
enough to utilize the seal of hierarchical approval for its
impact to be extensive throughout the institutions of the
American Church (by contrast with Ryan and the Social Action
Department itself); the potential of lay involvement limited to
a small circle of the Catholic elite (not extensive enough to
affect the broad spectrum of the Church's educational institu¬
tions - the Social Action Department itself faced similar
limitations, and the heightened social consciousness of the clergy
in comparison to that of the laity which we shall observe in the
concluding section reflects the limited extension of its
influence). Another limitation of CAIP, which reflects a more
general deficiency in the organizations of the Church set up to
address the social, economic, and political questions (in the next
chapter, we shall consider Ryan's awareness of the problem:
in the following sections, we shall hear a constant refrain along
these lines), was expressed in a letter of Brendan F. Brown of
the Catholic University of America School of Law, dated January
24, 1940, in which he refers to a statement from the 'Law and
Organization Committee' of the CAIF, and points up one notable
characteristic of this kind of activity - what Brown calls
"a tendency toward abstract conceptualism":
"As the report brings out, for many years the Popes
and other religious leaders have been calling the
world's attention to the postulates of Christian ethics
in the world order but without success. While this
is a very important contribution apparently the problem
would have to be attacked not only from the normative
side, but from the viewpoint of a study of actual
economic and national and sociological conditions which
in the language of scholastic philosophy would be the
fundamenta in re on which the moral principles are to
operate."^
Thirty years later, the response of the American bishops to the
16
war in Vietnam and to the situation in Latin America is
affected by a lack of attention to the fundament^, in re, or
an unwillingness to accept the evidence of disturbingly un¬
pleasant "conditions" demanding the response from the "moral
principles".
By that time, however, a new dimension had been given to
the Church's responsibility in international relations by the
experience of Vatican II, and it is to the organization of
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church involvement in this field that we now must turn our
attention. Unlike the foundation of NCWC and CAIF, the initiative
came from outside the United States, from the central ecclesias¬
tical authority in Rome (Pope and Ecumenical Council), and it
is my contention (to be developed in what follows in later
sections) that this initiative, on balance, illustrates the
possible advantage of the "Roman obstacle" to which I referred
17
in the previous chapter (as distinct from "the American way")
Paragraph 90 of the 'Pastoral Constitution on the Church
in the Modern World' (GS) called for the setting up of an organism
of the universal Church for the promotion of development and
international social justice concerns throughout the Catholic
community. A working group was formed, and from January to May
1966, held a series of meetings which resulted in a 'Report to
the Holy See of the Working Group charged with making proposals
for the implementation of paragraph 90, Gaudium et Spes,
calling for the creation of an organism of the Universal Church
to stimulate the Catholic Community to promote development of
needy regions and social justice among nations'. (Rome, May 9-12,
1 8
1966.) The co-chairmen of this working group were Bishop
Edward Swanstrom, head of CRS, and Msgr. Jean Rodhain,
president of Caritas Internationalis (the relief aid and develop¬
ment agencies of the American Catholic Church and the Vatican).
The secretary was Msgr Joseph Gremillion, one of Swanstrom's
deputies at CRS. Among the eighteen participant members were
Msgr Giovanni Benelli (Permanent Observer of the Holy See at
UNESCO), Louis Lebret, O.P. and Gerald Mahon of Mill Hill (the
former a peritus at Vatican II, the latter a spokesman for the
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the "mission countries" at the Council), Henri de Riedmatten
(the delegate of the Holy See to the U.N. at Geneva), and
Vittorino Veronese (a prominent leader of Italian Catholic
Action). Among the six consultants were Arthur McCormack of
Hill Hill and Roberto Tucci of the 'Civilta Ca"fctoliea'.
It was not by accident that Swanstrom and Gremillion were
in important positions in this group. During the Vatican Council
the American bishops, with few exceptions (Meyer, Ritter, Hallinan),
had been silent most of the time, but no other group of bishops
could equal their resources in personnel, organization, finance.
When there was an evident will to influence some aspect of the
Council's deliberation as on the 'Declaration on Religious
Liberty', their support was decisive (this declaration, which
gave the official seal of approval to the American system of the
non-confessional state, was the only major American contribution
to Vatican II, but does not rank in importance with the central
documents - LG and GS). But on most conciliffcr topics the
Americans stayed in the background. One other exception to this
pattern came when Swanstrom proposed the amendment to Schema XIII
1 9
which became paragraph 90 of _GS . As one of the group of
churchmen involved with the organizations, like CRS and Caritas,
for the promotion of disaster relief and economic development in
the third world, and as the American bishop most familiar with
the needs of bishops in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, Swanstrom
had wide support for such an initiative. The subject of world
poverty, justice and peace was the topic of over a hundred
speeches at Vatican II, and a constituency was formed there for
a commitment by the universal Church to these concerns (stimulated
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by the evident interest of Pope John and Pope Paul).
A provisional committee succeeded the working group and
was in existence from July to December, 1966, chaired by
Cardinal Roy of Quebec. On October 17th it recommended to
Pope Paul that an autonomous 'Papal Commission' be set up,
separate from the 'Consilium pro Laicis' and the 'Secretariate
of State'. At the same time, October 1966, Swanstrom was
pressing upon the American bishops the formation of an
American counterpart and constituent agency of the proposed
'Papal Commission', urging "moral leadership and inspiration"
from the U.S. Church, "in view of global responsibilities of
our nation as leader of the free world, with all its vast
20
affluence and power."
Liaison had been established with other American Churches.
The first meeting of the 'Joint Working Group' of the National
Council of Churches (NCC) and the Catholic 'Bishops' Committee
for Ecumenical Affairs' had met (May 25-26, 1966), and among
the subjects they had discussed was "the complex and far
ranging field of international social justice and development
as the basis of world peace." After the World Council of
Churches Conference on 'Church and Society' in Geneva, July, 1966,
a consultation was held with the NCC in New York in October on
the concerns of justice and peace, with Swanstrom, Gremillion,
George Higgins of the Social Action Department, Bishop. Wright
(the episcopal moderator of the Department), and Bishop Carberry




On January 6, 1967, in the motu proprio 'Catholicam Christi
Ecclesiam' Pope Paul set up the 'Pontifical Commission Justitia.
et Pax, which held its first plenary meeting at the Vatican,
April 18-25. The Pope also gave it its charter document -
the Encyclical 'Populorum Progressio' (Easter Sunday, March 26,
1967), the latest addition to the "social encyclicals" of Leo
XIII, Pius XI, and John XXIII. On February 1st, the report of
the committee set up by the NCCB the previous November, in
response to Swanstrom's letter, advised that a 'Bishops'
Committee for World Justice and Peace' be set up:
"The strong emphasis of the Committee and its secretariat
must be educational in the large sense of the term:
the creation of awareness among Catholics, especially
of lay leaders, of the poverty, hunger and illiteracy
of half the human family; the formation of Christian
conscience and commitment to influence societal,
economic and political policy and structures for world
justice and peace, particularly in view of Vatican II
decrees and the Holy Sees present initiatives."
The. educational program was to be channeled through existing
structures-the departments of the recently reformed USCC, the
National Catholic organizations, the diocesan and religious -
order school systems. The content of this long term educa¬
tional effort should include the need to re-structure world
patterns of trade and finance, examining the ways in which
world poverty affects peace. Efforts to influence the national
society could best be done in concert with other religious, as
well as secular, groups involved in the same task. The three
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bishops of this Committee were Swanstrom, Dougherty and Benincasa,
and this report reflected what was now a consensus of the
interested parties - the officials of the NCC, the American
Catholic hierarchy, the CRS, and those people in the academy and
other institutions who wanted a more enlightened approach to
international economic development.
At their semi-annual meeting in April, 1967* the NCCB
established the official 'Bishops' Committee', and set up a
'Secretariat for World Justice and Peace' to service the
committee and act as its executive or operating arm. The
members of the bishops' committee were Dougherty (chairman),
Swanstrom, Benincasa (auxiliary in Buffalo, N.Y.), Primeau
(Manchester, N.H*)> Reed (Oklahoma City-Tulsa, Okla.) Wright
(Pittsburgh P.a.), Bernardin (auxiliary in Atlanta, Ga.). The
secretariat was to begin operations in June and its budget
($48 thousand) from July 1st. Msgr Marvin Bordelon of Sh,YSvepoft
La. was appointed executive-secretary.
The personalities involved merit some attention. We have
had occasion already to describe Bishop Edward E. Swanstrom,
executive-director of CRS. Later it will be necessary to go
into further detail about the character of CRS but for the
present it is enough to note that Swanstrom, who had been in
charge of CRS since 1946, was and is an influential personality
in the American hierarchy, and is not just one of the dozen
auxiliary-bishops of New York. His importance is due both to
the nature of his job and his long tenure which have put him in
contact with the worldwide church and its material needs more than
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any other American bishop. At the same time, the nature of
CRS activities does not lend itself to a radical evaluation of
the workings of the international economic system; it is
directed to attend to the immediate needs of feeding the hungry
and rescuing the victims of catastrophe, natural or man-made.
Like his predecessor, the recently retired CardinalO1 Boyle,
and a host of other American Catholic churchmen involved in trying
to serve the immediate economic and social needs of the deprived,
Swanstrom is concerned with the starving man at the gates whose
needs cannot await a better ordering of the system. The work
of 'Justice and Peace' (whether at Vatican or American Church
level) for such a man is seen within the same framework - the
stirring of the consciences of American Catholics, and any other
potential allies, to attend to the immediate needs of the two-
thirds of the world's population who do not enjoy the benefits
immediately available to the reasonably contented one-third.
Bishops Ernest Primeau, Victor Reed, and John Wright,
represented the minority of American bishops who stood out at the
time of Vatican II and later as moderately progressive promoters
of its reforms, patently competent churchmen who would speak their
minds, and whose views merited attention. Reed in particular was
a convinced supported of aggiornamento; Primeau, from the
beginning, represented the conciliar cause in New England, and
during the period of our concern - the late '60s and early '70s -
found like-minded men among his fellow members of the Boston
province (as we shall see in Section III; Wright in the conciliar
period and its aftermath came to be accepted by the American
hierarchy as its leading theological light, and it was no surprise
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when this culminated in his appointment in '69 to a leading
position in the Roman Curia. Wright also, as we have seen, took
an interest in the CAIP and was committed to promoting a greater
attention among American Catholics to the solution of the problems
22
of the international community-
Two other members of this first 'Bishops' Committee for
World Justice and Peace' are principal participants in the events
discussed later - Joseph Bernardin and John Dougherty. Bernardin
at the time was auxiliary to Archbishop Hallinan of Atlanta,
another of the American bishops who had made a notable contribution
23
to the Vatican Council . Hallinan was known above all for his
support of liturgical reform. Those who were informed and
progressive in matters liturgical, in the sense that they
supported the need to respect the "pastoral" character of the
liturgy - the notion of liturgy as "for the benefit of the people",
for their growth in the christian life, and not just a formal act
of worship bound by a rubrical code - were the same people at
Vatican II who were in favour of a re-definition of the Church
and its mission. There is a direct link between the:'Constitution
on the Liturgy', that on 'the Church', and Gaudium et Spes. Men
like Hallinan who had been in on the ground floor of the Council -
liturgical reform - were in a position to advance, with the same
conciliar spirit, to 'The Church in the Modern World' (GS) and
its conception of Christian mission. Bernardin, as a protege' of
Hallinan, came under this influence, and it is not surprising to
find him in the 'Justice and Peace' committee. Shortly afterwards
he became the General Secretary of the NCCB and USCC, and it is in
that 'persona' that he figures prominently in this study .
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John Dc^gherty, the chairman of the committee, in status is
like Swanstrom. At face value, as an auxiliary-bishop of
Newark, N.J., he could be ignored, until other details are added.
The American hierarchy is not known for its intellectual competence,
but for that very reason anyone with such competence, as
in the case of Wright, has certain advantages. Dougherty is a
fully qualified scripture scholar, and for years was president of
Seton Hall University, the best known and biggest Catholic college
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in New Jersey . Over the years he has gained a certain standing
among the American bishops, as attested by his continuing appoint¬
ment to chair 'Justice and Peace' committees (at this writing he
is the chairman of the 'Secretariat for Social Development and
World Peace', which oversees all the programs of social action,
justice and peace of the USCC.) In addition, he enjoys the
advantage traditional in Catholic Church structures of being, and
looking like, a venerable sexagenarian (in this regard, the low
profile of Cardinal Spellman's successor in the American hierarchy
does nothing to undermine the tradition). In retrospect, and as
this narrative will show,'World Justice and Peace' (WJP), as a
second-level structure within the USCC, has been fortunate to
have a "father figure" like Dougherty.
The man appointed chief administrative officer of the new
committee and secretariat, Marvin Bordelon, brings us full circle
back to the world of CRS, although with a twist which will be of
importance in the later evolution of affairs. We have already
seen the connection between CRS and the conciliar-Vatican origins
of 'Justice and Peace'. It remains to add some personal details.
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Gremillion, chief administrative officer of the Pontifical
Commission, who before his appointment had. been an auxiliary of
Swanstrom as "director of socio-economic development of the overseas
social agency of the national conference of the Catholic Bishops of
of Louisiana, the immediate predecessor of Bordelon in the same
parish in Shreveport, in the diocese of Alexandria, La., and a
confrere and friend of Marvin Bordelon and his brother, who is
regional director in South America of CRS. The three thus form
an interesting triumv/irate and an important one for the formation
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of 'Justice and Peace' . Their institutional locus in the CRS
underlines the symbiotic relationship of CRS and WJP. Already
we can detect, in the very description Gremillion gave of his job
at CRS, before he moved to the Pontifical Commission, a change in
ideology which would be accentuated in the future and eventually
would lead to the critical fissure we shall witness between CRS
and WJP: "Socio-economic development" is a stage along the road
from relief work to critical questioning of the economic system.
Bordelon conceived his task along the lines of a more
enlightened approach to international economic development,
dependent on an educational mission to the American Catholic
public, in cooperation with similar efforts of the 'National Council
of Churches' and any non-ecclesiastical initiatives (Bordelon soon
was to become involved in the establishment of the 'Overseas
Development Council' (ODC));■ in league with efforts to reform
official U.S. government aid, directed by the State Department
through its 'Agency for International Economic Development'(AID).
the United States" (as he described himself in a speech at Notre
Dame University in March
It was not envisioned, by him that 'World Justice and Peace' (WJP)
should be involved with more direct questions of war and peace,
like the war in Vietnam. This point has to be emphasized, strange
though it may seem in light of the involvement of Americans at that
time in Vietnam on a massive scale, and in view of the events to be
discussed shortly - Bordelon took up his job with no awareness that
Vietnam was an immediate issue. This is clear from a letter he
wrote to Bishop Dougherty in July, 1967, after their initial
discussions about the work of 'Justice and Peace':
"The matter of statements came up, for example, on
Vietnam, on peace, and on foreign aid. We agreed
that we were too new, or at least not ready to make
27statements on these significant issues immediately."
This initial reluctance to become involved in controversy was
reflected at a meeting of the Bishops' Committee itself, in New
Y ork, January 15-16, 1968. CALCAV ('Clergy and Laymen Concerned
about the War in Vietnam') was sponsoring a meeting in Washington
and an invitation to the Catholic hierarchy had been passed along
to the Committee, to send a spokesman, but they shied away from
this exposure, even suggesting that a non-member be asked to
speak for the hierarchy (the names mentioned were Archbishop
Hallinan or Bishop Pulton Sheen).
Behind this reluctance lay an even more significant factor -
lack of support from the bishops for the whole 'Justice, and Peace'
enterprise. A proposed seminar on 'Justice and Peace' issues to
be held in St. Louis in June, 1968, had to be cancelled.
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"We began in early spring with a well founded hope that
some 35 bishops and 50 religious superiors would attend.
The religious superiors held rather firm but in the weeks
before the seminar we ended up with only seven bishops
28
firmly committed."
The following year the Archbishop of Chicago (the largest diocese
in the coufitry) declined Bishop Dougherty's suggestion that an
archdiocesan committee be formed for 'Justice and Peace',
29
as part of a national network . A seminar, December 2-4, 1969,
to prepare a guide to assist dioceses throughout the U.S.A. in
implementing the Church's teaching on 'justice and peace', issues
drew representatives from 34 of the 160 dioceses. Throughout
the course of the following chapters it will be noticeable how
often the same few bishops become involved in 'justice and peace'
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issues , and that the majority of the American hierarchy remain
silent.
With the establishment of the 'Bishops' Committee for World
Justice and Peace' the issues of international relations entered
the organizational structure of the Catholic hierarchy. This
was one important difference between the new institution and the
CAIP. After the BAH management study the 'Division for World
Justice and Peace' (WJP) became part of USCC (before, as servicing
the 'Bishops' Committee', it had "technically" been part of NCCB -
as we have already noted, this distinction between USCC and NCCB,
like the earlier one between NCWC and NCWC,Inc., is in fact only
an unsuccessful subterfuge, made more absurd by the fact that it
rz a
is a case of the same people wearing different hats .) Prom
that point on 'Justice and Peace' was in a position to be integrated
with, the operation of the various structures and societies of the
American Church, under hierarchical auspices (the dioceses,
parishes, religious orders of men and women, and their institutions •
schools, colleges, social services - in the U.S.A. and abroad).
An officially established 'Justice and Peace' network was now
possible, and this the new Division began to inaugurate. Even
though the specific issues we are to consider here came too soon in
the fledgling organization's history for it to make adequate use
of this network, we shall witness something of its operation and
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the importance of its establishment
The more fundamental dilemma of Church "institution" and
"ideology" remains unresolved - the hierarchical character of
USCC and WJP militates against the missionary vocation of all the
Catholic people to be conscious of a collegial responsibility as
members of the Church to work for the promotion of the conditions
of the Kingdom in society (the "leaven" - 1G, paragraph 31)
because the proprietary instincts and interests of the bishops
which have been established in an "Americanist" direction
(Chapter i) are opposed to the prophetic mission of the Church
to be critical of the socio-economic-political order; and their
style of episcopal authority has emphasized form at the expense of
substance, power and prestige at the expense of responsibility
(Chapter II). In the following sections we shall see this being
dramatized as WJP becomes involved in controversial issues, and as
it and the Tjatin American Division' attempt to influence the
attitudes and actions of the bishops. Before that, to give a
more personal precedent, of historical importance to the themes
of this section, and in many respects a prophetic harbinger of
the actual issues discussed in Sections III and IV, let us
consider the figure of John A. Ryan.
CHAPTER IV
THE FORGOTTEN INHERITANCE OF
JOHN A. RYAN
"....the entire heritage of American Catholic social action
and. of the Protestant Social Gospel often seems to have
1
been forgotten."
We can complete this historical survey by considering now that
part of American Catholic history which is most directly
relevant to the contemporary issues which are the subject of
the following two sections. One name stands out in such a
consideration, since as first head of the 'Social Action Depart¬
ment' of the NCWC he was the most important teacher and prophet
to the American hierarchy on the issues of social justice and
2
international peace - John A. Ryan .
Ryan's professional career as a teacher and promoter of
social justice began in that age of American Catholic history
which was the heyday of Gibbons and Ireland (the latter Ryan's
own ordinary), and ended in the twilight of the New Deal, which
had seen Ryan's social concerns vindicated as a legitimate
programme for Church and State. The two most influential
experiences of his formative years were his contact with
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Minnesota populism and his reading of Rerum Novarum in 1894 .
Not only did this give Ryan an understanding of the compatibility
between the progressive social ideas of populism and Catholic
social teaching; it gave him that confidence, which he possessed
all his life, in the possibilities of reconciling the best in
Americanism, as represented by the heritage of populism and
social progressivism, with the social Catholicism of the great
encyclicals, without sacrificing the radical character of either
as a critique of the economic, political, and social order which they
had inherited from the past. Ryan's career is significant because
of the radical, critical character of the Americanism and the
Catholicism which he exemplified. In later times, and in a
different historical context, many of Ryan's ideas could not be
considered radical, but conservative (like the New Deal itself).
But this is to miss the point of Ryan's example - it is because
his example was not followed that the American Catholic bishops
and the American Catholic Church in general did not respond to the
2
issues raised by Vietnam and Latin America in the way that Ryan did
to social and economic problems from the populist era to the New
Deal: that is the character of "the forgotten inheritance".
Today, it is difficult to appreciate that Rerum Novarum (RN)
could ever be considered a radical document, but its acceptance of
the possibilities of state intervention in the economy, the
advocacy of "a just wage", and the recognition of labour unions
as legitimate instruments for securing the rights of employees,
4
were unwelcome interferences with the prejudices of the Gilded Age .
It was not just Ryan's acceptance and promulgation of the principles
of RN which marked him out as a social reformer, but his ability to
relate specific economic policies to the realization of those
principles - the theory of under consumption of John A. Hobson, the
concept of a "living wage", increasing the purchasing power of the
poor. Ryan came up against a lack of social concern in the Church
5
and an unwillingness to support measures of social justice .
This was further enhanced, and exploited by conservative upholders
of the status quo, by the use of the communist and socialist bogey
to discredit social reform ( a tactic which has continued to be
exploited throughout contemporary American history )^. The
Catholic hierarchy in particular articulated a strident anti-
communism which made them susceptible to this conservative trap.
In spite of this, Ryan's first achievement at the NCWC was a
remarkable fillip to the promotion of ecclesiastical support of
social reform - the "Bishops' Program for Social Reconstruction"
of 1919 which Ryan hastily assembled and had no time to edit
properly. Within the Church, this "Program" gave authoritative
sanction to Ryan's reforms, even though in fact only four bishops
and Ryan were responsible for the document and it had no
legislative or definitive character. No bishop came out
publicly against it, several showed their enthusiasm for it, and
it came to be accepted, with the approval of the Catholic press,
as a standard, along with RN, for the efforts of the Church in the
7field of social action and economic reform . Even though the
succeeding lean years of the Harding-Coolidge-Hoover era put back
8
the fulfillment of Ryan's vision , he displayed courage and per¬
severance in continuing his efforts at education and persuasion.
This he did through his teaching at Catholic University, where he
formed a whole generation of "social action" priests, and from
q
his important forum at the 'Social Action Department . He had
to fight again the old battles over a 'living wage", union recog¬
nition and union rights, along with the new battle over the child-
10 11
labour amendment . In spite of the 1928 setback , all came
right in the end, with the confirmation from within the Church of
1 2
Ryan's position in the publication of Quadragesimo Anno and the
accession of Roosevelt.
Ryan had been outspoken in his criticism of the Hoover
administration:
"Ry an knew that fundamental reform would not occur
1 3
until Hoover left the White House."
Now he set out upon the crowning accomplishment of his career:
"All in All, Monsignor Ryan was more the New Deal's
Ambassador to Catholics than a Catholic legate to the
New Deal. He helped create the social mood and the
program that the New Deal embraced. Bu't his greatest
service was in acclimating that program to Catholic
1 4
Americans."
In that role Ryan clashed with another priest" Charles Coughlin.
In his famous radio speech of October 8th, 1936 Ryan answered
Coughlin's criticisms of the New Deal and defended it against
the "communism" bugatoo. As the Second World War approached
Ryan vigorously opposed the isolationism in American Catholicism
which Couglin articulated. In 1926 Ryan had been the chairman
of the small committee which had organized the CAIP, and during
these years had been associated with its efforts to promote among
Catholics that concern for international affairs which Benedict XV
1 5
m particular had promoted . But Catholic opinion had
16
crystallized around the menace of communism , and Catholicism
had been compromised by the support given to Franco's revolt in
17 18
Spain and the Vatican's diplomatic embrace of Fascism - Ryan
was on the defensive, and Coughlin was in the ascendant until
America entered the war.
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The 1930s were the crucial period in contemporary American
Catholic Church history. The memories of 1928 lingered on to
reinforce Catholic suspicions of the nativist anti-Catholicism
of their fellow citizens and their own lack of confidence in
1 9
social acceptance , making them easy prey to the appeal of Coughlin,
and later Joe McCarthy, when these particular Catholics seemed to
20
identify a cause which reconciled Americanism and Catholicism
During these years also Coughlin was able to feed on German and
Irish - Catholic opposition to European wars (WASP wars) and his
simplistic appeals to narrow nationalism, zenophobia, ethnic
prejudice, suspicion of political parties and financial powers,
struck a chord which has resonated throughout American history.
Coughlin diverted attention away from the needs of social reform
and economic and political reorganization (Ryan's concerns) to a
confused and confusing appeal to quasi-apocalyptic crusades against
the anti-Christ. In doing so he demonstrated another possibility
of religiously based and legitimated "social action" which could
take the experience of personal and social distress and dissipate
its reforming energies in some cathartic release as the extreme
21
millenarists had done in all ages . Even when Coughlin was
silenced by Archbishop Mooney the tensions lived on. Some
were mitigated through the experience of the war, from 1943 to
1946, and the anti-communist crusade of the Cold War; while the
conservative Catholicism predominant until after Vatican II gave
to American Catholics a vicarious experience of authoritarianism.
Ryan was a representative of those Catholics whom 'the experience
of the Depression and the vacuity of the Harding-Coolidge period had
rendered sceptical of the prevailing socio-economic order and
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22
receptive to the radical elements in Catholic social teaching ,
while at the same time responsive to the potential of strong
23
government action to change that order . The depth and pace of
change, however, were hostage to the inertia and apathy in Church
and nation which had halted the flow of progressive social
policies promoted for quarter of a century by the mid-west populists
24
like Ryan . The Church was still vulnerable to the intimidation
of those who controlled the agencies of economic power and
privilege and who would resist any encroachments. The achieve¬
ments of the New Deal, like the meaning for the American Catholic
Church of the efforts of John A. Ryan, cannot be gauged in an
anachronistic calculus based on more recent experience, but must be
assessed in light of the situation which they attempted to change.
In that context, the most significant comparison for the American
Catholic Church is that the work of John A. Ryan grows in stature
when it is compared with the absence of similar progress along the
radical path he pioneered.
Ryan himself was apprehensive about the future and the
possible return of the "Bourbons". He himself had experienced the
set backs of the '20s, when the causes of the 1890s had to be taken
25
up again . His own approach, which relied on the power of the
federal government, was dependent on holding in check the Catholic
suspicion of federalism, which could be used by the majority
Protestants to impose their own foim of religion nation-wide.
Ryan had opposed since his formation under the influence of
26
populism and RN's corporatism Catholic acceptance of American
economic individualism, and he had always seen the necessity of
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government intervention to control the monopolistic power of the
"Bourbons". While supporting the unions, Ryan considered them
inadequate to promote economic reforms necessary for social justice
without the overarching control of the economy by a powerful
reform-minded federal executive. In his singlemindedness Ryan
was less concerned with the dangers of the state than
other Catholics who, suspicious of the power of government in the
wrong hands, appreciated better than he the pitfalls of an all-
powerful state, and concentrated their efforts on support of the
27
unions as the instrument for attaining social justice . Into
this category came some of Ryan's own proteges. In the first place
McGowan, his assistant, who conceived of a system of economic self-
government within the political state, and the need for an
industrial democracy in which labour would share in management and
in the profits of industry. These ideas (state control, industrial
democracy) could find justification for their claims in and KN,
since Catholic social teaching cast a wide net.
In addition, the presence of the Catholic Worker Movement, and
the social implications of the Liturgical Movement led by Virgil
Michel, made visible yet more possibilities of realizing the
fundamental principles of that teaching: respect for the human
person and the family, within a social order geared to the needs of
both; respect for the freedom of the individual and his right to
form intermediate associations. Ryan was vulnerable to the criticism
that he neglected the religious, liturgical-spiritual foundations of
social justice, in favour of a too exclusive concern with the nuts
28
and belts of economic reform . However, if these various strands of
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Catholic social action are seen as complementary, not exclusive, the
inaispensability of Ryan's contribution is apparent, as the way by
which the principles of Catholic social teaching formed the found¬
ation for a set of economic policies to reform the prevailing economic
29
order in favour of social justice . The Liturgical Movement and
the Catholic Worker Movement expressed elements of a comprehensive
approach to social and personal reform founded on Christian
30




All three approaches were complementary and have come down to
the contemporary American Catholic Church as a valuable inheritance.
Unfortunately, they have not been sufficiently appropriated by
American Catholics. The Liturgical Movement is the one which has
impinged most directly on contemporary American Catholic consciousness,
through the liturgical reforms of Vatican II. The mixed reception
which these have been accorded is a manifestation of the spotty,
neglected, unresponsive reception earlier given to the liturgical
32
movement . The Catholic Worker Movement remains very much a
minority concern - undoubtedly, it has influenced many of the more
active and committed Catholics, in particular those who like the
Berrigans protested against the war in Vietnam from the prophetic
stance of Christian pacifism, and who have been involved in the
movements for racial and social justice, in opposition to the
dominant values of American society. But until recently it has
been considered a maverick phenomenon, with minimal episcopal support.
The Social Action Movement, which is the focus of our attention, did
not incorporate the example of John A. Ryan into an on-going work
108
of radical social criticism and reform, or extend Ryan's vision
33
internationally
It is this particular "forgotten inheritance" which can give
us a point of reference for the variety of events and issues which
will be considered in the following section. The failure to
integrate the Liturgical-Catholic Worker - Social Action-movements
has been a corporate loss for the American Catholic Church. The
unpreparedness and confusion which attended the Church's assimila¬
tion of Vatican II in the United States attested to the absence of a
corporate awareness of those concerns to which the Council addressed
itself - the very same concerns adumbrated in the three movements we
have been considering. However inadequate his understanding of the
spiritual and theological dimension of his apostolate, no matter
how minimal his comprehension of the place of the lay Catholic in
such work, Ryan had tried to involve the Church as a religious
institution in the work of social and economic reform. He had
pioneered a conception of christian mission in society which a
renewed theology of the Church could have built on, to engage the
attention and energies of those Catholics (lay, in addition to
priests and religious) who were being formed in a broader and more
authentic Christian apostolic tradition. The question to be asked
is, why did Ryan's vision and his work remain a petrofla^enterprise,
its authentic radical character a forgotten precedent in the
American Catholic Church?
One reas.on can be found in the domestication of what was at
one time considered radical (minimum wage legislation, state
intervention in the economy, massive public works programmes) and
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was now the law of the land. The same apathy which had originally
worked against the radical proposals now acted to limit their scope
(or, as Ryan had discovered in the '20s, grasped any opportunity
to turn the clock back.). The men of vision, like Ryan, were
upsetting the established order in Church and State, and no matter
how many people were to come under his influence, their number was
not to be compared with that of the others, clergy and laity, who
were not exposed to Ryan's presentation of Catholic social
34
teaching, and who were daily subject to other influences . In
spite of all, a certain amount of the message has been installed
in the consciousness of many churchmen, so that on certain issues
(racial justice, poverty programmes) even the most conservative
Catholic bishop reacts to manifestations of plutocratic disinterest
in the poor. Cardinal O'Boyle did not appear at any White House
Sunday service in recent years. As a member of the "social action"
tradition, his ecclesiastical conservatism had its limits.
Another reason was that the bugaboo of "socialism" and
"communism" ensnared the American Catholic Church where it had not
35
succeeded with John A. Ryan. In that sense, Coughlin had prevailed
The emphasis given to the negative condemnations in the papal
encyclicals ("anti-communism", "anti-socialism") and the correspond¬
ing neglect of their anti-capitalism (especially as expressed in QA)
suited those who, for whatever reason, were more concerned to re¬
concile their Catholicism with the American way of life as defined
by the Bourbons than to undertake the task of promoting critical
36)
social reform in the light of the relevant parts of the encyclicals
"As the anti-communist stance became identified with
patriotism and virtue, the prestige of the church was
vastly enhanced and its loyalty to America was less and
37
less questioned."
This, put people like Ryan on the defensive on two counts - the
need to defend the New Deal and social reform in general against
the charge of communism, and the need to defend his clerical
involvement?Ryan could answer the first charge, but the second
exposed the vulnerability of his position - the isolation which
had once been his protection, since it had allowed that independ¬
ence from congregational pressure not enjoyed so easily by
Protestant and Jewish spokesmen, and the insulation within the
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NCWC , were drawbacks in the public confrontation with Coughlin
in 1936, and thereafter underlined the absence of a sufficiently
broad base of support for Ryan's and the Social Action Department's
concerns within the American Catholic people.
This exposed an important flaw in NCWC, and later USCC, which
we come across in the following sections - the clerical cast of
the ecclesiastical institutions prevented the extension of
responsibility to lay Catholics, formed in the Church's social
teaching and equipped to spread the influence of that teaching in
all sectors of society, including government. Instead, the Church
continued to be identified with the clerical leadership, so that
even the most energetic social reformers like Ryan were not
supported by an informed Catholic opinion able to extend the scope
of such work beyond the circumscribed confines, however important,
of the few professionals. There was a gap between the clerical
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specialists like Ryan, Dietz, Haas , who were involved nationally
and the majority of the parish clergy and the Catholic people.
The latter were, as Catholics, preoccupied with the domestic
concerns of running their schools, financing church building,
attending to social concerns through their voluntary societies
like, the Knights of Columba, the St. Vincent de Paul Society?
rather than through organized efforts to change the social and
economic order. They were jealous of their own institutions and
opposed to cooperation with non-Catholics. Corresponding to
this was a conception of the priesthood which was geared to the
narrowly defined image of the Church and its mission - the Church
as a religious institution, perfect in itself, dispensing the
salvific and sanctifying grace of God through its sacramental
rites, and teaching with absolute authority the doctrines and moral
prescriptions which the Church alone possesses. It was the priests'
job to serve this institution, and whatever extra he might do, for
example by attending to the social needs of his people, his
40
primary concern was to promote the good of the institution . In
such a scheme, someone like Ryan was inevitably isolated, and the
theological interpretation of-what he was doing lay in the future.
His foim of ministry was suspect.
The demagoguery of Coughlin discredited any public political
action by priests, and Ryan, who had been the soul of discretion,
fell out of favour with Archbishop Curley in his embroilment with
Coughlin. This breach was soon repaired, but Ryan was by now an
old man and the war intervened to put an end to another stage, the
final one, of his long career. In 1945 he once more gave the
benediction at a Roosevelt inaugural, but by the end of the year
both men were dead.
112
Ryan's achievement had been to establish a programme of radical
social reform as the official policy of the American hierarchy,
expressed at various times in their statements and pastorals (in
particular the 'bishops' Program of Social Reconstruction'of 1919
and 'The Church and the Social Order' of 1940), and to make use of
this official endorsement of his combination of traditional
Catholic social teaching and the American populist-progressive
tradition to promote support of the New Deal in the American Catholic
Church. Whatever the attitudes and opinions of individual bishops,
the official policy promoted by the hierarchy through the 'Social
Action Department' had been solidly established in a progressive
direction. Two things remained to be done to complete Ryan's
work - a deepening and broadening of this progressive social
ideology (nationally and internationally); the complementary and
increasingly important task (especially with the social and
educational improvements) of extending the knowledge of and
commitment to the concerns of social justice and reform among the
Catholic people. Unfortunately, both were stymied by the anti-
communist crusade.
The narrow definition of patriotism and the corresponding
simplicities of defending the city (i.e. "the West", "the free world")
against the anti-Christ prevented the extension of a radical socio¬
economic critique. The New Deal itself had to be preserved from
attack: far less could its extension be promoted. Many of the
energies of Ryan's successors were devoted to supporting and defending
the labour movement and the unions, preventing their takeover by
communists, making them respectable as the focus of the social-reform
Catholics' apostolate . Other social action priests were involved
with the Church's welfare agencies ("Catholic Charities"), others
with CRS - "both were directed to immediate relief assistance rather
than the more fundamental work of economic change, through legisla¬
tion and federal action, promoted by Ryan. Little was done to
integrate Catholic social teaching into the educational systems of
the Church, which continued to be dominated by the teaching of
doctrinal faith and dogma as a defence against heresy, rather than
an initiation into a way of life inspired by the liturgy and the
42
biblical Kerygma
The gap continued between NCWC (the bishops, the clerical
personnel in charge of the national ecclesiastical organizations)
and the local dioceses and parishes. The "remote bureaucracy"
of the NCWC was bound to be increased by the clerical-episcopal
domination of the ecclesiastical institution. Episcopal involve¬
ment in voluntary local community efforts at social change, such
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as Bishop Shiel's support of Saul Alinsky in Chicago , was the
exception, and the post-war leadership of the American hierarchy
(in the first place Cardinal Spellman) showed little or no aware¬
ness of the pioneer work of Ryan. Their interests were parochial -
protection and promotion of the institution - and they displayed no
urge to go beyond the reforms of the New Deal in response to the
44
changing social conditions . Whatever contribution might have
been made by the Catholic colleges and universities was limited
45
because of the lack of contact between them and the bishops.
Even Catholic University, which in the Ireland-Gibbons era had been
the focus of intellectual and religious ferment for the bishops, and
with Ryan the centre of social action education for American priests,
was reduced to a centre for the production of seminary teachers and
canon lawyers.
SECTION III
In this section I shall record the response of the American
bishops to the war in Vietnam as its course unfolded from 1966 to
1973- Having traced in Section II, Chapter 3 the history of the
official (or in the case of CAIP, semi-official) organisations set
up in the American Church to represent "the Catholic voice","the
Catholic response" to international questions, this Section shows
these in operation. After a first chapter which establishes the
initial episcopal support of the American war in the period before
the establishment of W^P (Part A records the response of CAIP and
serves the dual purpose of integrating this Section with Section
II while referring Catholic support for the war back to the
period before direct American involvement), I shall go on to
describe the course of events from the setting up of wjp and the
'68 pastoral to the end of the American war in early 1973 and the
character of episcopal response. In doing so I have attempted to
include all the public statements of the American bishops on the
subject, but with the main attention given to their collective
CHAPTER I
a. GAIP AND VIETNAM
As an introduction to the consideration of the response of
the American bishops to the war in Vietnam, we shall trace here
the course of CAIP statements on the subject.
The earliest in the files is one from the 'Subcommittee on
Asia', dated June 14, 1953> which speaks about "Communist
aggression" and the "immoral attack upon peaceful peoples", and
calls upon the United Nations to take action under Articles 34
and 35 of the Charter. The reaction to this statement from the
Public Affairs Office of the U.S. Mission to the United Nations:
"It is helpful to have expressions of opinion from
citizens and citizen organizations."
An interesting gloss is provided by a letter from Rev. Thomas
A. O'Melia, M.M. of Maryknoll College, Lakewood, N.J. dated June
4, 1953:
"You will find.Prance blocking the road. Mendes-Prance
proposes a deal with the Reds. The Reds are not the
chief problem in S.E. Asia. Colonialism is the key."
The Secretary of the Committee replied:
"We discussed the colonial problem and recognized that
it is one of the most dangerous factors out there, but
we felt that it would not be wise to inject it into the
statement on aggression In spite of French shortcomings
we felt it would not be wise to highlight the colonial
issue at the same time, especially since we took a clear
stand on these problems in February, and because there
apparently is great pressure on France for pulling all
troops out of Indo-China, which might be disastrous."
This reflected the consensus of the American foreign policy, rather
1
than any specifically Christian critique.
The CAIP continued to reflect conventional Cold War
attitudes, as in the July 17, 1965 statement of its 'World Order
Committee' which brushed aside the Geneva agreements of 1954 and
1962:
"Whatever the merits of these agreements, they are not now
a help in bringing order out of the situation. Indeed they
2
have become part of the controversy."
The main points of this statement will be reflected throughout
this survey of the bishops' response - basic support for the
American war against the Communists (a patronising attitude to
the natives, with one eye on the Reds coming down from the
horizon); qualms of conscience about the possibility of civilian
bombing and reciprocal use of "terrorist tactics" unaccompanied
by an effort to find out whether or not this was actually happening
7
(the "fundamenta in re" again neglected ); "peace" meaning victory
over the Communists and their expulsion from Indo-China (in this
scenario the fact of indigenous communism is discounted -
applying an American analysis, "communist" equals "alien"):
"We support the government of the United States in its
use of armed force, provided always that this force is
measured and is calculated to bring about a negotiated
peace. Deliberately to bomb civilians or to seek to
match the Viet Cong in terrorist tactics would be, in our
judgment, an immoral use of legitimate power.... (how
"immoral" can possibly be "legitimate" is not discussed)
We think the United States should be prepared to continue
the use of military power for as long as the Viet Cong
with its supporters continue hostilities. This may be
a long time. We need to match communist patience with
our patience We must hold out for peace because the
peoples of Asia now living quietly in their misery expect
the U nited States to check the threat of the over¬
shadowing power of China."
A letter of August 24, 1965 from James L. Greenfield, Assistant
Secretary, Department of State, to Msgr. George C. Higgins, the
head of the Social Action Department of the NCWC (and who had
continued his predecessor John A. Ryan's supervision of CAIP)
underlines the July 15th statement's character:
"I know the President would want me to express his
appreciation for your support of our policy in Viet-Nam."
Likewise, from within the Church, a letter in the files from
Archbishop Lucey of San Antonio, dated July 21st, 1965*.
"I think it is excellent and also timely."
Archbishop Lucey, a friend of President Johnson, was a long¬
standing member of the CAIP, one of the few active episcopal
members from the time of the Second World War, when he was Bishop
of Amarillo. During the Vietnam period Lucey was one of the
most outspoken supporters of American government policy in
Vietnam among the ranks of the American Catholic hierarchy. In
this regard, it will be of note as this Section progresses that
such outspokenness, whether supportive or critical of government
policy, was limited to a minority of the bishops, and part of
the reason why I give priority to their corporate statements is
because in most cases this is the only means of determining their
response. In the case of Archbishop Lucey - the record of his
reactions to CAIP statements is one way of determining their
tone, supportive of American government policy until 1967, then
increasingly critical.
The change came with the presidency of CAIP of William V.
O'Brien of Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. On December
30, 1966 and September 11, 1967 he issued statements in his name
as CAIP president, protesting the bombing of targets, even
military ones, in heavily populated areas such as Hanoi and
Haiphong. In doing so he was following the advice offered him
in a letter of January 10, 1967:
"CAIP has been silent all too often.... since the committees
are so difficult to rouse, it is necessary for the President,
after consultation with qualified members of the board, to
let the voice of CAIP be heard."
O'Brien was criticized by the older establishment of CAIP -
Archbishop Lucey, Charles Pahy, and Harry W. Plannery (the latter
two, past presidents of the Association). Pahy's reaction:
"I opposed the issuance of the statement (December '66)
as untimely and for other reasons. I thought the
Association would be of greater service at this time by
encouraging continuation or renewal of the truce, and by
supporting the recent initiative of the United States with
Secretary General U Thant. Moreover, I did not think we
had enough data about the recent bombing with regrettable
loss of civilian lives in or near Hanoi to make a public
statement in that regard, especially as I felt certain
4
the bombing was being restricted to military objectives."
Flannery's reaction:
"I cannot believe that the United States has deliberately
and directly attacked population centres in North Vietnam.
Perhaps I am too naive. Maybe you, as you may well be,
5
are better informed."
There was no consensus within CAIP which would have caused the
Association to criticize the Vietnam policy of the administration;
and O'Brien himself expressed support for President Johnson's
general policy, but drew attention to the distinction between
the legality of a war and that of the means employed (an important
point, as we shall see in the following chapters):
"The moral justice and legal permissibility of a war
are distinct from the permissibility of the means used
,, 6m war."
This CAIP pattern was reflected among the bishops - from a
basis of general support of government policy in Vietnam, the
question of the destructive means being employed to carry out
that policy begins to insert itself into the debate in 1968,
until in 1971 it leads to an ambiguous criticism of American
policy by the national Catholic hierarchy.
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B.
THE AMERICAN CATHOLIC BISHOPS AND THE VIETNAM WAR :
1966 - 1967
The terminus a quo of the response of the American Catholic
hierarchy to American involvement in Vietnam is their 'Statement
on Peace' of November 18, 1966 and. its reiteration in a shorter
7
'Resolution on Peace' of November 16, 1967 • These express
the bishops' view of international affairs, and of the specific
case of Vietnam, in the period immediately following the con¬
clusion of Vatican II in December 1965- The influence of
Vatican II, and in particular GS, is merely formal: what is
more obvious is that American Catholic tradition of unquestioning
support of government policy, absence of a will to find out the
facts ofthat policy independently of the government, and the
consequent presumption of government probity, which we have
observed in the historical sketch of the American Catholic Church
and above in part A:
"While we do not claim to be able to resolve these
issues authoritatively, in the light of the facts as
they are known to us, it is reasonable to argue that
our presence in Vietnam is .justified." (italics mine)
In the matter of nuclear disarmament, the 1966 statement
insinuates the view of nuclear deterrence which some of the
American bishops had striven, without success, to insert in GS:
"While the stockpiling of scientific weapons serves, for
the present, as a deterrent to aggression, the Council
has warned us that " (italic's mine)
This presents a subtle change from the corresponding paragraph 81
of GS, by stating boldly the argument justifying the possession of
nuclear weapons for deterrence which was side stepped in paragraph
0
81 . In the actual debate at Vatican II on this Chapter V of GS,
Archbishop Hannan of New Orleans had been one of the principal
opponents of the whole tone of the chapter, which condemned the
counter-city form of nuclear deterrence (then as now part of
American nuclear strategy), in the context of the papal condemna¬
tions of total war (the opponents denied that recent popes had
\9
condemned total war) . Hannan was in this matter a spokesman for
that policy of support of the American government which dominated
10
the American Catholic hierarchy . While at Vatican II this
policy could not be translated into anything except the prevention of
a condemnation of nuclear stockpiling, back home it was possible to
go further. What the 1966 statement shows is the absence of that
"entirely new attitude" to war advocated in _GS, and the continuation
of that stance of the American Catholic hierarchy supportive of
American policy.^
This was dramatized in December, 1966 by Cardinal Spellman,
the dean of the hierarchy since the end of the Second World War,
when in Vietnam he set the crusading seal on American involvement,






A. THE 1968 COLLECTIVE PASTORAL
By 1968 the effects of the changed order post-Vatican II
were beginning to influence the concerns of the American hierarchy.
With a 'World Justice and Peace Commission' established in response
to CIS, plans were under way for a collective pastoral to be presented
at the November meeting which would seek to relate the concerns
experssed in GS to the American experience, just as the collective
1
pastoral of 1967 had related LG to the American Catholic Church.
The appearance of Humanae Vitae (HV) in mid-summer affected the
preparation of the proposed collective pastoral, which now had to
respond not only to the general concerns of GS but to the
2
particular concerns of HV . As a result, the 1968 collective
pastoral - 'Human Life in Our Day' (HL) - has two sections: one
on 'The Christian Family', the other on 'The Family of Nations',
■7
which are two separate productions (the latter prepared by WJP) ,
written from different perspectives (the former dominated by HV,
the papal encyclical, and constituting the American bishops'
response to HV; the latter in the line of GH, the conciliar
pastoral constitution, and making applications to the American
context of the Vietnam war and the nuclear war debate). Most of
the attendant publicity was given to the first section, on account
of the controversy surrounding HV.
It was not the first section, however, to which John Tracy
Ellis was referring when he made this comment:
"With it (hl) the bishops may be said to have made the
kind of break with the American Catholic thinking and
5
practice of the past that would allow for no reversal."
'The Family of Nations', especially when it is compared with the '66
and '67 statements (which reflected that "American Catholic thinking
and practice of the past"), represents a response, accepted as their
official response by the American Catholic hierarchy, to the
changed circumstances of the American consciousness as that most
traumatic of years in recent American history was drawing to a close.
Gone is-the complacent tone ("....the moral sensitivity of the
American people has not diminished but in fact increased and
intensified." '67 Resolution), and in its place an awareness of
some implications for American bishops of that "entirely new attitude"
to war of GS paragraph 80:
"This compelling obligation is the greater in our case
since we are citizens of a nation in many ways the most
powerful in the world. The responsibility of moral leader¬
ship is the greater in the local Church of a nation whose
arsenals contain the greatest nuclear potential for both
the harm that we would wish to impede or the help it is
our obligation to encourage. We are acutely aware that
our moral posture and comportment in this hour of supreme
crisis will be assessed by the judgment of history and of
God."6
By contrast with the old formalism of the opening paragraph of the
'66 statement, a recognition of the question of credibility (in
line with the new perception of 'the Church in the World'):
"We speak as witnesses to that Gospel, aware that the
issues of war and peace test the relevancy of its message
for our generation, particularly in terms of the service of
life and its dignity."
On the specific point of nuclear deterrence, progress is made
from the policy adopted at Vatican II by the Hannan party - while
noting that the Council did not condemn the "possession" of nuclear
weapons, they go on to quote that part of paragraph 81 of GS which
declares the arms race as "an utterly treacherous trap for humanity"
and for the first time attempt to lend their support to specific
policies of arms' limitation - strengthening of the Partial Test
Ban Treaty, ratification by the Senate of the Non-Proliferation
Treaty, negotions for balanced reductions of nuclear weapons,
7
opposition to the proposed American ABM system. Continuing a
critique of contemporary government policy, the bishops urge the
ratification of the genocide convention of the United Nations and
"....of every sound implementing instrument by which the United
Nations Declaration of Human Rights can be translated from the level
Q
of ideals to that of actuality." The support of the United
Nations, which the bishops declare to be normative for Catholics in
light of the public support given by Pope Paul at his 1965 visit to
the headquarters of the UN in New York, is in line with the inter¬
nationalism of the Catholic Church's official statements, in
particular those of Benedict XV, and reiterated throughout the
history of the CAIP. This doctrine is opposed to the reduction
of peace to the "maintenance of a balance.of power between enemies",
and demands more than the promotion of the national interest, which
indeed can only be promoted in the context of an international
^ 10common good.
This statement of Catholic internationalism now provides us
.with a standard, in the very words of the bishops' pastoral, with
which to judge the official response by the bishops to the events in
Vietnam, and, to a somewhat more limited extent, in their relation¬
ship with the world of CBLAM. Unfortunately, the judgment must be
predominantly negative, as showrn in particular in Chapter four of
this section.
In the first place, the forthrightness of this 'doctrinal'
section of HL contrasts with the following section on Vietnam,
which is intended as an updating of the '66 and '67 statements.
The bishops recall their judgment in the '66 statement, "that, on
balance, the U.S. presence in Vietnam was useful and justified."
They acknowledge the widening of the national debate on "the moral
aspects of our involvement in Vietnam", and state their estimation
of the issues:
"In assessing our country's involvement in Vietnam we must
ask: Have we already reached, or passed, the point where
the principle of proportionality becomes decisive? How
much more of our resources in men and money should we
commit to this struggle, assuming an acceptable cause or
intention? Has the conflict in Vietnam provoked inhuman
dimensions of suffering? Would not an untimely withdrawal
be equally disastrous?"
They do not attempt to answer their own formulation of the issues I
Instead, after stating some clearly defined questions, they look
for some means of evading a response and find it in pro forma
incantation:
"While it would be beyond our competence to propose any
technical formulas for bringing the Vietnam War to an end,
we welcome the bombing halt and pray for the success of the
negotiations now underway."
The very mention of "moral lessons to be learned from our involvement
in Vietnam that will apply to future cases" (the limitations of
external military power and technology to solve internal political
conflicts; the recognition that existing evils "...such as under¬
nutrition, economic frustration, social stagnation, and political
injustices, may be more readily attacked and cob fleeted through non-
military means, than by military efforts to counteract the sub¬
versive forces bent on their exploitation"; the discrediting of
violence as a means of remedying human ills - when it is recalled
that the Vietnam experience was not past history but should have
been present reality for them, merely compounds their schizoid respon
(just as later we shall see the same syndrome of anticipating the
end of the war while ignoring its present realities, and their
responsibilities, which in HL they have just enumerated).
It is this example of "studied ambiguity" and the "total
absence of any attempt at answering" their questions which prompts
11
Drinan to dismiss this '68 statement. He takes up the words of HL
which note "that opinions among Catholics (re. "the moral aspects
of our involvement in Vietnam") appear as varied as in our society
as a whole; one cannot accuse Catholics of either being partisans
of any one point of view or of being unconcerned." He describes
the possible inferences of this phenomenon:
"1. There is nothing in Catholic teaching which would
assist Catholics to come to an informed judgment about
the morality of any modern war or at least about the war
in Vietnam.
2. Whatever wisdom the highly developed Catholic theory
of the just war might have had in the past, it has been
lost or at least has not been communicated to American
Catholics.
3. War today is a matter of "realpolitik" on which
Catholics have no moral principles which differentiate
12
them from other citizens."
Noting the implication in the statement (the absence of a
particular Catholic viewpoint regarding Vietnam) that this is a
healthy phenomenon, he describes it rather as an example of
turning shame into glory; and taking exception to the words,
"The Council did not call for unilateral disarmament, Christian
morality is not lacking in realism." (which he regards as a
sanction for the continuation'of the arms race), he declares:
"There is a persuasive case for the proposition that the
Church can never tailor its moral judgments so that they
13will not be criticized as "lacking in realism""
Finally he delivers the argumentum ad hominem:
"In its condemnation of duelling the Church did not try
to enunciate a judgment which would be in accord with
"realism". Nor has the Church done so in its position
14
on abortion...."
(Ve shall find the latter contrast expressed more recently hy
Bishops Gumbleton and Kelly.)
The unwillingness of the NCCB to apply their own principles
to the war in Vietnam finds no better expression than here in HL,
where the very statement of some of the 'just war' criteria is
not followed by an attempt to address themselves to the facts, and
to an evaluation of the facts of the war in the light of these
criteria; or indeed, one of the criteria, since the application
of the just war doctrine demands the fulfillment of all the con¬
ditions. HL is a significant advance with regard to the Vietnam
War over the '66 and '67 statements only because it does not gloss
over the dilemma of the juxtaposition of principles of traditional
Catholic 'just war' teaching and the need for an application to
15
situations like the Vietnam war
A much more credible image of Catholic teaching is presented
in the final section - 'The Role of Conscience'. Here the right
of conscientious objection and selective conscientious objection
is upheld as in conformity with that teaching (the first based on
traditional moral principles regarding the primacy of conscience,
the second applying these not to all wars but to a particular war,
in the light of "the norms for the moral evaluation of a theoret-
16
ically just war".) That this traditional teaching was not and
is not yet the common property, not only of establishment political
17
and military people like General Hershey, but even of the Catholic
public, has been demonstrated by its low profile throughout the
continuing debate and even after the more comprehensive statement
of October, 1971 -18
B. 1969 - 1970
The absence of an NCCB statement on the Vietnam war for three
years - until November, 1971 - signified that the limits of
episcopal consensus had been reached in the ambiguity of those few
words in HL. The vacuum left by the NCCB was filled by individual
bishops who spoke out in the national debate, by a group of bishops
/ 19\
(.the fourteen bishops of the New England province ), and from
within the USCC by the Division for World Justice and Peace (on
its own or through the Department of International Affairs).
As we review here and in the following chapters this variety of
voices which filled the vacuum left by the hierarchy as a corporate
body, from 1968 until 1971, the increasing volume of criticism of
American government policy in Vietnam contrasts with the unanswered
questions of the 1968 Pastoral and prepares the way for the debate
at the November, 1971 meeting when once more the hierarchy
collectively addressed itself to the issue. A 'Resume - 1969,
Public Statements on Crucial International Issues and Events' (sent
20
to Archbishop Benelli at the Vatican ) details the response of the
Division to Vietnam and other international issues - expressing
disappointment with the Senate's vote authorizing development and
deployment of the Safeguard ABM system, but encouragement at the
closeness of the vote (August 7, 1969); welcoming President Nixon's
statement (November 25th) that the U.S. would not engage in germ
warfare; a joint statement from the directors of WJP, the 'Division
of Campus Ministry', the 'Division of Youth Activities', favourable
to the October 15th moratorium against the war (October 3rd); a
statement (December 10th) from the director of WJP (Bordelon) in the
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Division's name, on the occasion of the My Lai revelations and
related practices.^
The principal response of the Division in 1969 was a November 7th
'Statement on Vietnam Situation' which emphasized the need for
22
genuine political and social change in Vietnam. However, the
most informative evidence of the position of WJP on the American war
is to be found in a memo of May 23, 1969, which records a meeting
of representatives from official religious bodies like the Division
(the corresponding departments of the NCC and AJC - 'American Jewish
Committee') with Dean Moor, chief adviser to Henry Kissinger on
23
Vietnam. This shows, in its tone of skepticism regarding the
rationale of American government policy, that WJP had advanced far
beyond the uncommitted rhetoric of HL and the original "hands off"
attitude of Bordelon, to a position of radical criticism of the
24
American war policy. The December statement on My Lai under¬
lines the distance from HL, in the very different character of the
rhetorical questions now being asked - implace of the neutral ones
of HL, no doubt remains about the implied answers. The only trace
of the American consensus remaining in the WJP response is the
continuing naivete with respect to the capabilities of American
attempts to affect the underlying social and political realities
of Vietnam, a naivete described throughout Frances Fitzgerald's
25
study. The "militaiy escalation" which followed one year after
the meeting with Moor could not but confiim the skepticism within
WJP about American policy, and the direction of WJP response.
This escalation - the American invasion of Cambodia in May,
1970 - prompted a statement of criticism from the USCC 'International
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Affairs Committee', continuing the rhetorical style of HL, and a more
specific questioning in a follow-up by Bordelon, secretary of the com-
26
mittee as well as the director of the WJP. In the follow-up,
Bordelon emphasized the gap between the requirements for a just war
and the actions of the government - lack of congressional approval
rendered questionable whether the war had been 'declared by legiti¬
mate authority'; the succession of shifting causes invoked by
American presidents obfuscated the requirements of 'just cause';
saving American prestige and the determination not to be the first
administration to lose a war provided dubious grounds for the
escalation of military activity and the just war requirement of
'right intentions'; and the conditons of 'proportionality' under¬
lined in HL were now being posed in even more urgent form. No
statement of the bishops attempted to make a similar application of
'just war' criteria.
The semi-annual meeting of the bishops had taken place just
before the Cambodian invasion, but nothing had been said there
about the war. Instead, the.bishops in an official statement had
thanked the president for announcing the establishment of a
commission to study ways in which the government could help private
and parochial schools. The political strategy of the executive
with regard to the Catholic Church had been established - inter¬
mittent sounds of approval for Catholic schools (including a
"folksy" presidential remark about his secretaiy Rosemary Woods having
been at a parochial school), and support of the anti-abortion movement
which was identified with the Catholic Church. The irony behind this
strategy was not incorporated into any statements or actions by the
hierarchy - the fact that the president could not "deliver", either on
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parochial schools or, for the most part, on anti-abortion legislation,
because of Supreme Court opposition (four of whose nine members are
Nixon appointees). The executive strategy did, however, correctly
calculate that favourable hierarchical reaction to these issues was
more likely than opposition to administration policy in Vietnam.
The administration could ignore an outburst like that of
2V
Cardinal Cushing (who, in any case, would never be a supporter of
the Nixon administration, being too closely identified with the
Kennedys), since there was always the different response of an
28
Archbishop Lucqy. Bishop Begin of Oakland, California and his
Senate of Priests urged withdrawal from Cambodia, Laos and South
Vietnam in letters to President Nixon and the Central Committee of
the North Vietnamese Communist Party, but even this type of response
was more by way of exception to the general rule of Catholic ac-
29
quiescense.
The first American bishop to express dissent with official
government Vietnam policy was.Victor Reed of Oklahoma City-Tulsa,
who in June 1967, with seventy-nine of his priests (about one half
of the diocesan clergy), urged an end to the bombing of North
30
Vietnam. In 1970 he helped finance, "as a private citizen", the
mailing of an anti war statement to the forty thousand U.S. priests
31
urging them "to publicly deplore the American policy in Vietnam"
This statement was signed by three thousand priests (about 10^ of
the American Catholic clergy), among whom were two bishops (Buswell
of Pueblo, Colorado in addition to Reed), the first two presidents
of the NFFC (the only national organization of priests); well known
theologians like Sloyan, Curran, McSorley, McBrien, John L. McKenzie;
older and widely respected clerics like John Tracy Ellis, John A.
O'Brien, Charles Rice (the latter two were pioneer social action
priests of the Ryan School), and Robert hrinan; the religious
periodical editors Nerin and Sheerin (U.S. Catholic and The Catholic
World': ). This symbolized the ever growing number of clerical, non-
episcopal voices opposing the war, as did the letter from the American
Jesuit Provincials on May 21, 1970, to all U.S. Senators:
"1 . We urge that you take steps to end this war without
delay.
2. We urge that the national budget be channeled into
peaceful directions by cutting back military appropriations.
3. We urge you to modify Selective Service regulations
(the draft) to allow selective conscientious objection,
as recently espoused by the United States Catholic Conference.
4. We urge that you take these positive actions to heal
the alienation of our youth from this country."
The significant "thing about this section of Catholic opinion was
that it represented many of the priest-authors and educators most
respected by the younger clergy (whom we shall see in the case of
Louisville, which is representative, were overwhelmingly anti-war);
and a pro-war policy was not supported by any number of people of
similar standing. The latter relied on acquiscense more than
articulation, and even in the national debate, just as in the
ecclesiastical, this contributed to the erosion of pro-war
sentiment.
WJP was caught between the continuing majority Catholic
acquiescense, NCCB silence, and the growing number of clerical and
lay anti-war voices, particularly of the young. On the one hand
WJP, in the person of Patrick McDermott, Bordelon's assistant,
prepared a paper, 'Christian Tradition and Peace-Making Today :
Education- and Action to build a World of Peace', which was presented
as an official working paper at the third annual meeting of the
Pontifical Commission in Rome, March 2-5, 1970, expressing a view
'ZrZ
of the war critical of government policy . On the other hand, the
November 1970 NCCB meeting produced no echo of this, or of the





On July 29, 1971 the 'National Catholic Office for
Information' of the USCC published a "Chronological History of
Statements made by American Ca tholic Bishops on the war
in Vietnam", which was claimed to be "an extensive though not
exhaustive chronology of statements". This prompted Gordon C.
Zahn, the sociologist and Catholic pacifist, to describe it as
an attempt to disguise the overwhelming acquiescense of the
1
American hierarchy in government policy .Taking this
"chronological history" at face value it shows that from
November, 1968 (when HL was issued) until July, 1971 less than
thirty of the almost three hundred bishops in the country were
on record expressing any kind of opposition to the American
2
involvement in Vietnam . The three most outspoken critics
of American policy among the Catholic bishops were, significan¬
tly, not even diocesan ordinaries but auxiliary-bishops, and of
these three, two - Shannon of Minneapolis-St. Paul and Kelly of
Providence, Rhode Island - had left the ranks of the hierarchy
by July, 1971 (Kelly directly in consequence of NCCB acquiescense
The third - Gumbleton of Detroit - remained to become, as we are
about to see, the somewhat reluctant prime mover of the November
'71 statement.
Bishop Kelly on March 12, 1971 had joined a group 'protesting
the war at the Newport, Rhode Island naval base where President
Nixon was making an appearance. That same month Bishops
Gumbleton and Kelly joined an inter-religious campaign called
"Set the Date Now", whose purpose was to urge the Administration
and Congress to establish December 31> 1971 as the date to end
all direct and indirect American military involvement in Indo-
3
China . At the April Bishops' Meeting in Detroit Bishop Kelly
4
tried in vain to have a statement on Vietnam issued . This
April meeting preceded the '71 Bishops' Synod in Rome at which
the two topics to be discussed were 'the priesthood' and 'justice
in the world'. The latter topic was given no attention at the
meeting, and from April until July 13th there was no effort by
the bishops' delegates to the Synod to utilize their own
'justice and peace' staff at the USCC to prepare for the Synod
5
discussions . This underlines the lack of "conscientization"
among the bishops, both with regard to the wider implications
of American involvement in Vietnam for peace in the world, and
for the symbolic effects of that involvement in the Third World.
Such was the reality which the public relations office of
the USCC was trying to disguise in its "chronological history
of statements" (the fact that it neglected to mention the
statement of Archbishop Lucey, indeed the absence in its list of
any statements supportive of government policy, underlines not
only the validity of Zahn's criticism but also the embarrassing
futility of any effort to demonstrate real opposition to American
involvement in Vietnam by the NCCB, as distinct from individual,
generally unrepresentative bishops - unrepresentative,.that is,
of the national hierarchy in its institutional expression as
NCCB).
On May 7, 1971, the bishops of the New England, province
(Massachusetts, Vermont, Maine - fourteen bishops in all)
issued, a joint pastoral letter, which in its criticism of the
lack of proportionability between the stated aims of the American
war effort and the destruction being meted out on the people of
Vietnam, in particular the policy of giving precedence to
American lives as if they were inherently of more value than
Vietnamese, went beyond HL in a significant manner. This,
again, was not representative of the NCCB, and no other similar
grouping of bishops produced such a statement^.
Individually, some bishops took up a stand critical of
American policy. Bishop Durick of Nashville, Tenn. in May, 1971
issued a statement urging his fellow-citizens to petition for an
amendment to the charter of the city-county government calling
for an end to U.S. involvement in the war. Bishop Dozier of
Memphis, Tenn. in June endorsed objection to the war in Vietnam
as grounds for a refusal to answer the draft , and an individual's
right to make an "ethical and moral" decision about military
service, when he appeared before the Memphis draft board to
support a young man's effort to obtain 'conscientious objector'
7
status . On June 9th, in a homily during a 'Mass for Peace'
in his cathedral, Bishop Flanagan of Worcester, Mass. criticized
the May pastoral of the New England bishops as not explicit
8
enough in its condemnation of American actions in Vietnam .
On July 27th in his diocesan paper, The Catholic Week,, Bishop
May of Mobile, Alabama, called the "whole sad story" of the
Vietnam war "a graphic picture of the futility of war in this day
and age", concluding that "....now we are morally bound to
get out of there as fast as we can". In a September pastoral
Bishop Primeau of Manchester, N.H. reiterated his opposition to
the continuance of the American war.
An action which could be interpreted as at least mildly
critical of American involvement, but more importantly as
prefigurative of the attitude to be adopted at the November
meeting with significant effect by its most prestigious
supporter, was the call for an April 30-May 2 "time of prayer,
repentance and mourning for all those who have already died in
South-East Asia", supported by Cardinal Sheehan of Baltimore,
Bishops Reed, Unterkoefler of Charleston, S.C., Dozier, Gossman
(auxiliary in Baltimore), and Gumbleton. U nterkoefler on his
own initiative, like Reed, Flanagan, Primeau, Durick, Dozier, had
expressed opposition to the American policy in Vietnam.
Archbishop Casey of Denver, Colo, wrote to President Nixon on
July 13th at the urging of his Senate of Priests (like Begin of
Oakland the year before):
"1. The tradition and ideals of America will best
be served by discontinuing our military presence
in Southeast Asia.
2. The people of Southeast Asia must be allowed to
determine their own destiny."
In his reply Nixon stated the usual reasons why the war was being
dragged out as far as the American involvement was concerned -
the need to have this bargaining chip in the negotiations, in
particular to secure the release of the prisoners of war; the
necessity of providing a "reasonable chance" for the South
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Vietnamese to defend themselves and determine their own future
(while declaring the American troop withdrawals were not being
mortgaged to the indefinite future for South Vietnam) - describing
this as "an honorable obligation which I believe the American
people have acquired with respect to the people of South Vietnam,
and an obligation which we must fulfill." One element of the
letter did, however, record something which was not usually allowed
to appear as an influential factor in the Nixon-Kissinger policy,
the recognition of which was not communicated to the American
people:
"There is little question that the presence of our
troops in Vietnam has created division at home. This
was among the reasons that I decided as soon as I was
given the responsibility for this problem to withdraw
our forces."
(American troop withdrawals were presented officially as a result
of the success of 'Vietnamization', and the Nixon Administration
was loathe to recognize publicly the existence of division at
home - those opposed to government policy were considered to be
a minority which could safely be ignored, even when the "minority"
consisted of the biggest public demonstrations in American history
of opposition to government policy, in October 1969 and November
1970.)9
Whatever action there was on the part of the American Catholic
bishops still did not add up to anything except the voices of a
small minority, less than ten per cent of the total number of
bishops, with the same names appearing all the time (those recorded
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here, in what becomes almost a litany until the end of this section).
By contrast, the leaders of the largest religious order - the
Jesuits - had already urged change of government policy, as we have
seen, and on April 30, 1971 the provincial of the New England
province wrote to the members urging them with the necessity of
speaking out against the suffering being perpetrated on the people
1 0
of South-East Asia.
From May 21-23, 1971 a unique meeting was held in Paris
which brought together American and Vietnamese Catholics opposed
to the war. The principal organizer on the American side was
Harry Bury, Newman chaplain at the University of Minnesota, and
he was joined among others by Richard Griffin, Newman chaplain
at Harvard, and Frank Bonnike, president of the NFAC. On the
Vietnamese side clerical leadership was provided by student
chaplains and youth chaplains, especially those of the YCW
(the influential organization of 'Young Catholic Workers' founded
at the beginning of the century by Joseph Cardijn in Belgium
which spread throughout Europe, thence to Vietnam, and a
traditional centre of progressive Catholic socio-political
opinion). These Vietnamese were and continue to be the focus
of anti-government opinion among Catholics in South Vietnam, many
of them now in prison in consequence of their opposition to the
military cliques ruling in Saigon throughout the American war.
Earlier there had been soundings on the possibility of a
U.S. tour by such Vietnemese Catholics opposed to the war, but
this was never realized, since it was opposed by Swanstrom and it
was,not unexpectedly, found to be very difficult to obtain visas
from the American State Department . This was another example
of the relationship between CRS, the American government, and
the majority Catholic anti-communist Vietnamese who provided
the most concentrated support for the Saigon military rulers.
The Paris meeting in May, 1971 acquainted the American
participants directly with the Vietnamese Catholic minority
opposition to the war (a minority whose views continued to be
ignored by the general American news media, treated with disdain
by the NC reports of the meeting - thus showing the unwillingness
by the official organs of the U.S. Catholic Church represented
by USCC to relate to the Catholics in Vietnam in terms other
1 2
than those dictated by the established channel - CRS.) No
representatives of the USCC or the NCCB attended this meeting,
1 3
or the Calcav meeting in Washington about the same time.
CHAPTER IV
NOVEMBER, 1971 - TOE BISHOPS' 'RESOLUTION ON
SOUTHEAST ASIA*
The November '71 Statement originated in a resolution
from the Senate of Priests of the Archdiocese of Detroit urging
the KOCB to address themselves at their November meeting
to the morality of the continuing U.S. involvement in Vietnam;
and that, specifically, they concern themselves with the
morality of the stated U.S. Government policy of Vistnamisation"^.
The priests noted that the KCCB had made no further statement
after HL, during which time it has become increasingly
difficult to Imagine that the principle of proportionality has
not been violated
This resolution was forwarded to WJp, with a request that the
Division inform the Senate whether ox not the Division intended
to submit a statement at the November NCCB meeting - if not,
the Detroit Senate planned to have a statement placed on the
agenda through the agency of cute of their own Detroit bishops.
No action was taken on the initiative of WJP, and consequently
Bishop Gurableton forwarded a short item for the November agenda on
this Vietnam issue* Bishop Bemardin sent notice of this
to the International Affairs Committee and Pat McDermott,
Associate Director cf WJP prepared a first draft before he left
the Division in October.
The baton was then taken up by Edward M. Gaffney, at the
time an Assistant Director of the NCCB "Ecumenical Affairs"
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office who as a priest of the archdiocese of San Francisco, and
member of the Senate of Priests and the Association of Priests
there, had been involved in the Vietnam debate within the Church
and in the Bay area. Gaffney saw the item on the November
agenda and investigated the situation at WJP. Jim Jennings of
the Division had corrected McDermott's first draft, a bland
Criticism of American actions in Vietnam and a call for a cease¬
fire and an American withdrawal, and Gaffney now revised that
(Draft 3) • He then contacted Gumbleton and Robert Drinan, S.J.
by sending a copy of Draft 3 to both on October 20th and meeting with
Drinan that evening. Drinan expressed disapproval of these first
3
drafts, as mediocre and full of "pompous and empty rhetoric" and
4
drew up Draft 4 • The change from the environmental context of
3 (WJP trying to put things in a fashion designed to pass through
the USCC and NCCB sieve) to that of 4 (the first Catholic priest
in the twentieth century to sit in Congress, who in the process
had demonstrated his independence from official ecclesiastical
bureaucratic order) is apparent from the initial clarity of
statement - "By any interpretation of the so-called just war
theory traditional in Catholic doctrine any continuation of the
war in Vietnam is morally forbidden".
He makes direct judgments on the questions of proportionality,
and legitimacy of the means employed by the U.S. government in the
war, and not just a HL statement of the question (far less the
tentative approval of U.S. government policy in the '66, and '67
Bishops' statements). He brings up the issue of the obligation
to make restitution for American action of destruction, recalls
the outlawing of war in PT and G_S, the obligation to practise
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justice to the third world, the need to make the UN a real and
effective instrument of peace. One statement in particular
reveals not only the difference of perspective between Drinan
and hierarchy, but also the reason why such a draft could never
last the course through the successive hurdles of the USCC and
NCCB, since it was predicted on the assumption that the whole
historical trend of the American Catholic Church in its relation¬
ship with government could be stood on its head in one swoop
(the Ellis conclusion from HL was not so easily translated from
the general acceptance of moral responsibility to the particular
application of critical moral judgment);
"As never before in all of American history we find
ourselves in confrontation with the civil power and
feel compelled to inform and rebuke the highest officials
of the United States government that they are violating
the law of man and the law of God by any continued
hostilities in Southeast Asia. We urge all Catholics
in America to join us in' this moral judgment and to make
it known throughout the land."
Gaffney kept in contact with Gumbleton, and for the
successive drafts of the statement consulted with people at
WJP and ODC. In draft 7 we have the most comprehensive
5
version of the proposed statement . This involves an over¬
lapping of the first three drafts with Drinan's, the removal of
those sections of the latter that were considered to be impossible
to pass through the NCCB, while retaining the basic argument
(proportionality - the available evidence makes clear that at
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this point there is clearly no benefit for us or the Vietnamese
proportionate to the intense toll of human suffering inflicted
on all involved in this war.": "....the continuation of the
war cannot be justified by the traditional Catholic principle
of proportionality."; legitimacy of the means employed - the
indiscriminate killing of civilians through massive air and
artillery fire power which was expressed in Vietnam by the
designation of "free fire zones", where everything that moved
was fair game). The most significant addition is the inclusion
of the issue of amnesty as a means of healing the wounds in
American society caused by the war and thus promoting reconcil¬
iation in a divided society. This was an echo of the 'Declar¬
ation on Conscientious Objection and Selective Conscientious
Objection* published by USCC on October 21st^.
Gaffney pressed on Gumbleton the need to drum up support
for the prospective statement among his friends in the hierarchy,
but when he met Gumbleton on his arrival in Washington on Sunday
evening, November 14th he- discovered that this had not been done.
However, help in saving a Vietnam statement from the anticipated
oblivion came from an unexpected quarter - the secretary of
USCC and NCCB himself, Bernardin, who on the Saturday, November
ljth, rescued Gumbleton's item on the agenda at the Administrative
Committee meeting immediately prior to the full assembly and
arranged the appointment of three members of the Committee
(Archbishop Medeiros of Boston, Archbishop Byrne of Minneapolis-
St. Paul, Bishop May of Mobile, Alabama) who were given the task
of drawing up a statement to be submitted to the whole NCCB in
7
response to Gumbleton's item. Draft 7 was passed along to
Q
them and they drew up a text (Draft 9) which was the first
version of the proposed statement actually distributed to the
NCCB assembly at the initial gathering on the Monday morning,
November 15th.
When draft 7 and draft 9 are compared it is immediately
evident that the former has been emasculated and the latter
reverts to something closer to the initial blandness represented
by draft 3. In particular, the direct "application of Christian
moral principles" to the Vietnam war is reduced to respectful
recommendations (the "deep sympathy" for "those leaders on whose
shoulders have been placed the heavy burden of first urging this
war and now of bringing it to a close", expressed in both drafts
(Draft 7, p3; Draft 9, pi) - in 7 is placed in the context of
a "duty to inform our leaders of the conclusions which we set
forth in this statement and to urge that they act in accord
with these conclusions" ("...any) further continuation of this
war is unjust and morally indefensible"; "...it has long since
become evident that this war is a moral evil in which all of us
have become involved, and a scandal the Christian conscience
can no longer endure."): in 9 by contrast, "....with all due
respect, we feel an obligation to make these urgent and specific
recommendations in the name of justice and peace to our nation's
leaders" (the "recommendations" conveniently dovetail with
announced American government policy, and there is no indication
of any Christian obligation to judge the conduct of war in
accordance with traditional Christian moral principles, such as
those of the 'just war' criteria). The only items of draft 7
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retained in full in draft 9 were the papal and conciliar
quotations (draft 7 hy contrast with Drinan's - draft 4 - had
made a point of oiling the material with the relevant
"authoritative" writ, since the people within the ecclesiastical
bureaucracy knew from experience the indispensability of such
lubrication, especially for 'controversial' exposure). In
draft 9 the gospel of reconciliation and forgiveness is directed
to "our fellow Americans", but the special case of COs and SCOs
is ignored, in spite of the fact that the USCC statement of
October 21st could have been used as a quasi-authoritative
precedent.
F.o.ced with this draft 9, those who had been involved since
the initial letter of challenge from the Detroit Priests' Senate
now awoke from their slumbers, so that what could have issued
in a conventional avoidance of controversy provided instead
the spark which ignited the unique phenomenon of a Vietnam
debate in the NCCB. Bordelon, the director of WJP, and
Gaffney accepted the challenge presented by draft 9 and got down
to some serious "politicking". Gaffney contacted Gumbleton to
arrange a meeting of sympathetic bishops, Bordelon distributed
texts and lobbied with and through his episcopal and Washington
circle (people at the ODC and the State Department). The
meeting held Tuesday in Gumbleton's room was the most maverick
and decisive event until the full NCCB debate on the Thursday.
Even the business of contacting "sympathetic" bishops was a
risk, since the exposure of such a procedure could have been
used with effect by the opposition (those who either did not
want the NCCB on record with regard to the war or who wanted a
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statement supporting American policy). Archbishop Medeiros
had already indicated his opposition to USCC-NCCB staff
participation and his belief that the bishops could prepare a
statement without such support (draft 9 exemplified this
procedure!). However, Vatican II had provided a modus operandi
which if employed could take care of both obstacles. The
ploy was to have a bishop or a group of bishops (preferably the
latter) draw up some modi to a distributed, officially "received
text", in which case it would be necessary to form a committee,
including periti as well as bishops. No bishop could object
to such a procedure and, more importantly, no American bishop
would be inclined to find fault with such a recently experienced
precedent for overcoming the potential imposition of a "received
text" like draft 9 (thanks to Cardinals Lienart and Frings, who
had exemplified perfectly at Vatican II the requisite ecclesias¬
tical equipment for upsetting curial routine - uninhibited
challenge of such stylus curiae with progressive, "democratic"
notions of procedural style and content; expressed by one
"ancient of days", preferably over the number alloted to man
by the psalmist, and with some visible sign of venerable age
and deportment.)
Gaffney and Gumbleton assembled their group of modi
authors by approaching their friends among the three hundred
bishops, those who were known as sympathetic to an anti-war
position (hence the recurrence of those names with which we
are already familiar from this historical review), and making
assumptions about some others. Thus they assembled a group of
nineteen, with Bishop Flanagan of Worcester, Mass. as their
spokesman (Gaffney had got to know Flanagan through his work
with ecumenical affairs at USCC-NCCB). The others were
Primeau and G.erety, who had been associated with Flanagan
in the New England Bishops' pastoral of May 7 (the fact that
Medeiros,. who had put his name to this but had helped to draw
up draft 9, which dropped draft 7's endorsement of the New
England-Boston Province's item on "Vietnamization", was
associated with draft 9 after going through the process of the
May 7 pastoral is at least a harbinger of the denouement we
shall soon observe); the two bishop brothers Hurley whom
Gaffney knew, all three being from San Francisco, Francis
Hurley now bishop of Juneau, Alaska, and Mark Hurley, bishop
of Santa Rosa in northern California - Francis had served as
an administrative officer at USCC when it was still NCWC,
and Mark was a friend of Gaffney; O'Donnell of Madison,
Wisconsin, Malone, of Youngstown, Ohio, and Buswell of Pueblo,
Colorado (prominent exponents then and now of what is
conventionally described is "progressive" or "liberal", whether
these refer to social or ecclesiastical issues); Curtis and
Bonnelly from Connecticut (the former a moderate progressive
bishop, the latter well known for his involvement in the
mediation of labor disputes, in particular in recent years
those involving the United Farmworkers); Gossman (Baltimore
auxiliary) and Sullivan (Richmond auxiliary), Wycislo of
Green Bay, Cosgrove (auxiliary in Cleveland) Hunthausen of
Helena, Montana, and Helmsing of Kansas City (the fisst two
moderate-progressives; Wycislo had indicated a view critical
of the American policy; Helmsingwould be known to Gaffney from
'ecumenical affairs', Hunthausen and Cosgrove the unknowns who,
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fortunately, were in agreement with the procedure.) Douguerty, Unterkoepfler
and Gumbleton made up the nineteen who accepted and endorsed
Gaffney's plan of action.
Gaffney drew up a list of modi which were designed to
reinstate into the proposed NCCB statement all the important
points of draft 7 which had been dropped by the Committee of
Three (Medeiros, Byrne, May) in draft 9. This list, 'Modi on
Vietnam Resolution', was approved by the nineteen and in their
name Bishop Flanagan submitted this to the Committee of Three
9
on the Wednesday . At this point Dougherty and Bordelon, as
the chairman and the director of the corresponding committee
and division of USCC which alone could be considered the
appropriate consultative organs ('international Affairs'; WJP)
and who were acting as consultants to this ad hoc committee,
were joined by Gaffney for the meetings on Wednesday and
Thursday evenings and he acted as secretary from that point -
this was done on the initiative of Bordelon, who of course knew
what Gaffney had been doing to organize the counter attack.
Authough Dougherty, Bordelon and Gaffney had no vote in the
acceptance or rejection of any part of the statement, it is
10
clear that their input was in the direction of the Flanagan modi
Thus, this text (Draft ll) which they submitted to the three
bishops on Wednesday went beyond the first "received text" of
the Monday (draft 9), in the direction again of draft 7:
"It is our firm conviction, therefore, that its (the
war) speedy ending is a moral imperative of the highest
priority." (Draft 11, p1 )
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" we recognize the need, at this point in history to
urge upon our fellow Americans a spirit of forgiveness
and reconciliation We speak with concern for the
young men who bear the heaviest burden of this war:
both those who chose conscientiously to serve in the
Armed Forces and those who in good conscience
resisted the Vietnam war....For the young men who
resisted this war in good conscience, we reiterate our
plea of October 21 , 1971 » that the President grant
full pardon of any convictions they may have incurred
under the Selective Service Act." (Draft 11, p4-5)
From the Wednesday evening meeting of this group of six
(the three bishops of the ad hoc committee, Dougherty, Bordelon,
Gaffney) came the text submitted to the NCCB assembly on
11
Thursday morning, November 18th, for debate that afternoon.
This (Draft 12) retained the main content of draft 11, eliminated
some inessential material (Draft 11, p2, No. 4; p4 "Now's not
the time....a divided society."), and dropped the more
specific CO and SCO material of draft 11 (p5 " and that the
thousands of young men who fled to Canada....legal impediments.";
"...for young men in our day who opted in good conscience not to
engage in war at all."; p5, Second paragraph.) The most
important omission was this CO and SCO material, and Gaffney
regretted after the final vote that he, Dougherty and Bordelon
had been unnecessarily timid and too willing to accept this
omission in favour of an easier acceptance of the rest of the
text.
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When Archbishop Medeiros presented the 'Resolution on
Southeast Asia' for debate on Thursday afternoon the phrase
"as amended in light of the modi received by the Special
Committee of NCCB Administrative Board" covered over this
whole shift from the "received text" of Monday morning (draft
9) to this very different text of Thursday (draft 12). The
three pages of the Flanagan group modi (note 9) are the only
documentary evidence explaining this shift. Draft 9 was
demolished by these modi and its authors (Medeiros, Byrne and
May) accepted the weight of argument favouring points made
in the modi.
For example - the modus on page one, paragraph two exposes
the HL tactic of raising the question (in this case "proportion¬
ality") as a substitute for making a conclusion from the moral
principle, and the same is true of the following modus on page
one, paragraph three; the modus on page one, paragraph five
touches a sensitive episcopal nerve which would have been easily
exposed in full debate - "We reject the implication that moral
questions such as this are best left to those with competence in
military strategy." These examples underline an important
characteristic of the capacity and potentiality of NCCB inter¬
vention in social and political controversy which on a more
universal stage was expressed at Vatican II in GS - if an issue
can legitimately be presaated as a moral issue, no self-respecting
bishop can shy away from addressing himself, singularly or in
concern with his fellows, to that issue. Thus, the tactic of
those (whether bishops, lay Catholics, or members of the general
public) who wish that the bishops do 'not' address themselves)
publicly to such issues must be to argue that these are
military matters, or political, or economic "realities", which
must be accepted as not falling within the realm of competence
entrusted to the guardians and spokesmen of religious matters.
The alternative is likewise clear - "....let not our silence
be based on a lack of competence in the area of military
strategy, which is hardly a prerequisite for coming to a
moral .judgment about a moral problem." (italics mine) The
fact that the American Catholic hierarchy has traditionally
addressed itself to other issues, primarily the continued
existence of Catholic schools and the omnipresent questions of
divorce, birth control, abortion, pornography, etc. is due in
great part to the conventional wisdom (evident among the
hierarchy and expected by the politicians and much of the
general public), according to which these issues are considered
to be the legitimate domain of hierarchical pronunciamentos,
whereas socio-economic-political issues, even when these are
considered by the bishops, either remain below the surface of
the Catholic and public consciousness (e.g. the 1919 'Bishops'
Program of Social Reconstruction'), or fail to receive anything
like the attention given by politicians and the public to the
school/sex statements.
However, the Thursday afternoon debate of November 18, 1971
on draft 12 of the 'Resolution on Southeast Asia' broke with
tradition and must be considered the central consideration of
this section, and the most significant precedent for the future
role of the American Catholic hierarchy in socio-political
debate. In the first place, it was the one and only time when
the NCCB, in plenary session, debated the issue of the Vietnam
war. Indeed, Monsignor George Higgins told Ed Gaffney that
this was the first real debate he had ever witnessed in his
twenty-five years' experience of the American bishops' meetings;
the first time he had experienced the phenomenon of the bishops
dividing into two opposite directions on an issue.
In the one direction was the opinion articulated by
Cardinal Carberry of St. Louis, Archbishop Hannan, and Abbot
McCaffrey of Belmont, North Carolina, who were opposed to the
Resolution: in the other, the members of the modi group of
nineteen, joined by others in the course of the debate, in
12
favour of the resolution . The speeches of McCaffrey and
Gumbleton were the most obvious evidence of the division between
the two sides. McCaffrey invoked the doctrine of presidential
privilege of information and expertise ("The President has the
last say in foreigp affairs, and we are undercutting the
President. We - the body, of bishops - reflect the American
inadequacy in reflecting on international affairs. I suggest
that we get experts to brief us. Moral principles don't
exist in a vacuum but in reality."), in line with the tactic
noted earlier - episcopal incompetence in dealing with the
13.
issue " He exemplified the vulnerability of such a view to
\ /
the reactions of episcopal lese-majeste - the touch of super¬
ciliousness in his remarks was not likely to endear himself to
his older episcopal colleagues, even those who would agree with
his opinion (the hierarchy being especially conscious of the
gradations of rank and age - a claim to superior knowledge
might have been better digested if it came from a thirty-eight
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year old cardinal, hardly if its proponent was an upstart
abbot nulliusJ). Gumbleton bombarded the bishops with
statistics of death and destruction, but whatever their impact
he too suffered under a disability - he was only an auxiliary-
bishop and too well known as an anti-war "radical" (what used
to be known as a "peacenik" - &n example of the popular acceptance
of the military definition of realityJ) Most of the other
"interventions" conform to the known views of their proponents,
with the possible exception of Begin of Oakland, who showed that
even a bishop who had gone on record in some way critical of
American policy could yet be reluctant to go beyond the minimum
expression of dissent, and seek to procrastinate.
The most important speech of the debate was that of
Cardinal Sheehan. As a respected elder statesman, in spite of
a poor speaking voice (too high-pitched and without resonance),
he was heard in total silence as he made an emotional speech
which expressed the feelings of one for whom the issue of the
war had become a source of personal anguish. Among other
things he made the following declaration:
"The war has become an evident evil that threatens
to destroy all respect for authority and a 11 moral
values in a whole generation of young people. Its
speedy ending brooks no needless delay."
The effect of Sheehan's speech was heightened by the fact of
its unique quality. With few exceptions (Cardinals Cooke of
New York and Carberry of St. Louis), as noted by George Higgins,
the "bishops of the big inner-city dioceses, from which came the
bulk of the blacks, chicanos, and poor whites, who made up the
vast majority of those who actually had to fight in the war, these
bishops remained silent, and Sheehan was the only speaker of top
rank (the only Archbishop, not to mention the only Cardinal-
Archbishop of a major See) who spoke to the point of the actual
human experience of the war. Gaffney believes that this speech
was decisive in the final analysis of the final vote, and turned
the whole course of the debate in a direction away from the
impersonal debate of government policies and disputed military
actions to a personal "conscientization" facing up to the events
in Vietnam as they registered in the personal, moral experience
of the American people. In effect, Sheehan had expressed the
legitimacy of presenting the Vietnam war as a moral issue, much
more than a question of government policy and actions, which
demanded a response from those who claimed to speak with authority
on the moral issue. While the speech of Sheehan might have had
no auricular quality, its resonance reached the more important
area of moral conscience and there found its mark.
Action on the resolution was postponed until Friday and the
group of six (Medeiros, Byrne, May, Dougherty, Bordelon, Gaffney)
met from 8 p.m. until 12 a.m. Thursday evening to revise the
Resolution (now Draft 12) in light of the debate and the
subsequent modi. The Flanagan group had been there first with
their modi to Draft 9, and with the two "consultants'.' (Dougherty
and Bordelon) and the secretary (Gaffney) members of this cabal
there was no need for them to do much more than sit back while
these three endeavoured to preserve as much as possible of
Draft 12 against any efforts of the Committee of Three to
resurrect Draft 9. Gaffney had. decided to try and conciliate
Archbishop Hannan because Hannan, unlike McCaffrey, carried
weight in the Conference and, as the debate at Vatican II
on GS had demonstrated, he articulated conventional Catholic
support of "patriotic" themes (the U.S. is not the aggressor,
concern with the POWs, only military objectives were the
target of American bombing). He discovered that Hannan's
main objection was to the ceasefire proposals (Draft 12, p1,
paragraph 4 - "We are mindful of the serious difficulties -
as part of the process of withdrawal.") Gaffney considered
these were expendable, and to bolster the section on
conscientious objectors he added a reference to the October
21st statement, and the condition calculated to placate those
who could not stomach the granting of complete amnesty -
"....with the understanding that sincere conscientious objectors
should remain open in principle to some form of service to the
community."
The criteria which guided the Committee of Three and their
periti in revising draft 12 were explained by Archbishop Medeiros
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at the Friday morning assembly . The most important was number
two - "The resolution should include some clear moral statement
on the war based on traditional moral principles, but should
refrain from political or military judgments, especially if they
are problematic or unilateral". In terms of the debate of
Thursday afternoon and the personalities involved, this was in
effect an attempt to respond to the most significant and
influential speech (Sheehan's) while conciliating Hannan and
McCaffrey and Carberry (who supported the other two who obviously
knew more than Carberry about the subject matter - much as Spell-
man and Sheehan, the latter only until he found out that he had
been precipitate, had put their names to Hannan's petition at
the closing stages of Vatican II). The result is the central
phrase - "It is our firm conviction, therefore, that further
prosecution of the war cannot be justified by traditional
15
moral norms." The opposition of the "patriots" had
succeeded in making sure that the 'just war' criteria were not
applied directly - hence the judgment on proportionality, and
on the legitimacy of the military actions employed in Vietnam
which had been clearly expressed in Draft 7, was gone (in
deference to "....should refrain from political or military
judgments, especially if they are problematic or unilateral");
and in its place the one criterion of proportionality (without
the actual word being used) is made to cover both the criteria
of the 'just war' principles, leading to an obfuscation which
avoids answering the questions posed in HL (whereas the
Boston bishops' pastoral of the preceding May had criticized
the bombing and the prejudice against Vietnamese lives in
favour of American). However, this central phrase, even if it
remains too general and does not clearly express the "traditional
moral norms" (i.e. the 'just war' principles), still remains the
clearest statement on record of the NCCB judgment against the
moral legitimacy of the Vietnam war even though,as we shall see,
its acceptance in accord with proper voting procedure was
superceded.
Gaffney contacted Hannan Friday morning and read over the
phone the revised text (Draft 13), to which Hannan offered no
objections. When this final version was put up for the vote
at the concluding Friday morning assembly it was approved by
158 votes in favour to 36 against the Resolution (by now, in
accordance with the customary practice, many bishops had left
Washington for Rome, but even if all of these had voted negative
the Resolution would have passed; and in any case the actual
vote must stand as the clearest expression of the American
Catholic hierarchy position on the issue of the war.) The
actual vote came as a surprise to Gaffney, who had anticipated
a much larger negative vote. This also reflected what
happened at Vatican II - the preponderance of speeches opposed
to some controversial proposals (e.g. liturgical reform,
religious liberty) was not reflected in the votes, which approved
of the proposals in overwhelming numbers.
There followed a scene bizarre even in the annals of NCCB
meetings. Some time later, when the assembly had moved on to
other business, Cardinal Carberry interrupted, out of order, to
question the wording of the central sentence of the Resolution -
"It is our firm conviction...." Medeiros was called upon to
answer Carberry and, again quite out of order, said his notes
indicated that the Committee of Three had indeed accepted the
phrase " the speedy ending of this war is a moral imperative
of the highest priority" and that this should be the actual
wording. No further discussion took place, no other, vote was
taken, so that, after a Resolution had been approved, its wording
was changed through the intervention of one of the members, on the
approval of one member of the official Committee of
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Three. To emphasize the extraordinary character of the action, a
further addition was made by Medeiros in response to another
solitary intervention requesting a reference to the PoWs, again
without any further discussion and without any vote being taken to
discover if the assembly, which had just voted in favour of a
Resolution (iraft 13), now approved of the changes made in what
they had originally approved. Instead the explanation of
Medeiros was accepted and a pro forma voice vote unanimously
16
accepted the final text . Underlying the bizarre event, then
and later, was the suspicion of Carberry, later taken up by Car¬
dinal Krol, after the assembly had adjourned, that there had
been some tampering with the Resolution on the part of the
periti, specifically Gaffney. Krol told Bernardin to
investigate and the result is the December 3 1971 'Memo,
Bernardin to Bordelon, Re: NCCB Resolution on Southeast Asia'
(Note 10, Appendix H), which details the event and documents
the dismissal of the charge.
Since all along my .principal source of information is
Gaffney, it is apparent that I accept G;?ffney's dismissal of
the charge of tampering with the wording, thus hoodwinking the
Committee of Three, the same charge dismissed by Bordelon's
memo, in particular p2. I have based this account on the
recollections of Gaffney, and included are the very honest
descriptions of his attempts to have as strongly critical a
resolution as possible passed by the Bishops' Conference. I
see no reason to believe that he deliberately tampered with
the central sentence, and the existence of Bordelon's memo,
distributed as it was to all concerned, with no further
objection taken to this account of events, is in my opinion
testimony enough of Gaffney's veracity.
Of course, the result of the change was to further weaken
the force of the criticism - whatever application of "traditional
moral norms" there was in the approved text (Draft 13) was further
weakened by the even more general character of the amended version
(Draft 14), by a return to the wording of Draft 12 - "....its
speedy ending is a moral imperative of the highest priority."
This is documented in the story which appeared in The Washington
17
Post from The Post's religious affairs' specialist, William R.
MacKaye. The headline of MacKaye's story - 'Bishops call
Viet War Immoral' - reflects Draft 13 and Bordelon's briefing
of MacKaye, whereas the report quotes Draft 14 which could be
interpreted otherwise (the same confusion is evident in the
18
story appearing in The New York Times , which also records the
differing interpretations of Hannan and Gumbleton).
In January, 1972, Bordelon signed his USCC death warrant
when his article, 'The Bishops and Just War' appeared in America
(January 8, 1972, pp.17-19). This interpreted the 'Resolution'
in the sense of Draft 7, using the very words of the original
material which had been dropped on the way through the NCCB
machinery. Cardinal Krol, now president of NCCB, made his dis¬
pleasure known to Bernardin, the General Secretary, and sub¬
sequent events carried this to the logical conclusion.
Bordelon had resigned from his post by the end of 1972, and
Gaffney had already left the Conference. The final example
of Bordelon's powerlessness came in October, 1972, exactly a
year after the statement on conscientious objectors, when he was
unable to put out a statement to back up the October '71 'Declar¬
ation', while President Nixon and Vice-President Agnew were
denying the morality of amnesty for the COs and SCOs who had
avoided the Draft.
The last word in 1971, immediately after the November
statement, belonged to Bishop Albert L. Fletcher of Little Rock,
Arkansas, who was reported by NC (12/6/71) as opposed to the
Bishops' Resolution, declaring that the United States was
"defending South Vietnam from unjust aggression", and that he




The same pattern of response was maintained throughout 1972.
On the one hand, the familiar names of those bishops critical of
American war policies: on the other, continued NCCB acquiescense
and "diplomatic" ambiguity, with an occasional "patriotic" reaction
from a familiar voice. In February Archbishop Robert J. Dwyer of
Portland, Oregon, a champion of conservative causes in the Church,
as a frequent columnist on The National Catholic Register and
Our Sunday Visitor, in a letter to his archdiocese questioned those
who called the Vietnam war "unjust and immoral" and who were against
war in general (in effect he disagreed with the whole tenor of the
1
November 'Resolution')• The April '72 NCCB meeting was notable
for exemplification of the contrast already described - concern
with human life before birth (in this case, as a response to the
'Presidential Commission on Population Growth and the American
Future' whose Report of March, 1972 had recommended abortion ) and
silence regarding those human' victims of the American bombing in
3
South-East Asia .
When the meeting was over a further escalation of the war,
after the Paris peace talks had broken down, prompted a statement
from Bernardin, general secretary of NCCB and USCC,under authoriza¬
tion from Cardinal Krol, NCCB and USCC president, with no input
from theWJP staff (a further indication of the wide gap .now
4\
manifest between the parties ). This was intended "to repeat
and reemphasize" the November '71 Resolution that "the speedy
ending of this war is a moral imperative of the highest priority".
The tone of this statement is set by the initial analysis:
" the renewed North Vietnamese aggression, followed by the
stepped-up U.S. bombing response, appears to mark a new -
although, one hopes, temporary - stage in the war.V
This is given additional support:
"As at many stages of this tragic conflict, so now it is
difficult to portion out responsibility for the latest
developments (which does not prevent the following) ■
although, in fairness, one must say that the aggressive
actions of the North Vietnamese government initiated this
new round of fighting."
The evident bias is hardly assuaged by the addition:
"The priority of the moment, however, is not to assign
blame but to find ways of ending the violence. One
trusts that our government will take the lead in this
effort."
Especially if this is compared with the Boston Bishops' pastoral:
"Our primary concern in the matter at hand, as Bishops,
is for the consequences of American policy in Vietnam."
The recommendations of the Krol-Bernardin statement correspond to
the analysis:
"....withdrawal of North Vietnamese troops from the South
coupled with cessation of the bombing of the North and
prompt resumption in good faith of the Paris peace talks..."
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These were not calculated to upset the administration . This was
underscored at this time, and later in 1973 by the increasing
rapprochement between President Nixon and Cardinal Krol (the
a
president making speech in favour of parochial schools at the
'National Catholic Educational Association' annual assembly in
Philadelphia, while the cardinal joined the group of churchmen
invited to take Sunday morning services at the White House.)
The advent of Cardinal Krol to the presidency of NCCB-USCC
enthroned the triumph of acquiescense and "diplomatic" ambiguity
at the pinnacle of the Catholic Church's institutional expression
in the nation's capital. The annual assemblies, which had been
plenary sessions twice a year - November in Washington, April in
another American city - now reverted to one annual assembly in
November in Washington and regional meetings of bishops in April.
The acquiescense and the ambiguity continued because of the
precedence given to the traditional concerns, like parochial
schools and abortion, over the issue of the war. The presence
of the war to the American consciousness demanded a minimum of
critical comment strained through the NCCB-USCC sieve. This was
now firmly in the hands of the principal representative of American
Catholic "conservative diplomacy". He was chiefly interested in
the furtherance of internal politics - the institutional pre¬
rogatives of the Church, as expressed in its influence through
the parochial schools and on family life - and, in the general
political forum, only as this impinged on the latter. Hence the
lack of concern with American policy in Vietnam.
However, the changing ecclesiastical and general political
climate (national and international) rendered this scenario itself
ambiguous. NCCB-USCC never could be an American 'Vatican' and its
president wa^ now one who had himself acknowledged the limited extent
' of the institution^. While Vatican II had promoted episcopal
collegiality, it had also weakened the possibilities of national
episcopal centralization, by attenuating the juridical character
of papal monarchy (the pre-eminence of Cardinal Spellman, like the
earlier short-lived pre-eminence of Cardinal 0'Cornell, had been
founded on close links with the papacy). The unfolding events in
Vietnam gave impetus and added numbers to the group of bishops
continually outspoken against American policies - whatever the
preference of Cardinal Krol for diplomatic silence on the American
government's Vietnam war policy, in favour of attempts to influence
the government on issues considered more appropriate to the Church.
In response to President Nixon's address to the American people
on May 8, in which he described further measures to intensify the
pressure on North Vietnam, with the mining of North Vietnamese
posts arid a step-up in the bombing of the north, a statement was
issued by the 'American Catholic Coalition for Peace' which protested
the escalation and repudiated the "immoral military measures",
questioned the president's invocation of "national security and
honor" and declared that these were not absolutes, that there were
compeling values to be taken into account - reverence for life; the
fact that other international issues were prejudiced; self-determina¬
tion of all nations precludes the linking of Vietnamese politics to
American prestige. This statement was sigied by Bishops Buswell,
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Donnelly, Evans (auxiliary in Denver), Gumbleton, Schoenherr (another
Detroit auxiliary), and Sullivan •
At the same time (May 10, 1972) Bishop Unterkoepfler addressed
a pastoral letter to his diocese, 'Pentecost and Peace', in which
he declared that the "war in South East Asia has become morally
9
intolerable.." Recalling his previous call the preceding May
for prayer for peace there, he added:
"If we continue on the course as a nation to dissipate
our resources and energy at home for destructive purposes
abroad, how will it be possible for us as Americans to
rise to any new cause for good which will require the total
dedication of a free people who understand the goals of
peaceful living among nations?"
Bishop Edward ¥. O'Rourke of Peoria, Illinois described the
10
mining of Hanoi-Haiphong as "dangerous and immoral brinkmanship"
Bishop Begin of Oakland called for a "unilateral ceasefire" by
the U.S., and in one comment evidenced progression from his speech
of November '71 to a definite endorsement of a 'just war' critique:
"When the time comes that there is no proportion between
the good to be hoped for - in this case, the liberation
of the South Vietnamese - and the magnitude of the harm
that is done, it is indeed time to call a halt, to stop.
11
That time is now. That time is overdue."
Only one bishop at this time was recorded as supporting publicly
the policy of the administration and attacking "Catholic
pacifists" - Bishop Charles McLaughlin of St. Petersburg,
1 2
Florida.
In July, Cardinal Dearden and his two auxiliaries (Gumbleton
and Schoenherr) urged Catholics to demand an immediate end to the
war in Vietnam:
"....an immediate end to the conflict would be more
13honorable than the continued destruction."
By now Dearden was no longer president of NCCB-USCC where he had
played the role of conciliator of the different personalities and
philosophies represented among the three-hundred U.S. bishops.
He was therefore in a better position to be seen as supportive
of the views of his more outspoken auxiliaries (the contrast
between Dearden's and Krol's auxiliaries - the latter would not
have dared to be outspoken on any issue without Krol's imprimatur
is testimony to the difference between the two cardinals).
The most controversial statement made in the summer of '72
came from Bishop Mugavero of Brooklyn, in a pastoral read at all
Masses in the diocese on July 2nd, in which he called for an end
to the war and criticized the escalation of the bombing in North
Vietnam as "...an extension of an action which long ago exceeded
the limits of morality." He declared that the attitude, "my
country right or wrong", was not morally acceptable to Christians,
talked about "the misadventure in Indo-China" in which millions
have suffered, backed up the CO and SCO position of the October
'71 'Declaration', and commended his words to the people "...as
you reflect on the critical problems of the world in the light of
U
the Gospel of Christ." This pastoral was reported in Catholic
papers all over the country, and provoked a volume of criticism
in the New York area and elsewhere which indicated the novel
character of such a statement from such a quarter (the contrast
with Cardinal Cooke's continued acceptance of the administration
policy was evident.)
At the level of KCCB-USCC response, two events of 1972 are
significant. The first took place in January - the 'Ecumenical
Witness'Conference' on the War, in Kansas City, January 13-16.
This had been organized by the National Council of Churches (NCC)
The intention was to bring together as wide a spectrum of Church
anti-war opinions as possible. The USCC had been invited to
participate and the Committee for International Affairs at its
meeting September 11-12, 1971 had recommended accepting the
invitation, contributing financial support and active Conference
participation. This recommendation and the NCC invitation were
turned down at the USCC Administrative Board meeting, September
14-15, 1971. A letter from Bernardin to Dr. Robert S. Bilheimer
Executive Director of the NCC, dated September 23rd, gives the
Administrative Board's reasoning, and is an important piece of
evidence in its own right of the situation at the top of USCC;
In reviewing the invitation, the Administrative Board took
note of the ongoing and rapid withdrawal of U.S. troops
from Vietnam. In light of this, the Board felt it
would be more appropriate for USCC, looking to the future
rather than the all too tragic past, to concentrate its
limited resources immediately on ways and means of helping
the distressed people of Vietnam to rehabilitate their
devastated country. The fact that the United States
bears such a heavy and disproportionate burden of moral
responsibility for the widespread destruction which the
war has brought to Vietnam and for the incredible suffering
of the Vietnamese people makes it all the more imperative,
in the opinion of the USCC Board, that the churches in
this country take the lead in organizing the fullest
possible measure of support, both public and private, for
the all-important work of reconstruction."
This articulated a familiar attitude - haste to elude the task of
moral judgment, in favour of a CRS-type operation of relief and
rehabilitation in the wake of destruction:
"....The Board is totally opposed to any further continuation
of the war....Indeed, the war has already shaken our
political and social structures almost beyond the
breaking point and has made it difficult if not impossible
for the United States to face up realistically to its own
staggering economic, social and political problems, which
threaten to tear our nation apart if they are left unsolved
much longer."
Such "total opposition" has not been apparent throughout this
review, and the whole burden of the letter is in the direction of
glossing over the past by the subterfuge of looking forward to a
more hopeful future:
"The USCC Administrative Beard earnestly hopes and prays,
however, that by the time the conference is convened the
war in Vietnam will, at long last, be approaching a
merciful end. If this is the case - and there is
reason to think it may - it would then seem most desirable,
and hopefully feasible, for the agenda of the NCC confer¬
ence to be revised in such a way as to give adequate
attention to ways of helping Vietnam to repair the ravages
of one of the most tragic wars in history and to begin to
heal the breach between the conflicting parties and thus
establish a just and lasting peace in Southeast Asia."
Events did not oblige. The hoped-for "merciful end" (at least
for Americans) came almost exactly one year after the Kansas City
Conference.
The Conference, which took place two months after the November
'71 Resolution, attracted over five-hundred participants, and
despite the USCC Administrative Board's rejection of the invitation
to participate the two-hundred Catholics present constituted the
largest delegation from any one church. The bishops who attended
were almost all from the 'Modi' group - Flanagan, Mark Hurley,
Durick, Wycislo, Unterkoepfler, Helmsing, Davidson of Salina-Kansas,
Murphy (another Baltimore auxiliary), Evans, Gumbleton, Dougherty.
A non-American bishop attended, on invitation from the NCC, who
figures prominently in the following section - Helder Camara of
Recife, Brazil. The most notable American Protestant churchman
who was a critic of the American war was present - Eugene Carson
Blake, Secretary-General of the World Council of Churches. Blake
Blake was not invited to officiate at the Sunday White House services
during these years in spite of his unique prestige as a churchman.
There was no attempt to disguise the direction of the
conference - "U.S. participation in the Indochina war is immoral
1 5
and must be totally stopped." A "Roman Catholic caucus" was
formed which brought together those involved with the Catholic
attempts to achieve "institutional" ecclesiastical opposition to
the war (as distinct from those like the Berrigans who were taking
a more individualistic approach). Among this group were Jim
Jennings of WJP, Peter Harriot, SJ. of the 'Center for Concern',
Gene Boyle of the NFPC (whose annual assembly in 1972, March 12-
16, in Denver had as its topic "Ministry for Justice and Peace"),
Harry Bury (the organizer of the 'International Assembly of
Christians in Solidarity with the Peoples of Vietnam, Laos and
16
Cambodia', which met in Paris, 1970 and 1971, and in Canada, 1972
and 1973)- They decided to try and influence the NCCB April '72
meeting to condemn the U.S. bombing and continued American
involvement as "immoral and unjustified" (as we have seen, without
success); to move ahead on the whole question of the military
chaplaincy (they had been infoimed that Cardinal Cooke had sent
the October 21, 1971 Declaration on CPs and SCOs, the November '71
Resolution and a report of the debate to all the chaplains), by
promoting a civilian chaplaincy to military personnel, and urging
17
war protest by the military chaplains ; to petition Cardinal
Krol as president of the NCCB on the question of Church investments
18
in war-related industries ; to gain the support of Catholic
lawyers for amnesty efforts on behalf of war resisters..
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As well as the important ecumenical dimension of this
Conference, therefore, the Kansas City meeting helped to promote
important elements of the 'Justice and Peace' agenda within the
American Catholic Church which is presently being addressed by
increasing numbers of Catholic institutions, and its co-ordination
with that of the NCC. Efforts to change the Selective Service
System, and to influence the investment policies and responsibil¬
ities of religious institutions are the present results of this
coordination.
The second significant event at USCC-NCCB in 1972 was the
attempt by the Committee for International Affairs to issue a
statement on the war which concluded, in the light of further
American escalation, that "American participation in this war is
1 9
morally indefensible". A meeting of the Committee, June 19-20,
1972 (eight of the fifteen members present) passed the proposed
statement 7-1. In accordance with USCC procedure, the statement
was mailed to all members of the Committee for their approval.
In the light of the '71 saga .the reply from (now) Cardinal
Medeiros in a letter from his secretary, dated July 1, 1972, offers
corroboration of his position at that time. The secretary noted
that "...only part of statement he can approve", namely the first
two paragraphs, after which Medeiros would conclude:
"We can no longer escape the conclusion that every effort
and sacrifice must be made by all parties concerned to
bring about an immediate and just peace to South East Asia."
Thus, there would be no hint of condemnation of American actions
and continued participation, no deploring of the escalation. The
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reply of Unterkoepfler, in a letter dated July 5, 1972, contrasts
markedly with that of Medeiros - he wanted the proposed statement
to be given "careful reworking":
"I think reasons should be given why we deplore the
recent escalation of the war in Indochina. Secondly,
reasons should be given why we also deplore the actions
initiated by our government which contributes to the
escalation.... Paragraph Three could be strengthened by
some factual material - the number of air strikes per
week - the anti-person weapons.... I believe the term
"moral outrage" is rather vague. Perhaps another
word would communicate the same idea to the general
public."
The minutes of the June 19-20th meeting also show concern
with the issue of corroborating evidence, which will now become an
important element in the concluding stages of this present review,
and a pointer to the future direction of all ecclesiastical
interventions in this kind of political arena. It is this issue
which will determine the character of the interventions - are
they intended to face political situations honestly and factually,
or are they merely ways of avoiding such a responsibility? The
present review suggests the natter.
".... bringing together statements about war in Indochina
and-relating these statements to already accepted guide¬
lines which allow one to make moral and political judg¬
ments in this area. Documentation is to support
positions reached previously."
A working draft (July 31 > 1972), 'The W&r in Indochina : Some
20
Guidelines and Data' was prepared with this in mind.
Meanwhile, the final revised statement (July 7, 1972) was
dispatched and the voting went as follows: of the eight bishops
on the Committee, seven voted in favour (Dougherty, Dozier,
Gerety, Grutka, Gumbleton, Unterkoepfler and Wycislo), only one
against (Medeiros); of the others, five were in favour, two
against.
When the statement was sent to the Administrative Board of the
USCC, five bishops approved (Dogherty, Head, John B. McDowell, May,
Mugavero), seven disapproved (Carberry, Cooke, Krol, Medeiros,
John J. Maguire, Gallagher, John J. Ward), and thirteen had not
replied by August 8th (Dearden, Byrne, McDonagh of Louisville,
Manning of Los Angeles, Bernardin, Curtis, Leonard of Pittsburgh*
McCarthy of Phoenix, McManus, William A. O'Connor, Perry, Spence,
Wycislo). Thereafter, the whole thing was shelved.
At the November 1972 NCCB meeting in Washington a 'Resolution
on Imperatives of Peace' was passed by a vote of 186 to 4 as the
concluding Vietnam negotiations were going on. This re-echoed the
November '71 Resolution, and as the final NCCB statement encapsul¬
ates those aspects of their response which we have already
observed. Gumbleton did succeed in having a reference to the
bombing inserted. Since only one side was engaged in that activity,
it could be interpreted, as Gumbleton did, as a better statement
than the '71 Resolution, because it was directed to a specific
American policy . However, such a small advance, after the well-
publicized bombing of civilian targets in the preceding months,
was an even more obvious sign of the NCCB acquiescense and its
almost unlimited extent. In any case the bulk of the statement
manifested the tendency expressed in Bernardin's letter:
"It is vitally important that Americans now turn their
attention to the task of reconciliation not only in
Southeast Asia but also in our country We must be
unstinting in the expending of our moral, material and
technical resources and skills on behalf of the people
of Southeast Asia who have suffered so grievously."
No attempt was made to examine the war according to traditional
'just war' criteria:
"The experience of recent years amply illustrates the
fact that grave ethical and moral questions regarding
warfare remain unresolved."
By attempting to placate McCaffrey and Cardinal O'Boyle, who demanded
that the right of self-defence be included in the resolution, the
outlawing of war as the "utterly treacherous trap" was itself
weakened:
"While recognizing the right of self-defense, we are
nevertheless convinced that war is not an apt means of
settling disputes."
In all this, the Resolution demonstrated conclusively the
impossibility for the NCCB to face up to the reality of what America
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had been doing and was continuing to do in South-East Asia. Any
responsibility on the part of NCCB to stand in criticism on the
actions of the American government from the point of view of
Christian moral norms was ignored.
Again, as before, the voices of episcopal criticism were heard
far away from the confining framework of the NCCE assembly, and
came to a crescendo around the turn of the year with the stepped-
up bombing of North Vietnam which stamped Christmas, 1972, as the
most egregious example of American perfidy and callousness in the
whole course of the war. Hitherto silent voices joined the chorus
of protest - Bishop Paul P. Anderson of Duluth, Minnesota called
the resumption of bombing "an immoral means to a just and lasting
22
peace" . Bishop Clarence E. Elwell of Columbus, Ohio:
"Whatever faults other people may have, it is not right
for the American people to sanction violence in the pursuit
of peace, and it is important for our elected leaders to
know that they cannot expect us to support those things
23
which in conscience we know to be wrong."
Familiar voices condemned the immorality of the bombing - Bishop
Cietus O'Donnell called it "insane" ("The most immoral aspect of
the war has been the suffering and death inflicted on countless
thousands of non-combatants."); the "fourteen bishops of the
Boston province expressed "dismay and horror" over the renewed
24
bombin9..
On December 29, 1972 a telegram was received at WJP office
from the 'Commission Francaise Justice et Paix':
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"This testifies to fact that French Catholic opinion is
appalled at the outrageous bombardment of Vietnam.
Alarmed at the silence of the Church in the United
States. We are expecting Justice and Peace of your
country to take a courageous position." (12.02 p.m.)
This had been sent to Bishop Dougherty as chairman of WJP and a
reply went back under his name:
"Acknowledge receipt of your telegram about bombing of
Vietnam. Am forwarding by air mail recent position
taken by Cardinal Krol President of National Conference
of Catholic Bishops. Assume prompt committee review
about further action." (2.40 p.m.)
This referred to a statement of December 22, 1972 of Krol (written
by James Rausch - the recently appointed General-Secretary in
succession to Bernardin - and Russel Shaw of the USCC communica¬
tions department, with no reference to WJP) which did not go beyond
the conventional general pleading to both sides. As for the
"prompt committee review" - we have already seen the fate of the
June, 1972 proposed statement. Whatever progress was being made
within the Committee for International Affairs (now 'Social Develop¬
ment and World Peace' - Dougherty continuing as chairman) in the
matter of coming to terms with the facts of the situation in
South-East Asia and the responsibility of the bishops to respond,
remained within the Committee.
In any case, the hour of American deliverance was at hand,
and the final word was left to Cardinal Krol, as on January 24, 1973
he welcomed the news of the Paris peace agreement which ended this
stage of the American war in Vietnam:
" a tribute to the courageous and persevering





Latin America is today the archetypal theatre for the
contemporary drama of 'Church and Society' - 'Church and
polities', as it relates to the situation of the Roman Catholic
Church. The reasons for this lie in the history of the
countries below the Rio Grande since Spanish and Portugese
colonialism. Another factor is the changing relationship
between the Church and society in different countries in con¬
sequence of a political situation which is systemically un¬
stable. While, within the Church, the effects of the Second
Vatican Council have directly impinged on the cultural and
social situation of the countries of Latin America much more
significantly than to this date is true of Europe or North
America due in part to the historical traditions of the Latin
American Church, and, most significantly, because of the
political involvement of the Church with society since the
conquistadores^.
The concerns expressed in GS, MM, PP; the formation of
the 'Pontifical Commission Justitia et Pax'; the '71 Synod;
provide the terms of the Catholic response to the realities of
contemporary Latin America. Anyone who has come into contact
with this situation, even if only vicariously through the
ecclesiastical experiences and through listening to some of
those directly involved in Latin America realizes the immediate
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relevance of the confrontation between the spirit of Vatican II,
as expressed above all in GS, and the situation in Latin America.
Here, directly, we find the Catholic Church face-a-face the
realities of the Third World. The historical process is being
reversed - the process which saw the Church as an essentially Eur¬
opean phenomenon being carried to other regions of the world, and
established in diverse civilizations while retaining its
European foms. Now that, the identification of unity and uniform¬
ity has been abandoned officially, and the local Churches have
begun to set about the task of making the Church no longer a
transplant but a native expression of the Christian koinonia, it
is the turn of the non-European churches to preach the Gospel, and
in particular the Gospel of justice and peace, to the churches of
2
the first world - Europe and North America - ber moaum exempli' .
This is made urgent because of the situation within the Church
and in the world as a whole. It is becoming increasingly impossible
to relate to any of the branches of the Christian Church today, and
to fail to be challenged by the concerns of 'justice and peace'.
In this regard, the Christian Church is in advance of the national
society, and this is precisely because its experience is much more
international than the national society. When Machiavelli
observed that the universalism of the Christian Church runs counter
to nationalism, he was underlining a phenomenon whose relevance
continues to operate, and today it must increasingly lead to a
refusal by the Church to be confined by the interests and concerns
of Europe and North America. Hence, the language of Church
pronouncements, whether of the Catholic Church or the WCC, which
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puts the priority on questions of justice - the need to change
the .present world economic order, the impossibility of peace in
3
a world marked by inequity and injustice . Hence also the
unreality when blinkers are offered to contemplate the problems
of affluence and the difficulties of capitalist speculation^
It is this Catholic experience which finds its most effective
articulation in the contextof Latin America, because the situation
there, unlike Africa or Asia, is dominated by the very presence
of the Church amidst the realities of the Third World. And this
experience impinges upon the Catholic Church in the United States
in two ways - the problems of Latin America, economically and
politically, are bound up with its relationships to the colossus
north of the Rio Grande; the Catholic Church in the countries of
Latin America increasingly demands a response from the Catholic
Church in the United States, as a responsibility deriving from its
position within American society and as a fellow member of the
Catholic koinonia.
This section, therefore, in which we shall consider the
response of the American bishops to the present situation of Latin
America, will give us an opportunity to consider directly the first
component part of the tandem which today describes the relation¬
ship between church and society, church and politics. This will
lead us into a perspective of the total panorama which now
dominates international relations - the third world of. Africa,
Asia and Latin America, in relation to the worlds of Europe, Russia,
North America. It is implicit in the whole thesis that just as
'justice and peace' go together in the description of 'inter¬
national relations' from a Christian perspective so too the
concerns of 'peace' in South-East Asia involve questions of
'justice', while the concerns of 'justice' in Latin America have
implications for 'peace' there, throughout the hemisphere, and
indeed throughout the world. The division of this thesis into
sections must not be taken as any indication that these questions
can be treated separately - it is not the least vital insight of
the ecclesial language that it recognizes the inseparability of
economics and politics, 'justice' and 'peace'.
This section will have two chapters - the first sketching
the foundation of the 'Latin American Bishops' Conference'
(the counterpart of NCCB-USCC) and the initial 'Inter American'
contacts pre-Medellin; the second, after establishing the
central experience of Medellin, will consider the initial
response of the American bishops to the post-Medellin Latin
American Church. Two presuppositions are operative here - one
general, one particular. The general is a value judgment I
make - the present situation of the Catholic Church in the
countries of Latin America is the most significant Catholic
experience for our purposes ('justice and peace' - 'international
relations'). It is impossible to deal with 'the American Bishops
and Foreign Policy' without considering Latin America. The
particular presupposition is that the attitude adopted by the
American bishops to the evolving situation in Latin Amqrica must
be paradigmatic, since it provides the classic example of 'justice
and peace' - the Catholic Church directly involved in the 'Third
World' (the Latin American Church as part of that world, the
United States Church as part of that world's problem). It
would be cause for great confusion if the results of this
Section's investigation did not correspond and add significant
depth to the course of events described in the previous Section.
Such confusion is not anticipated.'
CHAPTER I
BEFORE MEB'ELLIN, 1968
The establishment of the Latin American Bishops' Conference
(CELAM - 'Consejo Episcopal Latino Americano') came as a result
of the first General Assembly of the Latin American Bishops, on
the occasion of the thirty-sixth International Eucharistic
Congress at Rio de Janeiro (July 25-August 5, 1955). The only
previous plenary assembly of the Latin American bishops had
been held in 1899 (a "sign of the times" of papal absolutism and
episcopal individualism); the next General Assembly was to be
Medellin, 1968 (the most important date in the history of the
Latin American Church). CELAM was to be based on an annual
meeting of delegates from each of the episcopal conferences of
the countries of Latin America, from the Rio Grande to Tierra del
Fuego. Pius XII gave his approval to the Statutes of the new
organization on Novanber 2, 1955. In these CELAM was described
thus:
"...es el organo de contacto y colaboracion de las
Conferencias Episcopales de America Latina."
(Estatutos, I, l)
Its functions were:
"1) Estudiar los problemas de interes commun para
/
la Iglesia de America Latina con vistas a
buscarle la solucion adecuada.
2) Procurar una oportuna coordinacion de las
/
actividades catolicas en el continente, con
el fin de asegurar su major eficacia.
3) Promover y softener iniciativas yobras que, directa
o inairectamente, presenten un interes commun.
4) Ocuparse de la preparacion de Conferencias del
Episcopado Latinoamericano, cuanao la Santa Sede
decida convocarles...."
Principally responsible for the initiation of CELAM were Bishop
Manuel Larrain of Talca, Chile and Helder Camara, at that time
auxiliary-bishop in Rio de Janeiro. Larrain was a vice-
president from the beginning, later president of CELAM, 1964-1966;
while Camara became his fellow vice-president in 1959. During
the crucial period of Vatican II the two main founders of CELAM
were at the helm (the appointment of the old Cardinal of Rio as
first president did not prevent the real leaders from acting).
Initially, CELAM expressed the traditional concerns of the
Latin American hierarchy for the internal order of the church,
and the defence and promotion of conventional religious interests.
Their attitude to social and political questions still retained
the characteristics of the conception of the Church as "the
expression of the culture and values of a people whose Catholicity
4
had never changed". Men like Larrain and Camara, who had become
more and more aware of the changes of culture and values of the
traditional society, and who had been formed by Catholic social
teaching in the RM and Qk tradition as transmitted through the
European Catholic intellectual and social movements, were very
much in a minority and struggled to modify the conceptions of their
fellows. For his progressive views Larrain was continuously
under attack from the traditional elites in Chile; Camara had
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an uneasy relationship with his mentor and superior the Cardinal
of Rio.
At the fourth annual meeting of CELAM at Fomeque, Colombia
in 1959 this perdurable tradition was given its characteristic
anti-communist flavour:
/ y y
"Se planifico la accion apostolica de la Iglesia
frente al problema de la infiltracion communista en
/
America Latina, en los sectores social, educational y
/ / / /
de la opinion publica. Se trato asimismo del Comite
Latinoamericano de la Fe (CLAF)."
It was in this same atmosphere, dominated by the Cuban Revolution,
that there took place at Georgetown University, Washington D.C.
from November 2-4, 1959 the first 'Inter-American Bishops'
Conference', sponsored by the 'Pontifical Commission for Latin
America', which had been set up in 1958 to promote a church-wide
concern for the problems of the Church in Latin America. The
membership statistics presented to this conference showed that
the countries of Latin America had 34^ of the Catholic population
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of the world, but only 9<5a> of the priests . This alarming
statistic was combined with worries about "Protestant proselytism"
and "Communist infiltration"; and although Camara raised the
question of the problems created by the lack of social and economic
justice^, it was the specifically ecclesiastical context, as
described in the former conception,which was given precedence.
This Georgetown meeting led to the formation of the 'U.S. Bishops'
Committee for Latin America') (LAD), as the service agency for
the'Bishops' Committee' at the NCWC.
18?
The statement of the Bishops1 Committee describing the
programme of the new agency serves also to describe the nature
of the relationship to, and the proposed assistance for, the
Church in Latin America from the U.S. Church:
"1) To maintain a liaison with the Pontifical Commission
for Latin America in Rome (CAL) and the Episcopal
Council of Latin America (CELAM).
2) To operate an orderly program of aid under the
authority of the U.S. bishops.
3) To assist U.S. religious communities in providing
personnel to Latin America.
4) To transmit requests for personnel and material
aid as received from the bishops of Latin America.
5) To provide information on the Church's needs in
Latin America to U.S. Catholics, in particular to
the bishops, priests, brothers, sisters and lay-
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leaders."
Cardinal Cushing was appointed chairman of the Bishops' Committee
and he in turn selected the Maryknoll priest John Considine as
the first director of the 'Latin America Bureau'. To complete
the organizational picture - at their 1965 meeting in Rome during
the final session of the Council, the American bishops established
an official assistance program for Latin America to be organized
by the Bureau, with an annual collection to be taken up in all
churches for the purpose, in addition to the Bureau's own fund-
raising efforts (the 'Latin America Fund'). The 'Catholic Inter-
1p
American Cooperation Program' (CICOP) was initiated in 1963
"to bring U.S. and latin American Christians together in mutual
understanding and friendship"; for which purpose an annual
three day conference is held in January each year which brings
together those in the continent who are knowledgable and
involved with the Latin American scene and interested American
Church people.
The period of the late '50s - early '60s, when all this
top-level ecclesiastical activity was taking place, corresponded
both with the era of Vatican II and the increasing American
involvement in South-East Asia. Clearly, this political
context could not be without its influence on the specifically
"ecclesiastical" scene, particularly the United States Catholic
Church scene, but it is not easy to disentangle the various
strands of the involvement. A study done on the Bishops'
Committee for Latin America (the only such study I cane across
at that Division) makes a point of directly linking the eccles-
Q
iastical effort with American political interests . Although I am
dubious about the directness of the linkage between Church and
government, I am quite prepared to recognize the implicit
connection between the mentality of the majority of the ecclesia¬
stical hierarchs, Latin and North American, and the political
hierarchs. This was still the era of cold war anti-communism,
and the identification of the Christian Church with the interests
of the Western Alliance. Pope John only gradually emerged from
the shadow of Pius XII in this area, with Mater et Magistra (1963)»
which initiated the process of dialogue with communism (symbolized
in the Italian centro-sinistra and Kruschev's son-in-law being
received in audience by the pope)^. In the United States, the
advent of the Kennedy administration, symbolic for the whole
history and situation of the American Catholic Church, did not
mean a change in the policy of confrontation with communism.
President Kennedy resented the presence of Fidel Castro in
Cuba and was intimidated into the disastrous Bay of Pigs adventure.
Having claimed to be more concerned with the "red threat"than the
previous Republican administration of Eisenhower, he was
vulnerable to pressure from the military and secret service
adventurers. This chastening experience, soon followed by the
crisis of fall '61, ultimately led to wiser counsels of prudence
and caution in international politics, in tune with policies of
detente and with the conciliatory spirit promoted by Pope John.
Looking back, it is difficult to appreciate the very different
atmosphere from that of today in which these ecclesiastical and
political events took place.
The bizarre way in which the Bay of Pigs prisoners were
freed - when Robert Kennedy phoned up Cardinal Cushing to have
Cushing finance the American agreement with Castro - belongs to
this same atmosphere. There can be little doubt that at the
beginning of this period of increased involvement by the official
organization of the American Catholic Church with the Church in
Latin America there was a strong streak of anti-communism and
Catholic protectionism running through the whole operation. We
have already seen this expressed by the tone of the official
statements of intent. Modifications were to come in the course
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of the next few years,under pressure from the evolving situation
in the United States and Latin America, and from within the
Church through the course of Vatican II and the development
of a 'justice and peace' constituency.
The seventh, eighth, and ninth reunion of CELAM took place
in Rome (1963-1965) during the Council and led to a reorganiza¬
tion of the Consejo: a reform of its structure by the creation
of special departments to promote various fields of church
activity throughout the continent - liturgy, evangelization
and catechetics, pastoral ministry, ecumenism, and .social action.
An important Study Session was sponsored by CELAM, July 13-30,
1964 at the Major Saninary in Porto Allegre, Brazil, on the
'Theological Bases of Pastoral Planning and Action in Latin
America, in keeping w'ith the Aggiomamento and the Council'.
This had been in preparation for two years, under the direction
of an ad-hoc commission of CELAM whose members had been appointed
by Larrain (president of CELAM by this time), with Archbishop
McGrath of Panama the direc.tor. The latter had come to the
fore at the Council as a forthright exponent of progressive
causes, and from now on he was one of the leaders of the pro¬
gressive bishops in Latin America. As his name suggests-Marcos
McGrath - he is of mixed parentage, a member of the Holy Cross
Order (C.S.C.), who was a student at their famous academy, Notre
Dame, and is a bi-lingual, bi-cultural churchman, a very
important participant in the whole U.S.-latin American scene^.
He became second vice-president of CELAM in 1966, also Secretary-
General in 1967 (chief administrative officer, like Bernardin for
the NCCB and USCC11).
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Ironically, in view of later events in that city, the bishops
appointed by Larrain to the ad-hoc commission for the study session
all showed up in Porto Allegre except the Archbishop of Medellin,
Colombia! These were McGrath, Scherer of Porto Allegre and
Lorscheider of Santo Angelo, Brazil (all progressive exponents).
The 'Adveniat' Fund of the German bishops financed the meeting,
1 2
including the travel expenses, with a grant of $30 thousand
The faculty included Carlo Colombo (auxiliary in Milan and Pope
Paul's unofficial personal theologian), Danielou and Roguet
(Council periti, the former from the Institut Catholique, later
Cardinal and spokesman for conservative ecclesiastical interests;
the latter the director of the Centre Pastoral Liturgique, Paris),
and Houtart (another Council peritus, the "technical consultant"
for the CELAM office in Rome during the Council - 'peritus at
large' for Latin American bishops - a very important exponent in
his own right, and a most authoritative voice in all questions that
pass in review here).
Joseph Gremillion (the future secretary of the papal commission
'Justitia et Pax, still at that time 'Secretary for Development'
at CRS), was authorized by Archbishop 0'Boyle of Washington to
represent the NCWC (an indication of the still ad-hoc character of
American hierarchical structure). Gremillion was the only American
present. In his report (p3) he records the following:
"I have been frankly nonplussed by the query from one
prominent ordinary who is secretary-treasurer of his
country's bishops' conference: "And in the United States,
how fares 'the Church of the Poor?"'
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Referring to HJ (esp. para. 8), this bishop was expressing the new
theology of the Church, in terms which are male sonantes when
compared with former triumphalism, not to say disturbing when
contrasted with the affluent figura of the Church in the U.S.A.
In the summary of the talks given at this study session
one comes across important indications of the effect the Council
was having. Thus, Colombo confessed his conversion to "non-
juridical theology", since the time of the first meeting of the
principal conciliar theological commission in 1960:
"Scholasticism forgot that ecclesiology (knowledge of the
Church) must reach the people. Rather than definitions,
images from the bible should be used."
His description of the Church reflected the influence of the "new
theology" (or, rather, the more traditional vocabulary rediscovered):
"The Church is a communion which we live, forming a
community which we are Humanity has a future,
because God continues to join Himself to man to
become the Body of Christ, the Church."
He interpreted the phrase "the signs of the times" as involving
the necessary task of the Church to speak to the world and to
listen to it, which would mean a different theological vocabulary
and agenda from that of the manuals.
This same summary of the talks shows the kind of thinking
being transmitted to the ecclesiastical elites in Latin America,
taking a direction which would arrive at Medellin 1968:
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"In the past man was defined too much by contemplation,
rather than by his creative role in constructing a better
world. This latter constructive role gives a truer
picture of man, and of the Christian vocation.
The Christian must dedicate himself to upbuilding a
just social order of world dimension....Disorder and
instability in society are due to sin, as well as to
technical reasons....In her relation with the State, the
Church must not claim rights, but rather offer her
services to the whole society. One of the greatest
of these services is the inspiration of citizens to
participate wholeheartedly in the upbuilding of this
world....Technical advance and world-wide socialization
are creating a new world community in which two problems
stand out: (l) Nuclear armament, and (2) the inequality
of economic and social development among the nations...The poorer
nations must strive to correct their own interior disorders
which result from social injustice. They must reform
their own societal structures to promote the common good."
Gremillion was attuned to this type of thinking, but there were
few like him who thus enjoyed the benefits of being exposed to
the theology behind GS and the "alternative" voices from the Third
World. No similar venture took place in the United States at
this time, and it was only in 1967 at Notre Dame that an American
audience came into contact with the theology behind GS- (the same
Notre Dame conference already referred to in connection with the
13
description Gremillion gave of his job ). In fact, the period
196
period of the Council affected the organization of CELAM much more
radically than it affected the USCC. Although the American
Catholic Church hierarchical structures were much older than
CELAM, the re-organization prompted by Vatican II did not come within
sight of what we are about to see at Medellin. One reason is
the absence of dynamic bishops like Larrain, Camara, McGrath.
Another is the growing influence of men like Houtart and the
religious sociology which was now being utilized throughout Latin
America. The facts of economic injustice and oppression were
daily reality in Latin America, whereas the United States was
only beginning to awaken from slumber to the implications of the
Vietnam War. The social action movement within the American
Church had lost steam since the depression of the '30s, and
while it continued to influence many Catholics, including many
bishops and priests, the post-World War II improved social
conditions helped to dampen its dynamism (Section II, Chapter 4).
And this same movement had yet to find out the extent of the
world-wide implications of the Christian commitment to social
. . . 14
justice
The difficulties of the task ahead are reflected in a
comment Gremillion records on the occasion of this Porto Allegre
meeting:
"In extending aid the richer nations can be properly
motivated by a well-ordered selfishness (egoismus ordinatus)."
As a man then engaged in trying to gradually extend the work of
CRS beyond the stop-gap relief needs to the wider demands of
socio-economic development, he was being introduced to the conflict
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between the increasing demands of the growing number of voices
from the Third World and the cosy self satisfaction of America
15
of the '50s and early '60s . This American environment was
not conducive to moral appeals based on the responsibility of
common humanity, or the rich for the poor, but would only respond
to carefully directed demands on its own self interests. This
16
had been the experience of 'Foreign Aid' . But from the Third
World the consciousness that was now increasingly coming to
expression was of the basic injustice of the whole international
and National politico-economic "disorder" which condemned them
to suffer the consequences of other peoples' interests, and to
have insult added to injury by the exploitation being increased
in the name of "aid".
The first post-Vatican II reunion of CELAM was held in
October, 1966, in Mar del Plata and reflected the influence of
the Council and the Porto Allegre meeting, its topic being "The
Role of the Church in the Socio-Economic Development and the
Integration of Latin America". A delegation of bishops
presented their conclusions to Secretary-General U-Thant at the
United Nations (January 31, 1967) and to the Secretary-General
17
of the 'Organization of American States' (OAS) . These were
incorporated into the Medellin statements and will be formulated
in the following Chapter. 1966 is known, however, not for
the meeting at Mardel Plata but for the tragedy that happened
earlier, on June 22nd, when Bishop Manuel Larrain was killed
in a car crash on his way to the airport to attend a CELAM
meeting. The Latin American Church thus lost its most important
leader at the very time when his progressive views were beginning
to make headway among the ecclesiastical leadership. Although
Larrain's work was crowned at Medellin (in his inaugural address
there Cardinal Landazuri Ricketts stated that it was Larrain
who had pioneered the way which led to Medellin), his death
deprived the Latin American Church and the Church in Chile of
irreplaceable leadership. The course of events since has
underlined Larrain's indispensability, not least the loss of
steady direction in the Christian Democratic Party of Chileiand
1 8
the absence of his leadership when Allende became President
As CELAM was experiencing the influence of aggiofe.amento, the
gap between it and the American bishops was growing. There was
no sign of any equivalent attempt by the North Americans to begin
to address questions of national and international social justice
and economic reform until HL in 1968. At the 'Inter-American
Bishops' meeting in Miami, May 30-31, 1967, Archbishop Carroll,
Vice-Chairman of the U.S. Bishops' Committee for Latin America,
described a minimalist interpretation of U.S. church involvement:
"Until further advised, our United States Committee
considers as its program the relatively limited goals
represented in the five objectives established at the
Inter-American Meeting organized by the Holy See at
Georgetown University in November '59, namely (l) to
cooperate with the Church in Latin America in its
upsurging program toward greater strength; (2) to
permit the Church in the United States to labor jointly
with the Church in Latin America toward serving the
common spiritual, cultural and other interests of our
Church in the Western Hemisphere and, indeed, throughout
the globe."
(it can be takai as another "iron law" of ecclesiastical politics
that the degree of practical involvement and commitment to social
or religious change and reform is in dii»Ect proportion to the
clarity and precision of statement. The language of Medellin
can be compared with the above in this respect.)
This Miami meeting danonstrated the gap now opening between
the Latin American bishops, whose awareness of the involvement
of the Church in responsibility for the social inequality and
economic injustices in Latin America had been established in
the "conscientization" promoted by CELAM and Vatican II, and
the United States bishops, who lived with the conceptions of the
past on which the 'Inter-American' dialogue had been founded.
The different attitudes with regard to Castro's Cuba encapsulated
the change. The Americans were still in the position of '59
and Carroll demonstrated that - his attitude to Cuba reflected
the presence in his diocese of Miami of the Cuban refugees from
Castro's revolution whose Catholicism was pre-Castro and pre-
Vatican II, benevolently tolerant of the forms of capitalism
which had promoted the conditions of mass penury and squalor,
under American auspices, which had brought Castro from the Sierra
1 9
Madre to Havana . The Latin Americans, through the progressive
leadership of men like Larrain and Camara, had left behind anti-
Castroism and anti-communism and were coming to grips with the
responsibility of the Church to promote radical reform of the
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social and. economic structures, which continued to condemn the
mass of their people to sqalor and oppression in the name of
an economic system whose evils had been described in the social
encyclicals (now given even more relevant form in 'Populoarum
20
Progressio', Easter, 1967)
November 27-December 1, 1967, was the first time a group
of U.S. bishops travelled to Latin America for an official
meeting with the Latin American bishops, and this reflected the
complacent paternalism of the North Americans in their dealings
with their Latin American confreres. In practice, the Latin
Americans were considered to be in the same position of
suppliants requiring ecclesiastical aid (personnel and finance)
as their countries in relationship to the Department of State
(the 'Alliance for Progress' contained the same implications).
Far removed from this attitude was the consciousness of




The first meeting of the reconstituted CELAM departments
in La Capilla, Colombia, May 16-23, 1967 prepared the agenda for the
meeting which was intended as Latin America's appropriation of
Vatican II - the third 'General Assembly' of the Latin American
Catholic hierarchy in Medellin, Colombia, the last week of August
and the first week of September 1968. Like the previous
Assembly in Rio (1955)» this came in the wake of a Eucharistic
Congress, in Bogota, attended by Pope Paul, who opened the
Medellin meeting himself with an undistinguished speech of en-
1
couragement for the bishops' deliberations . The Pope had
appointed the three Presidents of the Assembly - Cardinal Samore,
f
head of the 'Pontifical Commission for Latin America; Cardinal
Landazuri of Lima, Peru; Archbishop Brandao Vilela of Teresina,
Brazil, president of CELAM - and sent a delegation of consultors
from the Vatican who had no vote in the assembly but were there
to advise bishops at request. Seven apostolic nuncios attended
but did not meet formally among themselves. One hundred and
thirty bishops represented all the Latin American hierarchies -
two official CELAM representatives from each country elected
by the members of their respective national episcopal
conferences, and in addition for every twenty-five bishops in a
conference one was elected to attend. There were a hundred
periti from all over Latin America, and one-hundred and twenty-
five observers (priests, religious, lay). This was the largest
2
meeting of its kind in the history of the Latin American Church.
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The outcome of Medellin, like that of Vatican II, is twofold -
the experience of the participants and the results of that
experience in the life of the Church in Latin America; the
documents of the assembly as the permanent testimony of Medellin's
3
message for the Church in Latin America and the whole oikumene .
The consequences of the experience can be observed in the actions of
the leadership and general membership of the Latin American Church;
Medellin's message is a prophetic word to the whole Catholic Church.
The documents of Medellin were approved by Paul in a letter
of October 24> 1968, from the Cardinal Secretary of State to
Cardinal Samore. The two which concern us here, because they
express the Medellin position on international questions, are
. 4
the statement on 'Justice' and the statement on 'Peace'. The
5
Latin American bishops' 'Message to the Peoples of Latin America'
(following the precedent of Vatican II's 'Message to Humanity'^)
set the tone:
"Our peoples seek their liberation and their growth
in humanity, through the incorporation and partici¬
pation of everyone in the very conduct of the
personalizing process."
"It is necessary to end the separation between faith
and life."
The very first of their "commitments" they declare to be:
"To inspire, encourage and press for a new order
of justice that incorporates all men in the decision-
making of their own communities."
Quoting Cardinal Sales of Brazil they put their credibility
on the line:
"This assembly has been invited."to take decisions
and establish programms only under the condition that
we are disposed to carry them out as a personal
commitment even at the cost of sacrifice."
In this way the Latin American bishops described the mission
of the Church in Latin American society as the liberating
agent of radical social change towards a "new order of Justice
In the'Introduction to the Pinal Documents' the Bishops
described this situation of mission in which the Church now
found itself:
".... una nueva epoca historica de nuestro continente,
llena de un anhelo de emancipacion total, de
^ /
liberacion de toda servidumbre,....de maduracion
personal y de integracion colectiva. Percibimos
/
aqud los prenuncios en la dolorosa gestacion de una
nueva civilizacion. No podemos dejar de interpretar
este gigantesco esfuerzo por una rapida transformacion
y desarollo como un evidente signo del Espiritu que
conduce la historia de los hombres y de los pueblos
7
hacia su vocacion."
Re-echoing CrS they indicate the theological foundation of all
Christian efforts on behalf of justice and peace:
"....Dios, que quiere salvar al hombre entero, alma
y cuerpo."
and express the same conciliar inspiration:
"En esta Conferencia General del Episcopado Latimo-
americano se ha renovado el misterio de Pentecostes."
In the document on 'Justice' they express what is by now
an ideological consensus, drawing on the tradition of the
social encyclicals^ GS, in particular Populorum Progressio,
and apply it to the situation of their countries which they
qualify thus:
"...las extructuras injustas que caracterizan la
situacion de America Latina."
Drawing on this same tradition they underline the Christian
criteria which stand in judgment on all political and economic
systems - the primacy of the bonum commune, and the universal
nature of the goods of creation as directed by God the creator
for the use of all men:
"Es el mismo Dios quien, en la plenitud de los tiempos,
envia a su Hijo para que hecho carne, venga liberar
a todos los hombres de todas las esclavitudes a que
, los tiene sujetos el pecado, la ignorancia, el humbre,
y
la miseria y la opresion, en una palabra, la injusticia




Por eso, para nuestra verdadera liberacion,
todos los hombres necisitamos una profunda conversion
a fin de que lleque a nostros el "Reino de justicia,
de amor y de paz La originalidad de mensaje
/
Cristiano no consiste directamente en la aftermacion
de la necisidad de un cambio de estructuras, sino en
la insistencia en la conversion del hombre, que
g
exige luego este cambio."
Not that the Christian message is unconcerned with structures -
rather, the Christian doctrine of man, created and redeemed,
is the most fundamental determinant of the compatibility of
the structures with the dignity of the persons whom they are
meant to serve. The result in Latin America of this primacy
of persons is that the structures are found wanting:
"El sistema empresarial latinoamericano y, por el,
la economia actual, responden a una concepcion
erronea sobre el derecho de propiedad de los medios
v
de produccion y sobre la finalidad misma de la
economia. La empresa, en una economia. verdaderamente
humana, no se identifaca con los duenos del capital,
porque es fundamentalmente comunidad de personas y
unidad de trabajo, que necesita de capitales para la
produccion de bienes. Una persona o un grupo de
personas no pueden ser propiedad de un individuo, de una
sociedad, o de un Estado.
El sistema liberal capitalista y la tentacion
del sistema marxista parecieran agotar en nuestro
20$
continente las posibilidad.es de transformar las
estructuras economicas. Ambers.' sistemas atentan
contra la dignidad de la persona humana; pues uno,
tiene como presupuesto la primacia del capital, su
poder y su discriminatoria utilizacion en funcion
del lucro; el otro, aunque ideologicamente sostenga
un humanismo, mira mas bien al hombre colectivo,
/ /
y en la practica se traduce en una concentracion
totalitaria del poder del Estado. Debemos denunciar
/
que Latinoamerica se ve encerrada entre estes dos
opciones y permanece dependiente de uno u otro de
/ q
los centros de poder que canalizan su economia."
( In line with, recent Catholic Church statements the bishops
feel they have to acknowledge the ideological content of
Marxist humanism, whereas capitalism is given much shorter
shrift.)
In order to overcome these "sistemas y instituciones
economicas inhumanas" they invoke the concept of Pope John's
MM:
s
"La socializacion, entendida como proceso sociocultural
de personalizacion y de solidaridad erescientes, nos
induce a pensar que todos los sectores de la sociedad,
perO"Sn este caso, principalmente el sector economico
social, deberan superar, por la justicia y la fraternidad,
los antagonismos, para convertise en agentes del desarrollo
nacional y continental. Sin esta unidad, Latinoamerica
/ /
no lograra liberarse del neocolonialismo a que esta
sometida, ni por consiguiente realizarse en libertad,
con sus caracteristicas propias en lo cultural, socio-
n/,. /. ,,10politico y economico."
They call for political reform to ensure the rights and
liberties of the citizens, and the free functioning of inter¬
mediary structures - in line with another principle enshrined
in Catholic social teaching (1 subsidiaiqiry) - that no larger
institution should appropriate to itself what can be performed
by a smaller institution, as long as the latter can function
according to christian principles. The mission of the Church
in the Latin American situation must take into account the
absence of political and social consciousness:
"La carencia de una conciencia politica en nuestros
/ s
paises hace imprescindibile la accion educadora de
la Iglesia...
/
Deseamos afirmar que es indispensable la formacion
de la conciencia social y la percepcion realista de
los problemas de la comunidad y de las estructuras
sociales....
Esta tarea de conscientizacion y de educacion
social debera integrarse en los planes de Pastoral
11
de conjunto en sus diversos niveles."
Here we see clearly the influence of Paolo Freire, an$ his
■As-
program of conscientizacao made the official pastoral-
educational program of the Latin American Church. This is
naturally anathema to the traditional socio-economic political
1 2
elites who rely on the continuance of "the culture of silence".
In fine, they announce the mission of the Church to work
for justice:
" la educacion social, la conscientizacion en
orden al cambio de estructuras y la vigencia de
1 3
la justicia."
The same analysis is continued in the second document.
The social situation is determined by "Tensiones entre clases
y colonialismo interno", in which "Diversas formas de
marginalidad" are characterized by the following consequence:
"Desigualdades excesivas entre las clases sociales,
especialmente, aunque no en forma exclusiva, en
aquellos paises que se caracterizan por un marcado
biclasismo: pocos tienen mucho (cultura, riquesza,
, 14
poder, prestigio), mientras muchos tienen poco."
"....las des igualdades excosivas impiden sistematicamente
la satisfacion de las legitimas aspiraciones de los sectores
/ 15
postergados. Se generan asx frustraciones crecientes."
The attitude of the privileged elite is to treat any attempt
1 6
to change the system as subversion of social order or communism
Moving on to the international environment which has cul¬
tivated this Latin American situation, the document invokes
the tradition from Q.A. to P.P. to describe the "imperialismo
internacional del dinero" which has imposed on Latin
America the distortions of the international economic
system - adverse terms of trade, flights of capital, increasing
17
indebtedness
This leads on to one of the most significant sections of
the Medellin documents, in which the bishops come to terms with
that aspect of the Latin American reality which continues to
bedevil all attempts at political action - "la violencia":
"No deja de ver que America Latina se encuentra,
en muchas partes, en una situacion de injusticia
18
que puede llamarse de vidLencia."
"Tal situacion exige transformaciones globales,
audaces, urgentes y profondamenterenovadoras.
No debe, pues, extranarnos que nazca en America
Latina "la tentacion de la violencia". No hay que
abusar de la paciencia de un pueblo que soporta
durante anos una condicion que dificilmente aceptarxan
quienes tienen una major conciencia de los derechos
19
humanos."
The analysis thus begins from the "situation of injustice",
the "situation of violence", and the primary responsibility
belongs to those who maintain that situation in defence of
20
their personal and class privileges . This linic between
"justice" and "peace" was a central point of Paul VI's
'Populorum Progressio' (as it was to be of 'Octogesima
Adveniens' of 1971, encapsulated in the phrase "If you want
peace, work for justice.") Where the analysis falters, as
it must inevitably, is in the resolution of the conflict
between the class interest of the privileged and the bonum
commune. The remedy is proposed:
"La justicia y, consiguientemente, la paz se conquistan
por una accion dinamica de concientizaeion y de
organizacion de los sectores populares, capaz de
urgir a los poderes publicos, muchas veces impotentes
21
en sus pro.yectos sociales sin el apoyo popular."
But, as Freire discovered in Brazil, such action with the
masses does not give the solace of popular support to "los
poderes publicos" who are not in favour of change. This
dilemma is not lessened by the sympathetic understanding of
the bishops for those who have opted for a more direct
approach:
"Nos dirigimos finalmente a aquellos que, ante la
gravedad de la injusticia y las resistencias
ilegitimas al cambio, ponen su esperanza en la
violencia. Con Pablo VI reconecemus que su
actitud "encuentra frecuentemente su ultima
motivacion en nobles impulsos de justicia y
solidaridad". No hablamos aqux' del puro verbalismo
que no implica ninguna responsabilidad personal y
aparta de las acciones pacificas fecundas,
immediatamente realizables.
Si bien es verdad que la insurrecion
revolucionaria puede ser legitima en el caso "de
tiiania evidente y prolongada que atentase gravemente
2l<t
a los derechos fundamentales de la persona y damnificase
peligrosamente el bien commun del pais" (Populorum
Progressio 31) ya provenga de una persona ya de
/
estructuras evidentemente injustas, tambien es
cierto que la violencia o "revolucion armada"
generalmente "engendra nuevas injusticeas, introduce
nuevas desequilibrios y provoca nuevas ruinas:
no se puede combatir un mal real al precio de un
22
mal major". (Populorum Progressio 31 )
The first thing which comes out clearly here is the perspective -
recognition of the legitimacy of social change (the "illegitimate"
resistehces to change), and even the legitimacy of revolution¬
ary insurrection in the face of tyranny. The caution which
follows - that violence and armed revolution generally are
self-defeating, since they engender new disasters - does not
in any way alter the removal of legitimacy from an unjust
"social order". This has fundamentally altered the position
of the Church in Latin America. Since Medellin the opposition of the
conservative elites to the Church, as indeed the attempts by con¬
servative circles in the Church ( in the first place, bishops)
to ignore what was accepted at Medellin, is convincing proof of
23
radical change.
In this new perspective, the excesses of revolutionary
violence, are placed in a secondary position to the primary
violence of the unjust order which is their cause. Thus the
conventional estimation is stood on its head - instead of a
concentration on the opposition as a threat to law and. order (the
"
\
convenient wisdom of the ruling classJ, primary responsibility
for social peace rests with the political powers and their
willingness to change by instituting the necessary reforms
towards a greater social justice. It is the status quo which is
considered illegitimate, not the attempts (even violent) in favour
of change. Revolutionary violence in this perspective is not
automatically illegitimate (as it is in the conventional wisdom)
but an invalid means to the legitimate end of social change:
"Si consideranos, pues, el conjunto de las
circumstancias de ruestros paises, si tenemos
en cuenta la preferencia del cristiano por
la paz, la enorme dificultad de la guerra civil,
y
su logica de violencia, los males atroces que
y
engendra, el riesgo de provocar la intervencion
extrajera por ilegxtima que sea, la dificultad
de construir un regimen de justicia y de
libertad partindo de un proceso de violencia,
ansi.amos que el dinamismo del pueblo concientizado
y organizado se ponga al servicio de la justicia
y de la paz."
The bishops thus find themselves in the ambiguous
situation of denying legitimacy to the unjust social order
/ 24\
Whence the removal of the ruling class support for the Church )
while opposing what must appear to many as the only means to
overthrow this unjust order - revolutionary violence - given
the unwillingness of the ruling class to modify their privileged
control of the state. Hence the sense of disbelief which must
strike anyone familiar with the ecclesiastical politics
traditional since Constantine - the varied attempts by
ecclesiastical authority to come to terms with the political
power (dominating or, being dominated by it, endeavouring to
change it by supporting a revolution, or in most cases a counter¬
revolution) . The prophetic stance was left to individuals
(Jagerstatter), as was legitimate resistance to tyranny
(Stauffenberg and Bonhoeffer)^, but here we have the
ecclesiastical hierarchy of Latin America in its most authori¬
tative 'persona' adopting a prophetic political theology.
Camillo Torres symbolized and enacted the tragedy of the
Christian revolutionary who takes up as a last resort armed
26
resistance against the oppression of injustice . Helder
Camara expresses the necessary dilemma of the Christian who
experiences oppressive injustice but accepts the burden of non¬
violence as the only way to redeem the oppression and free
27
oppressed and oppressors.
Medellin was the achievement of those churchmen who had
for many hears been working for the establishment of a renewed
vision of the Church and its mission, in the tradition of
personalist philosophy, liturgical ecclesiology, and Catholic
28
social teaching; the achievement of CELAM, which with the
progressive leadership of Larrain, Camara, Sales, McGrath,
and their advisors (theologians, philosophers, social .scientists)
had brought the bishops of the countries of Latin America
together in a commitment to ecclesiastical and social reform,
21U
inspired by the aggiornamento of Vatican II and the demands of
29
the revolutionary situation of the continent
The present record is mixed. While the Medellin statements
stand to challenge the practice of the bishops and the influence
of Church institutions in the social development of Latin
America, the reality in individual countries often contradicts
the high hopes of Medellin. The hierarchy procrastinates
(Colombia), fails to give sufficient support to its more
courageous members when their work on b ehalf of the poor
encounters opposition from the social establishment (Ecuador),
30
or remains silent as the oppression of the poor increases
On the other hand, there have been examples of courageous efforts
31
to carry out the commitments of Medellin . In Brazil the Church
is at present the only voice of opposition to the authoritarian
32
military rule
When we consider the response of the North American bishops,
we have to examine how the experience and theology of Medellin
was communicated to them, and what impact this had on them as
leaders of the Church, particularly in questions of justice and
peace. We are concerned here-with the possibility of a
"conscientizacion" communicated to and assimilated by the American
y
bishops, similar to the "conscientizacion" of which John A. Ryan
was the initial agent-. Here we are in a position to catch only
a glimpse of this experience, which is a present reality, but
such a glimpse is an indispensable part of the horizon of this
thesis.
2lf
The only U.S. bishop who was at Medellin was Humberto
Medeiros, and his activity described in Section III shows no
indication of a Medellin "conscientizacion". However, both
in Brownsville-, and now in Boston, he has shown a commitment
to the cause of the poor and support for socio-economic reforms
beyond the present policies of the American government. In
this he is part of a majority consensus within the American
hierarchy supporting the 'Social Action' reforming work
pioneered by Ryan and his generation of Catholic leaders. -
more adequate welfare and social security provision, national
health insurance, federal housing, support of the migrant
workers. ' But the point of controversy comes when reform, is
extended to criticism of the economic system itself and it is
this attitude which Medellin enshrined.
At the 'Inter-American Bishops Meeting' in Caracas,
June 3-5> 1969> the North Americans came face to face with this
aspect of "conscientizacion". For the first time they met on
a Conference level, as representatives of their respective
Bishops' Conferences not just as ad iioc groups of bishops. All
sessions were closed to the press. This format is best suited
to the present investigation, because the information acquired
of such a meeting is much more revealing of the true state of
affairs than it would be of a meeting at which the participants
are more self-conscious and concerned with their potential
audience. The American delegates were Cardinals Dearden, Krol,
and Cody, Bishop Bernardin, and six members of the Latin American
Committee of NCCB - Carroll, Medeiros, Hodges, Green, Breitenbeck,
Hastrich. The main areas set for discussion were - the pastoral
guidelines of Medellin, socio-economic problems, the role of
personnel from the United States in the Latin American Church
33
and their training
Edgar Beltran of CELAM's 'Department of Pastoral Action' had
prepared a "position paper" - 'Pastoral Guidelines for Latin
America set by the Medellin Documents' - in which he described
what was set down at Medellin as flowing from a vision of the
Latin American reality and a theological judgment on this
reality, a development of Vatican II - applying the Council
teachings t'o the integral Latin American situation. In this
vision the Church is pictured as dynamic - an efficachus source
of development, integration and liberation for the Continent
at this point in history. Following Vatican II, the "pastoral",
not the "legal" image of the Church was emphasized, the importance
of universal co-responsibility because of the universality of the
Church (the need to inspire and lead the laity to take
responsibility for Christian mission), the importance of a
theology of the particular Church (diversity in unity, not
uniformity; sensitivity to the needs and aspirations of the
local koinonia), formation and growth in Christian faith and
mission ("conscientizacion"). Of particular importance in
Latin America was the LG emphasis on "the Church of the poor"
(paragraph 8) - the Church in solidarity with the poor and the
oppressed, dedicated to their liberation and redemption to a
dignity worthy of the person created and redeemed "in Christ" -
the "servant" Church, "incarnate" in the people, the "pilgrim"
2in
Church ("A pilgrim Church is being built: she does not believe
34 .
she is already established, but rather seeks to grow. "J
At the meeting, to present "the Latin American reality"
to be judged in terms of this theology, Carlos Acedo Mendoza
(an economist and secretary-general of the 'Commission for Justice
and Peace' of the Venezuelan Church) read a paper in which he
35
described the failure of the 'Alliance for Progress' and the
Latin American resentment of the international economic system,
with its built-in situation of dependency of the "underdeveloped"
countries on the "developed".
"The paradoxical fact is that the industrialized
countries which aid the non-industrialized ones
are the ones which profit the most by trading
with these same countries."
This dependency has increased, as the terms of trade show an
ever greater differentiation in favour of the developed countries,
with the burden of debt increasing in the underdeveloped.
Foreign aid does little to correct the imbalance:
"90'fo of the aid given by the Agency of International
Development (AID), was earmarked for the acquisition
37
of North American products."
The result is that situation of "marginalidad" and "violencia"
which Medellin described, and in which religion participates.
For this latter aspect another paper read at Caracas
complemented, that of Mendoza - 'Inter-American Missionary Effort
In Latin America', by Chrysostom Gaerets, O.P. He spoke of
the necessity to ask questions about the nature of the missionary
effort in Latin America, the dangers of American cultural
imperialism caused by the nationalism and secularism of American
culture influencing Latin America (a "work-culture", as opposed
to a "leisure, person-centered" culture:
"The cultural invasion from the United States is
not only secularizing the sacral at an alarming rate,
but in many ways is completely materializing the
spiritual heritage of centuries of Latin influence.")
He gave a three part description of the "Church as Mission" -
preaching word of God to all men, establishing a hierarchically
structured Church with its full liturgical life, the "social
pastoral or social apostolate" ("the underdeveloped ministry").
The missionary contributes to the mutual effort by which a
"third way" can be found "...which can preserve what is deeply
Christian in both the work-centred and leisure-centred cultures,
while carefully avoiding the excesses of both." U.S. personnel
in Latin America should be in a "complimentary" or "supplementary"
role:
"The areas of planning, programing, organization,
efficiency in actio#, and pragmatic adaptation are
normally part of the North American genius, even'as
reflective vision and wisdom are areas of weakness.
The goal desired by all pastoral agents is a living
faith in the developing world of our time, but to
achieve this, old Church structures must be reformed
and many times completely new pastoral techniques
have to be introduced. One conclusion of several
missionaries from the States in Latin America after
many years is that the Church can only begin
effectively its renovation through the social
apostolate. Likewise, only when catechetical
programs and liturgical reforms are integrated into
the social-human apostolate will a living Faith come
forth from the People of God."^
In an address on June 3rd, Archbishop Avelar Brandao
Vilela of Teresina, Brazil (President of CELAM ) stated:
"...the conclusions of Medellin are the Magna Charta
of the Latin American Church, applying to our
reality the open, comprehensive spirit of the
Vatican Council."
And the following day, June 4th, Cardinal Eugenio Araujo Sales
of San Salvador da Bahia, Brazil, expressed 'con brio' the
challenge of Medellin:
"Have we accomplished our duty, placing above material
interest of our respective countries, the doctrine of
our church? What have we done along with our
businessmen, politicians, and all those who are the
decision makers, not only in the United States, but also
in Latin America to realize some action fonforming to
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the gospel as applied by the pontifical documents and
the documents of the Vatican Council to the reality
of today?
This would be a work of love against hate and
revolution."
Since Cardinal Dearden was not present for the third and
final day, June 5th, Cardinal Krol (then vice-president of
NUCB, now president) made the closing remarks on behalf of the
American bishops. I single out this statement here because
it is the most significant example I have come across of the
gap between the spirit and substance of Medellin and the
reaction of the American hierarchy. It represents the
immediate response of a leader of the hierarchy who was later
to be voted into the presidency of NUCB, and who in the years
immediately following this represented the most visible and
most powerful influence in the hierarchy and at the USCC (as we
have seen in Section III). Nothing that happened subsequently,
in the following 'Inter-American Bishops' meetings which we can
consider here, changed the attitude and policy which this
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statement reveals
The first impression given in these remarks is the
patronising tone, the absence of an expression of awareness that
the United States Church has any responsibility for the socio¬
economic policies of the United States in Latin America, and the
attempt to invoke the "separation of church and state" as an
excuse for not becoming involved. In August, 1969» as we saw
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in Section III, the "separation of church and state" did not
prevent Cardinal Krol from questioning military spending, nor
has it ever prevented American bishops from criticizing state
legislation opposed to parochial-school aid. The complacent
acceptance of the "free enterprise" system disregards the
information supplied by Mendoza in his talk. Where this talk is
mentioned, it is to bolster evasion of responsibility for the
unjust economic system Mendoza was criticizing. Even when
"injustices" and "exploitation of peoples" within the United
States are recognized, this is unaccompanied by any attempt to
describe how the Church can take part in the task of righting
the injustice and ending the exploitation. The necessity of
linking an understanding of the "reality" with a theological
judgment (which Beltran had described in his "position paper"
and which was the central fact of Medellin) is ignored.
Instead, Krol made no mention of "judgment" and left the"reality"
to "the experts".
The following two 'Inter-American Bishops Meetings' (in
Miami, February 2-5, 1970 and Mexico City, May 18-21, 1971)
confirmed the failure of "conscientizacion" in the case of the
U.S. hierarchy, particularly since a third group of bishops were
present who manifested some non-Latin American understanding of
the "reality" and their responsibility - the Canadians. At
Miami three bishops represented the 'Canadian Catholic Conference' -
Plourde of Ottawa, Sanschagrin of St. Hyacinthe - Quebec, and
Mahoney of Saskatoon - and a similar delegation as the one at
Caracas represented the Americans (Dearden, Krol, Maguire - in
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place of Cody, Bernardin, Carroll, Swanstrom, Medeiros, Hodges,
Breitenbeck). Among the nine Latin Americans were the three
principal heads of CELAM (Vilela, McGrath, and Pironio of
Argentina) and Cardinals Ricketts of Peru, Maurer of Bolivia
and Munoz Vega of Ecuador.
The statement at the end of the meeting brought up the
important question of the actual status of such meetings - did
the bishops represent their respective Bishops' Conferences, or
their respective Churches, and was the meeting merely an exchange
of views or did it bind them in some way to take action in the
light of their discussions? In the background was the
Vatican II talk about collegiality - the responsibility of the
bishops for the universal Church, the need to foster co¬
operation between sister Churches:
"Meetings with our brother bishops should become
in a real sense meetings of churches. Episcopal
collegiality should be seen as a service to the
entire community of God's people. In this sense
our discussion has turned to consideration of how
the clergy, Religious, and laity can collaborate
more effectively with the hierarchy in planning
and implementing pastoral programs of the Church."
But later in the same statement this collegial aspect is played
down, and commitment is left in the abstract (exactly'the same
tone as Krol's remarks):
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"Although our meeting is informal and in no way-
binds its participants by the conclusions reached,
nevertheless we. express a willingness to commit
our resources as Pastors in the realization of the
Kingdom of God in Latin America with special
attention to the problems related to integral
human development of Latin American countries."
Two months after the 'Inter-American' meeting, at the 8th
General Meeting of NCCB in San Francisco, April 21-23, 1970, a
'Statement of Purpose for Inter-American Bishops' Meeting' was
issued which reflects this approach and is eloquent testimony
of the absence among the American hierarchy of a desire to go
beyond the minimum involvement:
"The Inter-American Bishops' Meeting is an informal
gathering of Bishops of Latin America and Worth
America. The designation of the participants is the responsibility of
their respective Conferences and CELAM.
The purpose of the Inter-American meeting is
primarily to promote dialogue among the participants,
to provide an opportunity for them to share ideas
regarding matters of mutual concern. Any conclusions
reached in the meeting represent the views of the
participating Bishops but not necessarily those of
the Conferences to which they belong.
s
While as a result of the discussions which take
place at the Inter-American meeting certain actions
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may subsequently be taken by the various Conferences,
the meeting itself is not called, to formulate action
..4-0programs."
An "informal gathering" is a far cry from the aspiration for
"meetings of churches", not to mention a more comprehensive
collegiality, involving all "the people of God", "in planning
and implementing pastoral programs of the Church". At Caracas,
Krol had made a remark which underlines his minimalist con¬
ception of collegiality, when he distinguished between bishops
and "the People of God":
"We cannot assume all the responsibilities of the
People of God, but we must instruct and inspire them...."
The American hierarchy was clearly uncomfortable with the
"conscientizacion" to which they were being invited at the
Inter-American meetings, and unwilling to become involved in
any attempt to translate Medellin into action. Whatever
influence these meetings might be having on individual bishops,
the men at the top (Dearden and Krol) who had the greatest
control over WCCR were not allowing this influence to affect
the concerns of NCCR. This can even be seen in the words used
by Cardinal Dearden in praise of Medellin:
"At the last meeting of the Latin American bishops
joined together in CELAM in Medellin, there was
evident a real sense of Christian awareness of the
values that are involved in the progress of their
people. A sense of Christian concern impelled
them to recognize clearly the realities of the
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situation, to appraise strengths and. weaknesses, and
to propose a program of action that will help to
achieve for all their people a more human existence.
We applaud them for their candor, their honesty,
their integrity and their pastoral zeal. And in
spirit we associate ourselves with them in their
efforts to bring to their people a fuller realization
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of their human dignity."
The Latin Americans were demanding more of the Americans than
an association "in spirit" with their efforts. At the 'Inter-
American' meetings the whole point in having people like Mendoza
address the bishops was to present them with those "fundftmenta
in re" which could be used to inform their judgments and actions
on the situation.
At Miami in February, 1970, a working paper of Gustavo
Gutierrez was put before the bishops - 'Notes for a Theology
of Liberation' - to focus their attention on the third topic
of their discussions (the first had been the question of
collegiality already mentioned, the second - pastoral
programmes for Latin American students in the U.S. and Canada):
the "concept of liberation in the light of the documents" of
Medellin. This, initial introduction to a discussion of "the
theology of liberation" was followed up at the '71 Mexico City
meeting, and this time from the North American side came the
position paper -'The Liberation of Men and Nations', by William
F. Ryan, S.J. (of the 'Canadian Catholic Conference' staff) and
Joseph Komanchak (an American theologian from the New York
archdiocesan seminary at Dunwoodie, Yonkers). The Mexico
City meeting preceded the 1971 Synod of Bishops in Rome at which
'Justice in the World' was one of the topics for discussion and
coincided with Pope Paul's 'Apostolic Letter' - _0c_tO£esima
Adveniens - commemorating the eightieth anniversary of EN.
The Ryan-Romanchak paper emphasized the mission of the
Church for social prophecy:
"In the midst of men God summons the Church to be
a social prophet and catalyst - protesting every
injustice, offering reasons to hope and motives to
serve."
It noted that the Church's social teaching emphasizes moral and
spiritual values over economic considerations and denies the
"inevitability" of economic laws. Its most telling point was
the "ns.ed for North American equivalent of the social over¬
view initiated by the Latin American Church at Medellin". It
described the Church's mission of reconciliation in a polarized
society, by efforts to liberate politics from its paralyzed
state, to restore it to the role of promoting the common good,
offering a vision of a "desirable future" to balance the
"predictable future" of technology. The 'Summary of Discussion'
gives a view of the themes from the 'theology of liberation' and




The two authors of the paper whom I contacted, during 1973
(Ryan in personal conversation, Komanchak in a phone conversation)
said that they knew of no response by the American bishops to the
paper. Ryan described the division between the American bishops
on the one hand and the Canadians and Latin Americans on the other.
The Canadians have shown a grasp of the Latin American situation
and expressed willingness to cooperate with the Latin Americans.
The Canadian Catholic Conference in Ottawa has openly encouraged
efforts to influence Canadian government policies towards Latin
America in the conduct of Canadian trade and aid, and most
recently in welcoming refugees from Chile.
Unlike the subject of Section III (Vietnam) the lack of
knowledge and sympathy among the American bishops for the
position of their Latin American confreres adopted at Medellin
could not be so easily excused by a lack of the resources
required to provide them with such information.. Part of the
organization set up by the Bishops' Committee for Latin America
had been the 'Catholic Inter-American Corporation Program'
(CICOP), founded in 1963, precisely for this purpose. The
titles of the CICOP meetings listed in the bibliography
outline the scope of this effort at "mutual understanding and
friendship". Very few bishops in fact attended these meetings.
Those few who did were without influence in the counsels of the
inner circle of NCCB in this crucial period immediately after
Medellin. Cardinal Cushing who had given his support to the
Latin American Division, and in particular to the Director -
Louis Colonnese - was burdened with increasingly severe illness
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which prevented him from becoming involved. Colonnese conducted
a vigorous effort to communicate the spirit and content of
Medellin (he himself was present at the assembly), particularly
through the CICOP meetings, and to lobby for support within
NCCB and USCC for the progressive cause in Latin America. Within
a year of Cushing's death Colonnese was fixed from his job as
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Director (summer, 1971).
CICOP itself has survived just long enough for its demise
to be recorded as this narrative ends. Such an eventuality
was not totally unexpected, since the same party which had
brought about Medellin - the progressive social and religious
exponents of aggiornamento within CELAM - found their North
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American forum at CICOP . This put them on a collision
course within the U.S.A. with those in American government and
business who did not welcome the changed image of the Catholic Church pre¬
sented at Medellin and given expression at CICOP. They had not only
agitated for re-establishing relations with Cuba, and changing
American support of the military imperialism of Brazil, but
vehemently criticized the practices of American business south of
the Rio Grande and demanded changes in the whole economic system.
At its demise, at the end of 1973> CICOP was the only social
action conference of its kind in the continent. The pressures
to which it was subject are described in an article by Thomas E.
Quigley, presently Assistant-Director of the Latin American
Division, written before the decision at the highest level of
NCCB-USCC was taken.^
The course of events from those few significant remarks
of Cardinal Krol at Caracas in 1969 has confirmed that policy of
evasion which he then expressed. This has been supported in
Latin America itself, because since Medellin a reaction has set
in which has confirmed the survival of a strong traditionalist
party;within the Latin American hierarchies which has shown in
practice an unwillingness to accept the policies expressed in
the Medellin documents.
Medellin spoke directly to the tasks of government and the
major institutions of society (industry, commerce, education,
the military). Only a bishop who had accepted the
"conscientizacion" was in a position to stand up to the winds
of opposition with integrity and confidence: any other
preparation was vulnerable to social pressure based on pre-
Medellin and pre-Vatican II ecclesiastical politics.
The American hierarchy was of little help. Their out¬
standing Vatican II "conscientized" members (Hallinan, Meyer,
Ritter, Reed) were dead. "The inheritance of John A. Ryan" -
the attitude of social and economic criticism of the
"convenient wisdom" of the prevailing capitalist order - had
been set aside since the end of the Second World War in favour
of a more constricted agenda. Most bishops were uninformed
about Latin America, and the ones who attended 'Inter-
American' meetings were either unsympathetic to the Medellin
"conscientizacion" or not able to communicate to their fellow
U.S. bishops any sense of priority for collegial efforts to
support Medellin policies. The direction of NCCB-USCC at this
time went from a centrist - Cardinal Dearden whose policy was
based on conciliating the conservative majority by gradually
introducing changes supported by a minority of progressive
bishops - to a conservative - Cardinal Krol whose policy was to
introduce as little change as possible and to avoid controversy
concerning the government's foreign policy - hence his attempts
to prevent criticism of Vietnam policy and evasive action in
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dealing with the Latin American bishops.
At the height of ecclesiastical concern with Latin America
(the aftermath of Medellin and the '71 Synod of Bishops) Krol
was coming into prominence as the leader of the American
hierarchy, meeting with President Fixon at the White House, giv-
Ingthp benediction at the Republican National Convention, limiting
his criticism of American policy to the generalities of military
spending. Krol's theology was confined by his Canon Law back¬
ground pre-Vatican II. This was both an obstacle to the type
of collegiality involved in working with Latin American bishops
to change the complexion of U.S. Latin American relationships in
line with Medellin, and to a broader understanding of the Church's
mission in society beyond the confines of "ecclesiastical
prerogative" (parochial schools, abortion). However, the
influence of Medellin continues. The network of people within
the Churches sympathetic to the "Social Christians" in Latin
America continues to grow, encouraged by the increase of
'justice-and peace' diocesan commissions, ecumenical efforts
to change the policies of American business abroad, and the
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heightened awareness of the quality of American foreign policy
in the Third World in consequence of Vietnam and the overthrow
of Allende. The "conscientizacion" is no longer confined to
CICOP - the principal theological journals of influence publicize
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the 'theology of liberation' , spokesmen of the post-Medellin
Church (Freire, Illicji, Camara, Gutierrez, Segundo) have been
given scope for communication of their views in the United States
and in Europe. The course of events in Latin America itself
has confirmed the analysis of Medellin and its further theological
progression in "liberation" theology.
This theology and the action it inspires (whether in Panama,
Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Bolivia, Chile, Equador, Cuba) draws
on a rich treasure of contemporary Catholic thought and experience
which Vatican II has established in the consciousness of the
Church. On the basis of the Church's mission of service in the
world, the Christian vocation is interpreted as one of cooperation
with "all men of goodwill" to redeem the social disorder in the
direction of that justic e, communion, and peace which Jesus
announced in his preaching as the "rule" or "kingdom" of God.
This vision of the "kingdom" (which finds New Testament
expression in Mathew, cc.5-7, and Paul's letters to the Colossians
and Ephesians) stands in judgment of all social, economic, and
political orders and forms. It calls for transformation of these
orders in the direction of that justice, communion, and peace of
the Kingdom. To bring about transformation is the tp.sk, not of
an "ortho-doxy" (Christian doctrine and theology understood as a
formulation of the truths - abstract, essentialist, formal) but
of an "ortho-praxis" (Christian faith and. theology as a critical
reflection and action on the "reality", the "fundamenta in re",
which demands, a commitment of the Church in the process of
liberation of the oppressed and the oppressor from the situations
of sin which define the socio-economic-political order). The
Church, far from standing outside society and its institutions,
is implicated in the "situations", and takes the side of the poor
and the oppressed, not that of the oppressors, because the





In this final section I am going to reduce the debate to more
particular and localized proportions, from which I shall consider
the dialectic of "institution" and "ideology", our original starting
point for the whole discussion. This is a •limited* attempt to come
to terms with this dialectic, in the first place because it is
impossible of final resolution. An example of the Church as both
"incamational" and "eschataloglcal"; and in the second place because
I think only a tentative approach to an explanation of such an
historically important issue is appropriate.1 It is much easier
to assemble the evidence of statements Mid actions in particular
circumstances than to make sense of these against such a complex
background as the situation of the American Catholic Church in the
United States. Now that I have assembled the evidence and sketched
in outline what I consider to be relevant themes in the history of
the Catholic Church and its expression in the United States, I shall
try here to bring the debate to some particular "Conclusions".
The principal focus of consideration in this thesis has been
the official leadership of the American Catholic Church - the bishops.
Here I am going to describe the response to the Vietnam War within
other ranks of Church membership in one diocese of the United States,
since this response reflects on that of the bishops and on the
general area of foreign policy, as this is at present being
presented in the Church in terms of concern for 'justice and peace*.
CHAPTER I
THE ARCHDIOCESE OP LOUISVILLE AND TOE WAR
Catholics from Maryland were among the first settlers in
Kentucky in the 18th century. Nelson, Marion, and Washington counties,
south-east of the city of Louisville, became the area of Catholic
population concentration in the new territory and Bardstown the
first Catholic diocese west of the Alleghenies, with New York and
Philadelphia one of the first three dioceses founded as suffragans
of Baltimore (1812). The Catholic Church was "native" to this
part of the United States, where the oldest and most respected institu¬
tions are Catholic (the mother-houses of the Sisters of Charity of
Nazareth, Kentucky, of the Sisters of Loretto, of the Dominican
Sisters of Springfield, and the Trappist Abbey of Gethsemane to
which Thomas Merton belonged and whfcte he is buried.) Bishop
Flaget, first bishop of Bardstown, supervised an area which today
includes the states of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and Michigan - the
geographical and cultural centre of American Catholicism.
The diocese was moved from Bardstown to Louisville in 1841 as
that city on the falls of the Ohio became the population centre of
the region in the age of river transportation (the cities of
Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Louisville, St. Louis, New Orleans, are all
examples of the river port - Catholic population centre tandem.)
Today the ecclesiastical province of Louisville includes the states
of Kentucky and Tennessee, with the archdiocese of Louisville and
the dioceses of Covington and Owensboro, Kentucky, and Nashville and
Memphis, Tennessee. The Catholic population of the Archdiocese of
Louisville (approximately two-hundred thousand) continues to be
concentrated in thecity of Louisville (Jefferson County) and the three
historic Catholic counties. Within the Louisville city area one-
quarter to one-third of the population is Catholic and Catholicism is
the major Christian denomination.
Kentucky, with a population between 5 and 5-1/2 million, is
one of the smallest states of the Union, and in the same way the
Archdiocese of Louisville does not rank with major dioceses such as
Chicago, Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Los Angeles. However,
its geographical and historical situation has placed the arch¬
diocese in an interesting position, contiguous to the raid-west
centre of American Catholicism, yet part of the most Protestant
culture in the nation, that of the South (Southern Baptist
Seminary is in Louisville), while being an indigenous Catholic
community. Louisville has participated in the conteit^orary American
experience, national and Catholic, while retaining the particular
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characteristics of its situation.
Here we shall consider two examples of the Louisville Catholic
response to the issue of the War which were reflected in the
response throughout the American Catholic Church. These local
experiences are a paradigm of the national Catholic response.
23&
A. THE SENATE OF PRIESTS
As the Second Vatican Council ended Louisville was in the
final years of the forty-year episcopate of Archbishop Floersch, a
traditionalist of the old school. The initial stirrings of enth¬
usiasm for change and for the new ways sanctioned by Vatican II
were taking their normal form - liturgical programs* efforts among
some of the younger clergy to organize in some form of priests'
association (Archbishop Floersch inaugurated a Senate of Priests
shortly before he retired and was succeeded by Archbishop Thomas
J. McDonagh in 1967 who supported the new institution)* ecumenical
outreach* civic involvement by church people, especially in the
civil rights' movement, open housing, fair employment practices,
etc.
Louisville clergy are almost all natives of the diocese
(unlike other parts of the country, especially the deep South and
far West, where many, if not the majority, of the clergy are from
other parts of the country or from Ireland.) Many of them studied
in Rome,Louvain, Innsbruck, or in wall respected American Catholic
theological colleges - St. Meinrad's (the Benedictine foundation
in Indiana), St. Mary's, Baltimore. In background and education they
are well placed to understand their local situation and post-Vatican
II Catholicism. The generation gap experienced in recent years among
the catholic clergy in the wake of Vatican II was reflected inthe
conflicts within the Louisville clergy, between those in favour of
change, both in the structures and practices of the Church and in
the work and life-style of the priests themselves (for the most part
those under fifty), and those older priests who had been satisfied
with the traditional structures and patterns of church life and could
not understand the changes in the Church .
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■The newly formed Senate of Priests became the focus of this
conflict. Since it was the younger group of priests who had been
enthusiastic for the foundation of a senate, and since it
responded to their desire for change and new forms of clerical
authority and relationships, they controlled the operation of the
organisation from the beginning. This group of priests, who have
been responsible throughout the American Church for irrudi of the
inspiration and vigour with which the aggiornamento was undertaken,
were not all newly ordained men (although a lot of the Vatican II
era ordinandi were included in their ranks), but relied an a strong
corps of men in their middle and late 30s to form the backbone of
their organizations. Since traditional clerical leadership had gone
with age, promotion most often dependent on seniority, their
emergence in the conciliar era was automatically a challenge to
the prerogatives of seniority. Two possibilities opened up for the
newly formed Senates of Priests - either the older clergy could be
perusaded of their usefulness to give them their support and be
prepared to give up some of their own traditional independence as
pastors in charge of a parish, or the senate would increasingly act as
a counterforce to temper the autocracy of the individual pastor.
This was just one expression of the introduction of new conceptions of
ecclesiastical leadership and authority which Vatican II had intro¬
duced under the rubric "collegiality."
The Senate of Priests also became the locus of all the issues
of substance facing the Church, because it was the most obvious forum
where the clergy could address these issues, just as the PSCC-NCCB
meetings provided the bishops with a coirmon forum. In this embryonic
fashion the Catholic Church has been re-discovering the qualities
and importance of the forms of collegial government, with variations
according to the circumstances of individual countries and dioceses.
The Louisville Senate of Priests becams the locus of that
issue which has dominated the immediate past experience of Americans
American involvement in Vietnam - because the Vatican II Church
and its institutions, after GS, could not avoid such a challenge.
The issue of the war in Vietnam came before the Louisville
Senate of Priests in the fall of 1971 (thus, immediately prior to
the bishops * 1971 debate and Resolution), in the form of a resolu¬
tion which found "the continued presence of U.S. military forces
in Southeast Asia incompatible with proper respect and reverence
for life, and that therefore such presence must be judged immoral.4
The minutes of the maeting record the discussion:
"In the discussion the Senators expressed many
opinions, among which were the following:
concern for the Church in South Vietnam if the
Communists are allowed to take over; the timeliness
of the statement; whether it was worth dividing
the priests of the archdiocese to get the statement;
the value of studying the issue and discussing
it with those of varying opinions, etc."
When it came to the vote the seven votes in favour of the resolution
and the eight opposed divided according to age ~ the younger men
for the resolution, the older men against it - and the motion was
defeated.
This resolution has been circulated among the priests of
the archdiocese for discussion preparatory to the senate maeting
of October 4th. The composition of the 3enata was based on a
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system of proportional representation. The total number of diocesan
priests (227) had been divided into seven groups according to year
of ordination, with two representatives from each of these "peer
groups" (numbering approximately thirty-five members) representing
their group on the Senate. The religious -order priests (129) were
represented by three of their number. The diocesan clergy held the
preponderant position, with the religious under-represented.
"Peer group" meetings were supposed to be held in conjunction with
the monthly senate meeting, to provide input and feedback for the
latter. In the case of the October senate meeting, no meetings of the
first three peer groups (those ordained before 1945) were reported.
The other four groups were reported as holding a discussion on the
resolution and taking a vote of those present at the peer-group
meeting.
The voting was as follows - Group 4 (those ordained 1945-1954)?
6 against, 16 for the resolution? Group 5 (1955-1959)? 14 against,
10 for? Group 6 (1960-1964)t 1 against, 8 for? Group 7 (1965-1971)?
3 against, 32 for. The voting of group 4 is rather unexpected until
it is noted, as it was at the senate meeting and recorded in the
minutes, that groups 4 and 7 held a joint meeting to discuss the
resolution. The voting of group 4, in contrast to that of group 5,
reflects the result of the consclentlgaclon of this joint meeting
(the older brathern responding to the anti-war views of the younger.)
At the October senate meeting the Vietnam resolution was not
debated as a priority issue, but towards the end of a two-hour
meeting, after the more parochial concerns of diocesan and clerical
business. As the minutes show, there was the conventional form of
opposition to such a resolution, but the voting was close. The
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The only other note on the subject in the minutes shows the strong
feelings of those in favours
"■Hie Senators were instructed to report to the
secretary the names of those in their peer group
who wished to publish the statement independent
of the Senate."
This was subsequently done in the local Catholic weekly and reported
in the Courier-Journal.
The wording of the Resolution shows an anticipation of the
bishops' November '71 Resolution and attendant controversy: the
judgment that the American military presence in Southeast Asia is
"immoralThis was precisely the cause cel^bre which provoked
the extra-parliamentary proceedings to tone down the moral judgment,
from "cannot be justified by traditional moral norms" to "the
speedy ending of this war is a moral imperative of the highest
priority." Finding the foreign policy of the united States "immoral"
struck a sensitive nerve of a section of the Catholic clergy of
the older generations. While the younger priests had few inhibitions
about criticizing the government, the older ones had been brought up
in a patriotic tradition in which "Americanist" attitudes determined
their response to foreign policy and "separatist" tendencies had
been for long limited to the preservation of Catholic schools and
some details of personal morality. Hie patriotic, anti-Communist
concensus reacted against c riticis m of American foreign policy.
Hie presumption of morality lay with the government, and any
information to the contrary (My Lai, civilian bombing) could not shake
it - "concern for the Church in South Vietnam if the Communists sure
allowed to take over"; "timeliness of the statement"» "dividing the
priests of the archdiocese"? "studying the issue and discussing it
with those of varying opinions." Much of this was subterfuge,
because most of those in the older age groups had not bothered
to arrange a discussion, and there was already a division among the
priests, as the "peer group" voting showed.
While the younger priests had tried to place the Vietnam issue
before all the priests of the archdiocese, the organization of the
Senate of Priests was too much taken up with parochial matters like
pastor-assistant relationships, personnel policy in the diocese, the
new commissions originating from the Vatican II reforms of liturgy,
religious education, and lay involvement in ecclesiastical affairs
through parish and diocesan councils. With all these internal
matters to be considered, the addition of the war issue involved
more controversy on top of all the delicate work of changing the
whole face of the ecclesiastical institution itself. Too many
things had to be dealt with all at once and the national debate on
the war was not considered to be a priority for the priests' senate
at that time.
Those priests who were opposed to the war made use of any
opportunities to persuade their confreres, but recognized the
obstacle of acquiescence in government foreign policy among the
majority of tie clergy. The priests who had been formed by contact
with Vatican II ware accustomed to controversy and the questioning
of the traditional. But the older generation of Louisville priests
had accepted the tradition of Catholic patriotism. This was
supported by the most recent expressions of such patriotism - the
Second World War and Cold War anti-Communism - and the new aspects
of America's involvement in Southeast Asia were lost on those
who had responded to these recent "uncomplicated" issues. Their
conservative patriotism corresponded to their conservative
ecclesiology. Some break in one or the other was required to
undermine the consensus, and this they opposed. The same
situation was evident in the parishes, because here also a critical
voice came only from a new type of parish.
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B. THE 'EXPERIMENTAL* PARISH
St. William's in the west-end of the city of Louisville
is one of those "e:xperimental" or "non-territorial" parishes which
emerged in metropolitan areas of the United States in response to
the changing conditions of Catholic life after Vatican II. The
desire among some of the clergy to try new forms of parish ministry
corresponded to the wishes of those laity who did not find what
was offered in their territorial parish, in the way of liturgy,
religious education, social action, adequate in the new awakening
prompted by Vatican II. The particular circumstances of the diocese,
the kind of bishop, the geographical location, the character of the
local clergy, gave a local quality to the type of experimental
parish which developed from this situation, and its longevity, but
the forms of ministry and community experienced at St. William's are
typical of this ecclesiastical initiative.^
The social situation of St. William's was an example of
a national situation. The west-end of Louisville had been a collection
of predominantly white ethnic neighborhoods, giving way to predominantly
blade settlement with the white flight to the suburbs and black
immigration from the deep South after the Second World War. The
Catholic parishes of the west-end had been traditional "national
parishes" - theGerman parish of St. Anthony (today one can still
see evidence of its origin in the German inscription over the main
door), the Irish Parish of St. Columba. Black Catholics were served by
St. Augustine and Immaculate Heart of Mary parishes (the former
founded in 1869 by John Lancaster Spalding). In other parishes
black Catholics were subjected to the same racial indignities they
suffered in society as a whole.*'
As the 60*s succeeded the 50*s the racial tension in American
society was reflected within the Church. Although the bishops sup¬
ported Civil Rights legislation, only a minority of Catholics
participated in the Civil Rights Movement, and the priests and nuns
who marched at Selma and joined in the other anti-segregation
activities were criticized by bishops who were opposed to such
Catholic support of the Movement. In Louisville a few priests
joined the marches in support of open housing and fair employment
practices.
The most visible effect of the social situation at that time
was the deteriorating financial condition of inner-city parishes
as the whites moved out leaving the burden of financing parishes
and schools on the generally less affluent whites and blacks
who remained. The national Catholic school financial crisis
accelerated with inflation and the drop-off in the numbers of
recruits to the teaching orders of nuns who had been the main
source of parochial-school teaching staff. This made the financial
survival of the traditional type of parish in the inner-city
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impossible, and gave scope to new ideas of regional and parish
apostolate.
St. William's had been a traditional territorial parish
e^eriencing the loss of parishioners and ever-increasing financial
problems, so that the closing of the parish was imminent. Such
a situation made the way open in May, 1966, for the iniative of a
Fr. Ben O'Connor who wanted to establish a parish which would be
directed at providing new forms of liturgy for any interested
people in the city, and at building up a parish from that base and
and in accord arsce with the desires of the people who becaite involved.
O'Connor was appointed pastor and was joined by a like-minded
colleague -Vincent Orenough. Both of them had been involved in the
formation of the Louisville Senate of Priests.
St. William's in its new form started off with about sixty
members; by August, 1969, there were two hundred* by August 1972
around four hundred. Included in the new parish were those local
Catholics who continued to coma to St. William's. In the
beginning, the St. William*s comnunity was concerned with personal
spiritual development based on liturgy. By the fall of 1969 the
growth of nuzibers led to the formation of a more structured comm¬
unity, including a Social Action committee interested in serving
the needs of the local people of this socially deprived area
in which the church was placed. The inherent dangers of paternalism
in such a situation, Wiere the majority of the members are middle-
class whites iho live outside the area, hava been overcome by
involving the local people themselves in this work. One of the most
impressive features of St. William's is the spirit of uninhibited
friendliness and lack of pretension about the place.
The structural form of St. William's includes a 'Town Meeting'
as the main decision-taking assembly, open to all Who are members of the
parish (itself called 'St. William Center*), and held every three months,
or in addition a special meeting for a major decision. The 'Executive
Board' prepares the agenda for the Town Meeting and is composed
of one member from each committee, four members 'at large*, the
paiests of the p>arish. The Committees (Social Action, Education,
Liturgy, Hospitality, Finance, Housing, Peace) meet once or twice a
month. Social Action has become the most important activity of
St. William's in recent years, expressed in the operation of its
1 Neighborhood Center', which fills the gaps in the provision of
social services to the area* across the whole range of needs
(food cooperative for the poor, locking after the financial
affairs of people referred to it by government agencies , purchasing
food stamps for those unable to get to the government offices,
providing help to the elderly - "primarily a friend", in the words of
the full-time social worker).
The relationalip between St. William's and the ecclesiastical
authorities is one of toleration. The Church authorities objected to
the St. William's custom of taking Communion in the hand and having
altar-girls as well as altar-boys. The question arose of inviting
the Archbishop to the parish and what to do about the offending
practices. At a 'Town Meeting* it was decided not to change the
practices and to avoid embarrassment all round, not to invite the
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Archbishop. The attitude of "benign neglect" is a mutual compromise.
St. William's goes itw way, doing nothing to offend ecclesiastical
susceptibilities unnecessarily, having no parish debt and being self-
supporting, fulfilling its quota of the 'Archdlocesan Development
Fund* annual drive, taking its full part in the work of the local
'West End Catholic Council." When the original priests (O'Connor
and Grenough) left, and the priest appointed by the Archbishop was
not in favour of vhat he found at St. William's, he was transferred to
another parish after a short period of turmoil, by mutual agreement
of all parties, and his successor, Rcfoert Mills, has been a more
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appropriat~ di oioa.
Trie St, William's coiariunity is different from the ordinary
parish. The people who belong to it are generally more committed
Christians ("militants"they would be called in Prance) is'ho in
other parishes would form the leadership. They have been attracted
to St. William's because it has offered them more in the way of
personal and social involvement as Christians. It is not surprising,
therefore, that only in St. William's was the issue of Vietnam a matter
of concern in a way involving the parish as a community of Christians.
1he uaiique phenomenon of the St. William's 'Peace Council' came
about in response to a challenge proposed to the St. William's
community by Pr. O'Connor in a New Yeetfc sermon, January 19 71, on the
occasion of the Pope's annual 'world Day of Peace'. This marked
another stage in the evolution of the eonssrunity - from liturgy,
through social action, to the larger concerns of world peace. The
Peace Council was organized in April, 1971 and began holding bi¬
weekly meetings, averaging twenty-five people in attendance for the
initial period, with about fifty active and associate members. From
this group came the Peace Statement, vhich was presented to the
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Town Meeting and to the whole community. The community was
asked to accept or reject this statement, and on May 27, 1971, of the
343 members voting, 92 percent voted to accept it as an esqeression
of the community's views.
The statement embodies the spirit of non-violence expressed
by Martin Luther King aid best known in recent American history in
association with his Civil Rights campaign. It recognizes the Viet¬
nam war as an expression of the violence permeating the society and
exported under the delusion that American might is the guarantee of
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of right. Its position on the war - complete American withdrawal
within six to nine months, with the discontinuing of military
aid to the present Saigon government - is placed in a broad context
of concern for an integral personal and social peace. As such, the
statement is more theological than those we have considered from the
American bishops. When the St. William's Peace Council proceeded to
mail it in JUne, 1971, to all the priests of the city of Louisville
and the chairnen of pariah councils, with a return-postcard for
those interested in cooperating with St. William's in working for
peace, five parishes out of sixty respoused.
The 'Peace Cow cil* also arranged an informal discussion with
Archbishop McDonagh in June, 1971, daout their statement, and
came away with the impression that the archbishop was not willing
to speak out against the war. (only at the end of 19 72 did
Archbishop McDonach express criticism of American policy, vd. th the re-
nawed boribing tfoat Christmas provoking him to join the 'justice and
peace* subcommittee of the priests* senate in protesting the action.)
The 'Peace Council' established contact with the Louisville branch
of CALCAV, formed at the same time. "*"0 Later they promoted other
anti-war activities - writing to their Congressmen, joining the
'war tax refusal campaign', supporting protests of anti-personal
arms production, encouraging debate on the morality of the war. There
was no equivalent activity in any other Louisville parishes. Come
Catholics from other parishes attended their debates and the meetings
they sponsored to explain anti'war activities, but no other parish
joined them or sponsored similar programmes. Although the resolution
for the Louisville priests* senate was being debated among the priests
at the same time, there was no contact between them and St. William's.
CONCLUSIONS
This singular example of critical response to the American
policies in Southeast Asia stressed the difference between such a
uniqus parish with its spirit of initiative and independence, and
the normal parochial situation*
"The majority of Catholics feel the Church should
stay out of socio-political matters and concentrate
on more traditional spiritual matters."
The American Catholic Church was ill prepared to face the
complexities of the Vietnam debate. The success of the Americanists
had led to an acceptance of the compatibility of Catholicism with
the American way of life, which in the post World War II era had
involved a complacent attitude to the foreign policy of the
government. This was presumed to be ^benevolent defence of the
"Free Wtorld" against Communism# and this blanket conception lulled the
inattentive to accept this justification for any and all American
actions in the rest of the world.
This conformism was no re pronounced among the older generation
of priests than the younger, as we have seen in the case of Louisville,
and this wis due at least in part to the greater interest among the
latter in the foreign-policy implications of the gospel which the
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theology of Vatican II encouraged. Among the Christian denomin¬
ations the Quakers and the Methodists in the United States had
traditionally been most opposed to U.S. military involvements,
supported disarmament and the strengthening of the United Nations,
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opposed the enthronement of national self-interest. The con¬
servative-fundamentalist denominations of the "preraillenarian" type
were least concerned about applying their moral critique to their
nation's foreign policy. Catholics came somewhere in between these
two groins, along with Episcopalians and mainline Protestant
Churches, But in all danoruinations the clergy overall tended to
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hold more liberal attitudes to foreign policy than their parishioners.
In the Catholic Church, the coincidence of Vatican II and the Vietnam
War further strengthened tie liberal attitudes to foreign policy
among the younger clergy and led many of them to support the anti-war
movamant. As the war dragged on, more of the olcter clergy joined
their ranks. Ihus, the NFPC, which had a considerable number of
middle-aged meriters, developed an outspokenly critical attitude to
the warf as we saw in Section III, and many of the best known priests
in the com try did lifcewisa.
However, the institutional energies of theChurch continued to
be employed in the more established structures - schools and parishes -
and these were not capable of supporting efforts to change the
direction of foreign policy * These institutions were socially
conformist, since their raison d'etre had been the establishment
of the Catholic Church in the society. Any accommodation of divisions
among the members would have detracted from that effort. Hence the
organizational pressure was in favour of a united Catholic presence,
in support of the government. When the monolithic Church was inder¬
ailed by VaticanI I's aggiomamento, and the credibility of American foreign
policy by the Vietnam War, the traditional institutions, by their
own inertia, complicated the general malaise.
The new institutions - priests* senates, esfcerirental parishes -
in which the ecclesiastical and national controversies could be
tackled provided an image of more flexible forms of Church life
better adapted to the changed conditions. But their specialized
character and their limited membership left ananswered he qua stions
of how the existing institutions could be updated and transformed
into agencies of aggiornaraanto incorporating all the people who
professed membership of the Church. Tha problem of "institution"
and "prophecy" describes the Catholic drive to bring people to the
experience of community, without exclusion and without any form of
gnosticism or elitism, tfiile not obscuring the radical demands
of social criticism which uoset those in control. of the statve quo.
This dilemma was present from the beginning of theChurch £>ut tie
new situation in the Church since Vatican II has revealed it
clearly once mom, since the Council tried to describe the total
diners ions of the Catholic experience.
Another feature of thedilemma is the changing conception
of ecclesiastical authority, if this has to be conceived
according to a more " collegial" framework, as it must if the Church
is to be true to its own nature, cnce more reiterated at \hticanll -
the common irenbership of the people of God giving everyone an equal
Christian dignity, authority in the Church a ministry.'ng
of service, not a form of domination - the drawbacks of democracy begin
to operate. In Section H vre saw these reflected in the experience
of the Protestant Church in the United States, described by Martin
Marty, in *h ich congregational control brought pressure against
the non-conformist minister. It was to John A. Ryan's advantage
that he was free from such pressure, and the more liberal attitudes
to social action among the Catholic clergy than among the laity would
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be hostage to congregational pressure in a conformist society.
However, this would be an expression of the true nature of ihe situation -
if the Church is indeed 'in* the world, the mission of prophetic
social criticism only becomes effective if theChurch has emerged
from the ecclesiastical cocoon to beeone engaged in the work of
25%
transforming society, its structures and institutions, and not
just as abstract theory. This is the implication of that
•orthopraxia* to which the theology of liberation points, and in
his own way iTohn A# Ryan had understood the same consequence. The
problems of society are ipso facto the agenda of the Churaht
"Action on behalf of justice and participation in the
transformation of the world fully appears to us as
a constitutive dimension of the Church's
mission for tie redemption of the human race and
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its liberation from every oppressive situation."
But the Church*s mission is hostage to the identification of
Church ami Kingdom. Only a servant Church, a learning Church, a
pilgrim Church, in dialogue with all fellow pilgrims cam engage in
the work of social criticism and social transformation, toward
that better order of justice and peace to which the Church looks
forward in its religious experience. An established Church is
subject to the demands of social acceptance and the pressure to
pronounce a blessing on the prevailing order. The agglornaroento
of Vatican II has brought this dilemma to the conscioysnesr
off the Church in the present age, and directed the Church back
to its origins - outside the establishment.
